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Abstract 
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I Introduction
What are the price effects of trade? Canonical trade models predict that trade benefits consumers through
lower prices but may hurt some workers through reduced earnings (e.g., Stolper and Samuelson (1941)).
While recent reduced-form evidence indicate that increased trade with China had a large adverse impact
on U.S. labor markets (e.g., Autor et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2014), Pierce and Schott (2016a), Bloom et
al. (2019)), much less is known about the potential benefits to U.S. consumers through lower prices. The
magnitude of the price response is an empirical question, because various mechanisms could be at play.
As trade with China increases, to what extent do retailers adjust prices facing U.S. consumers? Are price
changes driven by products imported from China, or is there a broader impact on prices of domestically-
produced goods? To the extent that prices fall, which consumers benefit most? Data limitations explain
the relative scarcity of evidence on these questions, which can only be answered with comprehensive price
data.
In this paper, we use micro data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to obtain
comprehensive coverage of price dynamics over a long panel, going back to the 1980s with both consumer
prices and producer prices. We organize our analysis into three parts. First, we estimate the causal effect
of increased trade with China on prices across detailed product categories in the 1990s and 2000s, using
the instrumental variable approaches developed by Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Autor et al. (2014). We
find large effects: on average, an increase in the import penetration rate from China of 1 percentage point
leads to a fall in U.S. consumer prices of approximately 2%. Second, we investigate potential mechanisms
and examine which trade models can account for the observed patterns. The estimated price response
is about one order of magnitude larger than predicted by the large class of quantitative trade models
characterized by Arkolakis et al. (2012). We find that the price response is driven by price changes for
domestically-produced goods and is primarily explained by declining markups, rather than by falling
domestic production costs. These findings highlight the importance of including endogenous markups
and pro-competitive effects into quantitative trade models used for policy analysis. Third, we use the
estimates to characterize the distributional effects of rising trade with China. We find that falling prices
in product categories that are more exposed to trade with China increase consumer surplus by several
hundreds of thousands of dollars for each displaced job, and that the price response is larger in product
categories that cater to lower-income households.1
Estimating the causal effect of trade with China on U.S. consumer prices is challenging because of
1Our main analysis focuses on consumer prices, but producer prices are also used to investigate mechanisms. The internal
Consumer Price Index Research Database of the BLS offers full coverage of the market basket of the representative consumer,
with the exception of shelter, and keeps track of products’ prices inclusive of retail margins, which are the relevant prices for
consumers. The product-level micro data allows us to work at a fine level of disaggregation, to isolate the role of domestic
products, and to built alternative price indexes (e.g., using “continued products” only so that the price index is immune to
potential changes in composition). The sample frame has a fixed number of products and makes it impossible to measure
the potential increase in product variety that is likely to be induced by trade. Because consumers value increasing product
variety, our estimates are likely to be a lower bound for the impact of trade with China on U.S. consumer prices.
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potential omitted variable biases and reverse causality. For example, China has a comparative advantage
in specific product categories that may be on different inflation trends, such as consumer electronics or
apparel. To overcome this challenge we use two complementary research designs borrowed from recent
work by Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Autor et al. (2014), who study the consequences of trade with
China on employment across U.S. industries.2 Pierce and Schott (2016a) leverage a change in U.S.
trade policy passed by Congress in October 2000, which eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese
imports. This research design uses transparent policy variation and lends itself to sharp tests for pre-
trends, but the effects of changes in policy uncertainty may differ from those of more common permanent
changes in tariffs (e.g., Handley and Lima˜o (2017)). To gauge the stability and generalizability of our
main estimates, we also use the empirical strategy of Autor et al. (2014), who instrument for changes in
import penetration from China across U.S. industries with contemporaneous changes observed in eight
comparable economies.3
To assess the plausibility of a causal interpretation of our estimates, we implement several falsification
and robustness tests. The results all support the validity of the exclusion restrictions. First, for each
of the two instruments, we implement pre-trend tests and consider alternative specification choices, with
different sets of fixed effects, time-varying controls and sample restrictions. There are no pre-trends and
the estimated price effect is stable across specifications. Second, we study the sensitivity of our baseline
estimate to aggregation choices by aggregating our data to the level of broader industries (as defined by
the BEA’s input-output table), and we use alternative measures of changes in import penetration from
China (including or excluding retail margins, and accounting for changes in trade with trading partners
of the U.S. other than China). We find that the estimated price response remains stable. Third, with the
instrument from Pierce and Schott (2016a), we implement a stringent triple-difference test using price
data from France. We find that there is no similar reaction of prices in France, where there was no policy
change. Finally, using both instruments jointly, we run the test of over-identifying restrictions of Hansen
(1982) and cannot reject that the restrictions are valid.
Our IV estimates indicate that the price effects of increasing trade with China are large. With the
instrument from Pierce and Schott (2016a), a one percentage point increase in the import penetration
rate from China causes a fall in inflation of 2.23 percentage points (s.e. 0.47). Put another way, the
consumer price index falls by 2.23%. With the instrument from Autor et al. (2014), the corresponding
fall in consumer prices is 1.44% (s.e. 0.45). With both instruments jointly, the IV coefficient is -1.91
(s.e. 0.38). The J test of over-identifying restrictions indicates that the two instruments are statistically
2We estimate the price effects of trade across product categories that are differentially exposed to rising trade with China
in the 1990s and 2000s, which characterizes the average impact on U.S. consumers at the national level. With suitable data
on local prices (in particular, housing prices), it would be instructive to estimate the price effects across local labor markets
in future work (e.g., for comparison with Autor et al. (2013)’s estimates of the local employment effects of trade).
3The eight comparable developed economies are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and
Switzerland. This research design addresses threats to identification that stem from U.S.-specific supply or demand patterns,
i.e. changes in U.S. supply or U.S. demand across industries that are not correlated with supply or demand changes in the
group of eight comparable economies.
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indistinguishable.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate a series of potential mechanisms that could account
for the estimated price effect of trade with China across product categories. We start by showing how
to interpret our IV coefficient within the structure of standard quantitative trade models. Conceptually,
the estimated price effect is a useful identified moment that can serve as a diagnostic tool to distinguish
between classes of trade models (e.g., a` la Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)). In the wide set of trade
models characterized by Arkolakis et al. (2012), the price response is predicted to be equal to the inverse
of the trade elasticity. We find that the estimated price effect is about one order of magnitude larger than
predicted by these standard models. To account for the observed effect, this class of trade models requires
an implausibly small trade elasticity, around -0.3, while common estimates are around -4 (cf. Simonovska
and Waugh (2014)).
To uncover the mechanisms that might explain the effect, we start by documenting which products
drive the price response. Using statistical decompositions, we isolate the roles of continued products
(as opposed to new products) and domestically-produced goods (as opposed to foreign products). We
find that continued products account for approximately 70% of the overall price effects. To isolate the
role of U.S.-produced goods, we identify U.S. goods in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) sample using
specification checklists.4 We find that domestic prices account for a substantial fraction of the overall
price effects, between 44% and 85% depending on the specification. We confirm the role of the domestic
price response using the Producer Price Index (PPI) sample, which covers domestic manufacturers only.
The domestic price response could result from two potential effects of increased trade with China
on U.S. manufacturers: changes in production costs, or changes in markups. We first assess the role
of changes in domestic production costs, which we decompose into several potential sources: wages,
intermediate inputs and offshoring, and returns to scale and productivity.
Although changes in domestic production costs are theoretically plausible, in practice we find that
they can account for only a small fraction of the estimated price response. Wages fall in response to
trade with China, but both public data and administrative data used in prior studies (e.g., Autor et al.
(2014)) indicate that the wage effects are much smaller than would be needed to explain the domestic
price response.5 To assess the role of intermediate inputs, we use the BEA’s input-output table and
measure upstream and downstream changes in trade with China for each product category. We find that
upstream and downstream trade does not help explain the estimated price effects. Finally, by displacing
domestic goods and reducing the scale of domestic production, increased import competition with China
could affect domestic production costs through (decreasing) returns to scale. In fact, empirical studies
4For each product in the CPI, specification checklist files record characteristics like country of origin. We identify the
subsample of U.S. products and repeat our IV specification.
5Because the labor share in total domestic output for the relevant product categories is very low, explaining the estimated
2% fall in domestic prices (due to a 1pp increase in import penetration from China) requires a very large wage response, on
the order of 20%, which we can reject empirically.
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find that tradable U.S. industries have increasing returns to scale; explaining the estimated price response
would require an elasticity of the opposite sign and about five times larger in magnitude than benchmark
estimates of returns to scale.
Having established that changes in domestic production costs are unlikely to drive the price effects,
we turn to the potential relevance of markups. We examine theoretically whether endogenous markups
arising from strategic interaction can match the estimated price response. To do so without committing
to a specific model of demand, market structure, price setting or production, we use the theoretical
framework of Amiti et al. (2018b), which only requires mild assumptions about demand.
We find that the large price effects can be explained by models that feature strategic interactions
in pricing. Intuitively, as Chinese producers become more productive they reduce their prices, which
leads U.S. producers to reduce their markups through strategic interactions. Because of the fall in U.S.
prices, U.S. consumers do not substitute as much toward the products from China, i.e. the equilibrium
change in import penetration rate from China is lower than it would be without the price response for
U.S.-produced goods. As a result, we can obtain a large reduced-form relationship between changes in
import penetration and price changes across product categories (which is our IV coefficient). Setting
markup elasticities to match the estimates of Amiti et al. (2018b), we find that the price response across
industries predicted by this class of models is close to our IV estimate.
Next, we conduct empirical tests of the markup channel. We start by examining the response of
estimated markups for publicly-listed firms in Compustat, following the methodology of De Loecker et
al. (2017) to estimate markups. We observe a fall in estimated markups: when the import penetration
rate from China increases by one percentage point, domestic markups fall by 1.75 percentage points (s.e.
0.848). This estimate is large in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from the IV coefficient
for the response of domestic prices. Moreover, the observed changes in the distribution of markups are
consistent with the predictions of the model: as trade increases, markups fall primarily at the top of
the markup distribution (e.g., there is no effect at the 10th percentile but a large effect at the 90th
percentile). Finally, given the limited coverage of the Compustat sample, we return to our main sample
and assess whether heterogeneity in the estimated price effects across product categories is also consistent
with the predictions of the markup channel. We document that the price effects are significantly larger
in industries where domestic market concentration is higher and where China’s initial market share is
lower. These patterns are in line with the model: there is more domestic market power to be disrupted
by China when the domestic market is more concentrated; conversely, there is less room for China to
disrupt market power in a product category where it already has a high market share. These findings
hold in both the CPI and PPI samples. Overall, the data point to markup responses as an important
explanatory mechanism.
In the final part of the paper, we discuss how our estimates shed light on the distributional effects of the
“China shock.” We first benchmark our estimates of the price response, which benefits consumers, to the
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employment effects estimated in prior work. Using the IV estimates for the price and employment effects,
our baseline specification indicates that falling prices in product categories that are more exposed to trade
with China create $411,464 in consumer surplus for each displaced job. The estimates vary from $288,147
to $477,555 across specifications.6 These large magnitudes suggest that it may be possible to compensate
those who suffer from the labor market impacts of trade shocks. In contrast, using the predicted price
effects from the class of standard trade models nested by Arkolakis et al. (2012), the predicted increase
in consumer surplus per displaced job would be attenuated by a factor of ten and would be on the order
of $40,000 per displaced job, similar to average annual labor earnings in the sample.7
Lastly, we investigate distributional effects across consumers and find that the price response is larger
in product categories that cater to lower-income households. For example, for product categories with a
share of sales to college graduates below median, the magnitude of the price response is about five times
larger than for the categories with a share above median. The patterns are similar with other proxies for
consumer income. These results indicate that distributional effects can arise because of differences in the
price responses to trade shocks. This channel appears to be quantitatively important and is novel relative
to other mechanisms investigated in prior work (e.g., Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016), Borusyak
and Jaravel (2018) and Carroll and Hur (2019) examine differences in spending shares on imports, and
Hottman and Monarch (2018) document differences in import price inflation across income groups).
This paper relates and contributes to several literatures. First, a growing literature examines the
reduced-form impact of changes in trade on prices, but no paper uses comprehensive data on consumer
prices as we do. Amiti et al. (2019), Cavallo et al. (2019), Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Flaaen et al.
(2019) estimate the effects of the 2018 “trade war” on import and producer prices over a one-year horizon.
Our work predates these studies and complements them by estimating the response of consumer prices to
the historical “China shock” over a long horizon, close to a decade. The price effects of the China shock
are also studied by Bai and Stumpner (2018) for consumer packaged goods, and by Amiti et al. (2018a)
for producer prices in manufacturing. Our findings advance the literature by leveraging a comprehensive
data set, which is representative of the market basket of U.S. consumers and allows for an in-depth
investigation of the identifying assumptions (e.g., with pre-trend tests) and mechanisms (e.g., isolating
the response of domestically-produced goods and markups).8
6These calculations reflect partial-equilibrium differences across industries with different levels of exposure to rising import
penetration from China. General equilibrium effects induced by the China shock could affect all industries simultaneously.
If displaced manufacturing jobs lead to more job creation in other industries, then the increase in consumer surplus per
“destroyed” job at the aggregate level (rather than per displaced jobs across industries) would be larger. In a related analysis
assuming no GE effects affecting prices in all product categories, we find that in 2007 the (annual) purchasing power of the
representative U.S. household increased by about $1,500 thanks to lower prices induced by increased trade with China from
2000 to 2007.
7Our large estimates of consumer surplus per displaced job are explained by our large estimated price effects, but also
by the fact that the product categories exposed to rising trade with China are not very labor intensive. Since they account
for relatively few jobs but for substantial consumption expenditures, a large amount of consumer surplus can be created per
displaced job.
8For our purposes, scanner data such as those used by Bai and Stumpner (2018) suffer from certain drawbacks: (a) the
sample covers consumer packaged goods (about 10% of total expenditures) and is not representative of several important
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Second, our estimates of the benefits of trade with China for consumers through lower prices com-
plement a large literature that has documented adverse effects for employment (e.g., Autor et al. (2013),
Autor et al. (2014), Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Bloom et al. (2019)), mortality (Pierce and Schott
(2016b)), marriage, fertility and children’s living circumstances (Autor et al. (2018)), domestic innovation
and investment (Pierce and Schott (2018) and Autor et al. (2019)), and political polarization (Autor et al.
(2016)). Third, by showing importance of the “pro-competitive effects of trade” to explain the observed
price response, our paper is part of a large literature that has estimated the empirical relationship be-
tween international trade and markups (e.g., Levinsohn (1993), Krishna and Mitra (1998), Nakamura and
Zerom (2010), Feenstra and Weinstein (2017), Arkolakis et al. (2018), Auer et al. (2018) and Amiti et al.
(2018b)) and that has examined the extent to which opening up to trade may reduce markup distortions
(e.g., Brander and Krugman (1983), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Epifani and Gancia (2011), Edmond et
al. (2015), Feenstra (2018), and Impullitti and Licandro (2018)). Finally, our findings speak to a growing
literature on the distributional effects of trade via the expenditure channel (e.g., Porto (2006) and He
(2018), and the aforementioned studies).
The paper is organized as follows: Section II present the data and variable definitions, Section III
estimates the reduced-form effect of increased trade with China on U.S. consumer prices, Section IV
distinguishes between potential mechanisms, and Section V estimates the distributional effects. Additional
results are reported in the Online Appendix.
II Data
In this section, we describe the data sources, define the samples and key variables we use in the analysis,
and present summary statistics.
II.A Data Sources, Samples and Variable Definitions
Our main analysis relies on three data sources: inflation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; trade
data from Acemoglu et al. (2016); and instruments for trade with China from Pierce and Schott (2016a)
and Autor et al. (2014). For robustness analyzes and extensions we use additional data sets, which are
also introduced below.
Consumer Price Index. Our main outcome variable is inflation faced by U.S. consumers across product
categories. We measure this outcome using the micro data underlying the Consumer Price Index, available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ internal CPI Research Database (CPI-RDB). The CPI-RDB contains
all product-level prices on goods and services collected by the BLS for use in the CPI since January 1988,
excluding shelter.9 A product is defined as a specific item available in a specific store, such as a 500 ml
product categories for trade with China (e.g., apparel, consumer electronics and small appliances); (b) the sample starts in
2004, making it impossible to test for pre-trends prior to the “China shock.”
9The sampling frame for the non-shelter component of the CPI represents about 70% of consumer expenditures. Although
the number of individual prices used to construct the CPI has changed over time, the BLS currently collects data on
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bottle of Coca-Cola Sparkling on the shelf of a specific Whole Foods Market store in Washington D.C.
The BLS data collectors track prices monthly or bi-monthly, depending on the product category, and they
identify products using bar codes whenever possible.
Our goal is to estimate the price effects of trade shocks defined at the level of a product category,
therefore we aggregate the product-level price changes into category-level price changes. We do so following
the BLS’ procedure to compute official aggregate inflation statistics, which is described in Online Appendix
A.A.10 We obtain 222 product categories spanning the full range of final consumption goods and services,
with the exception of shelter. These categories, called Entry Level Item (ELI) categories, are the most
detailed categories in the BLS’ product classification. They are ideal for our purposes because they
offer a comprehensive coverage of consumption and are sufficiently detailed such that we expect product
substitution to occur primarily within, rather than across categories. For example, a bottle of Coca-Cola
belongs to the “Carbonated Drinks” ELI; other examples of ELIs include “Washers & Dryers,” “Woman’s
Outerwear,” or “Funeral Expenses.”11
We leverage the price micro data to build alternative category-level price indices, which we use for
various robustness tests and extensions. Alternative category-level price indices help us address potential
measurement issues. For example, the baseline CPI index uses quality adjustments when the BLS data
collector is unable to find the exact same product in the exact same store from one period to the next
(e.g., the 500 ml bottle of Coca-Cola might not longer be on the shelf at Whole Foods and might have
been replaced with a 500 ml bottle of Pepsi). Given that BLS quality adjustments may not perfectly
account for potential changes in underlying product characteristics in such cases, we build an alternative
price index based solely on price changes for “continued products” (i.e., those instances when the same
item in the same store is observed from one period to the next). We also leverage the micro data to build
alternative price indices that help decompose the sources of the price effects we document. For example,
we can isolate the role of the price response of products made in the United States.12
In addition to its flexibility for inflation measurement, the CPI price data set features other noteworthy
advantages. The CPI data set is available over a long panel and covers the representative consumer’s
market basket almost comprehensively. This allows us to implement stringent tests for “pre-trends” and
assess the plausibility of a causal interpretation of our IV estimates.13 Although the main data set extends
approximately 80,000 products per month from about 23,000 retail outlets across 87 geographical areas in the United States.
10The BLS weighting procedure for aggregation has two components: (a) the main weighting is performed by BLS through
probability sampling, i.e. through the selection of retail outlets and individual products within those outlets; (b) the CPI-RDB
provides additional weights for each product-level price that correct for sampling error.
11There are nearly 360 ELIs between 1988-1998 and 270 ELIs after a 1998 revision of definitions. We collapse the number
of ELIs to 222 in order to maintain a consistent definition before and after a 1998 revision to the ELI structure. See Online
Appendix A.A for a complete discussion.
12See Section IV for a complete discussion. Note that such robustness tests and statistical decompositions would not be
possible by using the publicly-available inflation series from the BLS. Another downside of the public data from the BLS,
relative to the CPI-RDB dataset, is that the publicly available product categories are coarser than ELIs and their definitions
change over time; as a result it is difficult to build a balanced panel of detailed product categories over a long time horizon
in this data set.
13In contrast, scanner data is restricted to consumer packaged goods and is only available after 2000, making it impossible
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back to 1988, to conduct a more complete analysis of pre-trends we build a similar data set going back to
1977, following Nakamura et al. (2018). Online Appendix A.B describes the construction of this extended
sample. Moreover, the CPI measures prices inclusive of retail margins, which is the relevant price for
consumers.14
Despite these advantages, our price data set also has some limitations. The sample frame keeps a fixed
number of items in each product category, which makes it impossible to study changes in product variety
over time. A well-established literature has shown both theoretically and empirically that increased trade
tends to increase product variety, which lowers consumers’ effective price index through love of variety
(e.g., Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Feenstra and Weinstein (2017), Bai and Stumpner
(2018), Amiti et al. (2018a)). In this sense, our estimates are likely to be a lower bound for the impact
of increased trade with China on U.S. consumer prices. Although we cannot measure changes in product
variety in the CPI sample, we can study product turnover, using as a proxy the frequency of “product
substitutions” (instances when the data collector cannot find the same item on the shelf from one period
to the next).
Trade Data. Our main independent variable is the import penetration rate from China over time and
across product categories. For product category i, the import penetration rate from China at time t is
defined as:
ChinaIPit =
ImportsChinait
DomesticProductionit + TotalImportsit − TotalExportsit
, (1)
where the denominator corresponds to domestic absorption. To make our results comparable with prior
work examining the impact of increased import competition with China on employment, we use the
measures of import penetration from China built by Acemoglu et al. (2016) at the level of Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries.15 Following their approach, we consider long differences, i.e.
the change in the China import penetration rate over two relatively long periods, 1991-2000 and 2000-
2007. We work with the annualized change in Chinese import penetration, in percentage points, for each
of these two periods.16
to appropriately assess the validity of the research design. For example, the Nielsen scanner data is available from 2004
onward and offers limited coverage of several product categories in which trade with China is particularly important, such as
consumer electronics, household appliances and apparel (for a discussion of expenditures coverage in Nielsen scanner data,
see for example Jaravel (2019)).
14Therefore we use CPI inflation as our preferred outcome, rather than import or producer price indices.
15In prior work, Autor et al. (2013) measured labor market exposure to import competition from China as the “change
in Chinese import exposure per worker”. We don’t adopt this measure because in standard trade models price effects are
related to the ratio of imports over absorption (as in equation (1)), not to exposure per worker.
16Acemoglu et al. (2016) follow the definition in equation (1) using imports and exports trade data reported under
Harmonized System product codes, which they match to domestic production data at the level of more aggregated SIC
industries in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database. Acemoglu et al. (2016) keep the denominator in (1) fixed to
its value in 1991, implying that changes in import penetration from China over time result from changes in the numerator.
This approach could potentially conflate increased Chinese import penetration with overall industry growth. In a robustness
check, we re-build the import penetration measure following equation (1) in each year, i.e. allowing the denominator to
change over time (see Section III). In an additional robustness check, to alleviate potential measurement concerns, we
check that our import penetration measure is closely aligned with the import penetration rates published by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis for the detailed industries of the 2007 input-output table (Online Appendix Figure A1).
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Although our baseline trade exposure measure facilitates the comparison with prior work, it could
suffer from potential limitations, which we relax in various extensions. In standard trade models, the
price effects of trade are related to changes in the overall import penetration rate (not just from China),
sometimes with a specific functional form (e.g., the log change in the domestic expenditure share in
Arkolakis et al. (2012)). We compute these alternative measures by matching trade data recorded under
Harmonized System (HS) codes (from China and from the rest of the world) to domestic production data
from the NBER-CES Manufacturing database, using the concordance of Pierce and Schott (2012).
Another potential concern with respect to our baseline import penetration measure is that distribution
margins (i.e., retail and transportation costs and profits) sometimes account for a significant fraction of a
product’s consumer price. In the import penetration measure of Acemoglu et al. (2016), the denominator
does not include these margins, therefore the change in Chinese import penetration is potentially over-
estimated from the perspective of consumers. In a robustness test, we adjust the denominator in equation
(1) for distribution margins. We estimate these margins using the BEA’s input-output (IO) table: for
each industry the ratio of total output in purchaser prices to total output in producer prices gives the
distribution and transportation margins.17
Instruments for Trade with China. To instrument for the patterns of trade with China, we rely on
two complementary identification strategies, from Autor et al. (2014) and Pierce and Schott (2016a).
Autor et al. (2014) instrument changes in China import penetration in the U.S. by changes in China
import penetration across industries in developed economies comparable to the U.S. Their instrument
follows equation (1), except that the numerator is measured in developed economies other than the U.S.18
Pierce and Schott (2016a) use a policy change reducing uncertainty over import tariffs applied to China,
when the U.S. Congress granted China “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” in 2000. Pierce and Schott
(2016a)’s instrument is the “Normal Trade Relations (NTR) gap,” defined as the jump in tariffs that
could have occurred without this policy change. The NTR gap is measured at the level of 6-digit NAICS
industries. Section III details the research designs that leverage these instruments.
Main Analysis Sample. Our main analysis sample brings together the CPI inflation data (by ELI
categories), the trade data (by SIC industries) and the instruments (by SIC industries for Autor et al.
(2014) and NAICS industries for Pierce and Schott (2016a)). The ELI categories are more aggregated than
SIC and NAICS industries, therefore we build many-to-one crosswalks from SIC and NAICS industries
to ELIs and aggregate all variables accordingly. The crosswalks are built by hand and are described in
Online Appendix A.C.
Input-Output Sample. To investigate robustness to aggregation choices and test specific mechanisms,
we also build a linked data set at the level of 6-digit IO industries. We use the BEA’s 2007 IO table
17For this analysis, we aggregate the data to the level of the 6-digit industries of the input-output table (see Section III).
18These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland, which rep-
resent all high-income countries for which Autor et al. (2014) and the previous study by Autor et al. (2013) could obtain
disaggregated bilateral trade data at the HS level back to 1991.
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because it is the most disaggregated during our sample, with 170 industries relevant for final consumption.
We build by hand a many-to-one match from ELI categories to these industries and then aggregate the
data.19 We refer to this linked data set as the input-output sample, which we use to investigate whether the
estimated price effects are stable across levels of aggregation as well as to investigate potential mechanisms.
For example, we examine whether the estimated price effects result from indirect exposure to trade with
China, via intermediate inputs. The variables we build based on input-output linkages are discussed in
Section IV and the data construction is described in Online Appendix A.D.
Producer Price Index Sample. To assess the role of domestic prices in the overall price effects, we
use data from the BLS’ Producer Price Index (PPI) dataset, which tracks producer prices for products
manufactured in the United States. As we did with the CPI, we aggregate the product-level price changes
into category-level price changes. The PPI database allows us to work with 6-digit NAICS codes, which are
more disaggregated than ELIs. Our baseline category-level PPI inflation rate follows the BLS’ procedure
to compute official aggregate PPI inflation statistics. We also build alternative measures, for instance
using only the subset of “continued products” for which no quality adjustment is required. We then link
the trade data and instruments to the PPI inflation outcomes; in the remainder of the paper, we refer
to the linked data set as the PPI sample.20 Online Appendix A.E describes the PPI data set and the
computation of price indices.
Additional Data Sets and Variables. Finally, we supplement our analysis sample with several ELI-
level variables to assess the robustness of our main estimates and study heterogeneity in the treatment
effect. We use a product hierarchy from the BLS that classifies ELIs in various groups (e.g., to assess
the role of apparel or high-tech goods), demand-side variables from the public-use Consumer Expenditure
Survey,21 and several supply-side variables from Broda and Weinstein (2006), the NBER-CES Manufac-
turing Database and the U.S. Census (e.g., trade elasticities, average wages, capital intensity, total factor
productivity, and market concentration). We also use data from the French CPI to implement placebo
tests and Compustat data to measure markups following De Loecker et al. (2017). These variables are
introduced when relevant in subsequent sections.
19Whenever we need to aggregate measured inflation from ELIs to a higher level of aggregation, we use weights based on
Consumer Expenditure Surveys for each year from 1988–1995, 1999–2004 and 2008-2012. For all other years, we set weights
equal to the most recently available year’s weights (e.g., assign 1995 weights to 1997). We follow Bils and Klenow (2004),
Bils et al. (2012) and Gagnon et al. (2013) in using weights based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey. These weights are
also used as regression weights.
20The level of aggregation is 6-digit NAICS industries: PPI inflation is available across 6-digit NAICS industries; Pierce
and Schott (2016a)’s instrument can be directly matched to those industries; and we use a crosswalk from SIC to Naics codes
to link the trade data and Autor et al. (2014)’s instrument. While the main analysis sample only covers final products, the
PPI sample also cover intermediate products.
21We use the Consumer Expenditure Survey dataset as processed by Borusyak and Jaravel (2018). This data set provides
information on the characteristics of consumers across about 600 very detailed product categories, called UCC. We implement
a many-to-one match of UCCs to ELIs, by hand.
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II.B Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our main analysis sample, from 1991 to 2007.
The first three rows describe the CPI inflation data. Across non-shelter ELI categories, inflation was
on average 1.15% per year, but with a large standard deviation of 6.75 percentage points across industry-
years. The share of continued products corresponds to the share of product-level price changes for which
the exact same item is priced by the data collector from one month to the next. Continued products
account for over 80% of all observations on average, which makes it possible to build a price index based
on these observations only. The third row reports the share of unavailable products, which corresponds
to instances when the data collector was unable to find the same item from one month to the next. We
use changes in the share of unavailable products over time as a proxy for changes in product turnover.22
Rows four and five of Table 1 describe the changes in import penetration rates from China. As
previously discussed, we consider changes in import penetration over two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-
2007. The average (annualized) change in import penetration from China in the United States is 66 basis
points in our sample. There is large variation across ELIs and periods, with a standard deviation of 1.62
percentages points, which we will leverage to estimate the price effects of trade. Online Appendix Figure
A2 documents the increase in Chinese import penetration over time in greater detail.23 The change in
import penetration from China in developed economies comparable to the United States features similar
properties.
The remainder of Table 1 reports summary statistics for several variables defined at the ELI level.
The NTR gap from Pierce and Schott (2016a) is on average 21% and exhibits large variation across
ELIs, which provides another source of variation to estimate the price effects of trade. The table also
reports various indicators for product categories, showing the fraction of goods, apparel products, high-
tech products, and a set of durable goods with particularly low inflation rates as defined in Bils (2009).24
We use these variables, along with others such as contract intensity from Pierce and Schott (2016a), to
assess whether the estimated price effects may be confounded by omitted variables biases. Finally, we use
a range of ELI-level variables characterizing consumers’ income levels: the expenditure elasticity and the
shares of sales to college graduates and to households across income brackets. We use them to estimate
22The BLS data collectors sometimes start pricing a different item even when the initial item is still available, a case known
as a “planned rotation”. Planned rotations, forced substitutions (when the initial item becomes unavailable) and continued
products account for all items in the CPI’s sample frame.
23In manufacturing as a whole, the import penetration rate from China increased by approximately 5 percentage points
cumulatively from 1991 to 2007, with a faster increase after 2000. However, the increase varied drastically across industries.
Certain industries experienced a continuous increase in import penetration throughout the sample (e.g., footwear), while for
others the increase occurred only after 2000 (e.g., computers), and while certain categories remained entirely unaffected by
China (e.g., breakfast cereals).
24See Online Appendix A.A for a discussion of the set of durables defined in Bils (2009). In our baseline analysis, we
keep the full sample of ELIs, including services, because (a) the instrument of Pierce and Schott (2016a) is non-zero for
some product categories within services that are traded, and (b) services can be exposed to trade indirectly via input-
output linkages. As described in section III.C, our specifications include controls so that differences between services and
manufacturing do not contribute to the identifying variation. The results are very similar when only ELIs within goods are
kept in the sample.
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heterogeneity in the treatment effect for consumers across the income distribution and assess the potential
distributional effects of trade.
Online Appendix Tables A1 and A2 report similar summary statistics for the input-output sample
and the PPI sample.
III Estimating the Impact of Trade with China on U.S. Consumer
Prices
In this section, we estimate the effect of trade with China U.S. consumer prices using two complementary
identification strategies. After presenting our research design, we report an analysis of pre-trends to assess
the plausibility of the exclusion restrictions. We then report the baseline IV estimates and document their
robustness to a variety of potential concerns.
III.A Research Design
Estimating the causal effect of trade with China on U.S. consumer prices poses several challenges. To
understand the main threats to identification, suppose we were to estimate a simple regression of the
change in U.S. consumer prices (inflation) on the change in import penetration from China across U.S.
product categories over time. A causal interpretation of the OLS estimate from this specification could
be misleading for two main reasons.
First, there could be reverse causality. For example, China may decide to enter product categories
where U.S. suppliers are easy to out-compete due to low TFP growth (implying higher U.S. inflation in
these product categories and an upward bias of the OLS estimate). Alternatively, China may decide to
enter product categories where U.S. demand is growing (implying higher U.S. inflation if the marginal
cost of U.S. producers is upward-sloping, hence another upward bias of the OLS estimate).
Second, there may be omitted variable biases given that China has a comparative advantage in specific
product categories, which may be on different inflation trends compared with other product categories.
For instance, trade with China is large for computers, consumer electronics and apparel. Because of
high rates of innovation for computers and consumer electronics and because of the fashion cycle for
apparel, these categories are characterized by low inflation (implying lower U.S. inflation in these product
categories and a downward bias for the OLS estimate).
Given these identification challenges, we use two complementary research designs borrowed from recent
work by Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Autor et al. (2014). They study the consequences of trade with
China on employment across U.S. industries by leveraging different sources of variation.
Variation in the NTR Gap. Pierce and Schott (2016a) focus on a specific change in U.S. trade policy
passed by Congress in October 2000, which eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports.25
This policy change is known as the granting of “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) to China.
25The change became effective when China joined the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001.
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Although it did not change the import tariff rates the U.S. actually applied to Chinese goods, it reduced
the uncertainty over these tariffs. Indeed, before China was granted PNTR, U.S. import tariffs on Chinese
goods needed to be renewed by Congress.
As explained by Pierce and Schott (2016a), without renewal U.S. import tariffs on Chinese goods
would have jumped back to high non-NTR tariffs rates assigned to non-market economies (which were
originally established under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930). The “NTR gap” is the difference
between the actual import tariffs on Chinese goods and non-NTR tariffs. The fall in uncertainty over
tariff increases can generate an increase in trade with China is theoretically plausible (e.g., Handley and
Lima˜o (2017)) and can be directly assessed in the data (with the “first-stage” specification described
below).
The advantage of this research design is that the policy variation is transparent and lends itself to
sharp tests for pre-trends. The main limitation is that using a change in uncertainty over import tariffs as
an instrument for trade flows may potentially yield estimates with low external validity, because changes
in policy uncertainty may have different effects from more common permanent changes in tariffs (e.g.,
Handley and Lima˜o (2017)).
Variation in Import Penetration from China in Other Countries. To assess the stability and general-
izability of our estimates, we also use the empirical strategy of Autor et al. (2014), who instrument for the
change in import penetration from China across U.S. industries with changes in import penetration from
China across industries in eight comparable developed economies. This research design addresses threats
to identification that stem from U.S.-specific supply or demand patterns, i.e. changes in U.S. supply or
U.S. demand across industries that are not correlated with supply and demand changes in the group of
eight comparable economies.
A potential limitation of this approach is that reverse causality or omitted variable bias could in
principle stem from supply and demand changes that are in fact common to both the U.S. and the other
developed economies. Testing for pre-trends can help alleviate this concern. Pre-trend tests for Autor et
al. (2014)’s strategy are not possible in our baseline sample because trade with China increases throughout
this period; instead, we implement pre-trend tests in our extended CPI sample, going back to 1977.
In sum, we leverage the strategies of both Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Autor et al. (2014) and
assess whether they paint a consistent picture of the effect of trade with China on U.S. consumer prices.
We treat the instrument from Pierce and Schott (2016a) as our benchmark, because it allows for more
stringent falsification tests, including year-specific pre-trend tests and a triple-difference test discussed
below (in practice, both instruments yield similar results).
The next subsections describe our statistical specifications and present the results. We first focus
on reduced-form specifications that test for pre-trends, reported in Subsection III.B. We then turn to
our baseline IV estimates (Subsection III.C) and we assess their robustness in multiple ways (Subsection
III.D).
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III.B Pre-Trends Analysis
To assess the plausibility of the exclusion restrictions, we implement pre-trend tests. We examine the
relationship between the instruments and inflation in periods when we would expect to find none if the
identification conditions hold.
With the NTR gap of Pierce and Schott (2016a), we want to assess whether the NTR gap becomes
related to CPI inflation only after the policy change is passed, i.e. after 2000. We use the CPI-RDB
database to measure inflation in the pre-period, going back as far as possible, until 1988. We then run a
flexible “event-study” specification across ELIs:
πit =
2007∑
k=1988
βkNTR Gapi · 1{k=t} + νXit + δt + εit, (2)
where t indexes year, i ELI categories, πit is the CPI inflation rate, 1{k=t} is an indicator variable for year
t, Xit denotes a set of controls, and δt is year fixed effects. In the baseline specification, Xit includes two
“fixed effects”, i.e. two separate indicator variables corresponding to the set of ELIs within apparel and
to the set of ELIs within durable goods categories (see Bils (2009) and the discussion in Section II.B).
The inclusion of these controls is motivated by the fact that these product categories are known to have
low inflation rates and are more exposed to trade.26
The path of the year-specific reduced-form coefficients, denoted {βk}
2007
t=1988 in equation (2), is informa-
tive about the plausibility of the identification condition. The exclusion restriction, E [NTR Gapi · εit|Xit, t]
p
→
0, cannot be tested directly, but if it is valid then there should be no relationship between the treatment
and inflation prior to the policy change, and we would expect to find βk = 0 for any year prior to 2000.
Panel A of Figure 1 reports the set of reduced-form coefficients from equation (2), along with their
95% confidence intervals (standard errors are clustered by ELIs). This figure shows a striking pattern.
From 1988 until 2000, the estimated reduced-form coefficients are small and hover around zero and a
F-test cannot reject the null of no effect. But after 2000, the coefficients become markedly negative and
statistically significant. This pattern supports the plausibility of a causal interpretation of the relationship
between the NTR gaps and inflation outcomes. However, it does not rule out the possibility that other
shocks, correlated with both the NTR gap and affecting CPI inflation, may have occured specifically after
2000. We return to this hypothesis with a placebo test using French CPI data in Subsection III.D.
With the instrument from Autor et al. (2014), testing for pre-trends is more challenging. The instru-
ment is the change in import penetration from China in other developed economies, which does not have
a sharp start date. Trade with China starts increasing in the late 1980s, therefore it is instructive to
examine whether there is a relationship between the increase in trade with China in our main analysis
sample and inflation in the 1980s. We conduct this analysis using the extended CPI sample described in
26Likewise, when studying a variety of outcomes other than inflation, Autor et al. (2019), Fort et al. (2018), Pierce and
Schott (2016a) and Autor et al. (2014) highlight the importance of controlling for broad sectoral trends.
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Online Appendix A.B.
Panel B of Figure 1 presents the placebo reduced-form specifications in the extended CPI sample
(1977-1986), across ELIs. We regress the average inflation rate over the sample on the instrument from
Autor et al. (2014) (subfigure (a)) and from Pierce and Schott (2016a) (subfigure (b)).27 With both
instruments, there is no relationship with inflation. These patterns strengthen the plausibility of the
identification conditions.
The Online Appendix reports additional results about the analysis of pre-trends. Online Appendix
Figure A4 repeats the estimation of equation (2), but without fixed effects for apparel or durable goods.
Without these fixed effects, the figures exhibits pre-trends: ELI categories with a higher NTR gap had
lower inflation even prior to 2000. This result indicates that including fixed effects for apparel and durable
goods is important to ensure that a causal interpretation of the estimates is plausible.28 Online Appendix
Figure A5 document similar patterns using publicly-available data from the NBER-CES database, mea-
suring inflation as the change in the NBER-CES price index for the value of shipments.
III.C Baseline Estimates
The previous reduced-form specifications support the plausibility of the research design by documenting
the absence of pre-trends, but they do not yield properly scaled estimates of the impact of trade with
China on U.S. consumer prices. We now turn to IV specifications to obtain estimates of the impact of
increased trade with China on U.S. consumer prices.
Instrumental Variables Framework. We implement a difference-in-differences IV design after aggre-
gating the data over two long periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Because the effect of a change in import
penetration from China on consumer prices may occur with some delay, an IV specification allowing only
for contemporaneous effects (i.e., within the same year) may be misspecified. Following prior work (e.g.,
Autor et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016)), we implement specifications with
contemporaneous effects within periods spanning several years.29 This approach is natural for both of the
instruments we use: the policy change making the NTR gap relevant occurs in 2000; and the increase in
the import penetration from China in the other developed economies becomes more pronounced in the
early 2000s, as China joins the WTO. The variables are averaged within periods, such that we can study
27The specifications are pii = ∆ChinaOtheri + νXi + εit and pii = NTR Gapi + νXi + εit, where ∆ChinaOtheri is the
annualized change in import penetration from China in other developed economies from 1991 to 2007, pii is average annual
inflation for ELI i from 1977 to 1986, and Xi is a vector of fixed effects for apparel and durables. Online Appendix Table
A3 reports the regression results. Online Appendix Figure A3 reports the year-specific reduced-form coefficients by running
the event-study specification (2) in the extended CPI sample (the results are similar).
28The validity of the research design would be doubtful if changing the set of controls in (2) had a large impact on pre-
trends. However, we find that once fixed effects for apparel and durable goods are included, the estimated coefficients are
stable and do not exhibit pre-trends, even when we add additional controls. We demonstrate the robustness of our estimates
to this type of concerns in the remainder of this section by considering alternative sets of controls, including demanding
specifications with ELI fixed effects.
29For a recent discussion of the identification challenges posed by dynamic causal effects in IV designs, see Jaeger et al.
(2018).
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the relationship between the average annual change in import penetration from China and the average
annual inflation rate across ELIs and periods.
We introduce ELI fixed effects in our baseline IV specification. These fixed effects help reduce noise
and can address any potential omitted variable biases that remain unchanged over time. The analysis of
pre-trends in Subsection III.B established that fixed effects for apparel and durable goods are sufficient to
eliminate pre-trends. ELI fixed effects subsume these fixed effects and are more demanding, as they allow
for each detailed product category to be on its own inflation trend over time. Intuitively, we examine
whether ELIs that were relatively more exposed to import competition from China in the 2000s (relative
to the 1990s) also have lower inflation rates in the 2000s (relative to the 1990s), using the instruments
from Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) to obtain variation in trade with China.
Our baseline specification uses the most detailed product categories and the most demanding set of fixed
effects, but we then show that the results are stable across alternative sets of fixed effects and when
aggregating the data further.
Formally, the structural equation and first stage in our IV specifications are as follows:
πit = β∆ChinaIPit + νXit + δi + δt + εit, (3)
∆ChinaIPit = γZit + ν˜Xit + δ˜i + δ˜t + ηit,
where i indexes ELIs, t the period (1991-1999 and 2000-2007), πit is the average annual CPI inflation
rate over the period, ∆Chinait is the average annual change in import penetration rate from China,
Xit is a set of time-varying controls, δi ELI fixed effects, and δt period fixed effects. Zit is a vector of
instruments, which varies across specifications. Under the identification condition E [Zit · εit|Xit, i, t]
p
→ 0
and relevance condition E [Zit ·∆ChinaIPit|Xit, i, t] 6= 0, the coefficient β gives the causal effect of a 1
percentage point increase in the import penetration rate from China in an ELI on the level of inflation
faced by U.S. consumers in that product category. All specifications use consumption weights.30
We start with just-identified IV specifications with a single instrument, using in turn the NTR gap
and the change in import penetration from China in the other developed economies. The two instruments
are only weakly correlated and offer independent sources of variation. Since the NTR gap is relevant only
after 2000 (after the policy change), we set Zit,1 = (NTR Gapi · PostPNTRt), with PostPNTRt = 1 for
the period 2000-2007. The change in import penetration from China in the other developed economies
offers variation in both periods: Zit,2 = ∆ChinaIP Otherit. After using the two instruments separately,
we use them jointly, which allows us to increase power and to run a Hansen overidentification test.
Results. Figure 2 reports binned scatter plots depicting the first-stage and reduced-form specifications
30In our baseline specification, the only time-varying control included in Xit is goods-by-period fixed effects. We include
the full set of ELIs in the sample because the NTR gap instrument is defined for some ELIs within services. The results are
identical when we restrict the sample to goods only. When services are included in the sample, goods-by-period fixed effects
must be included so that differences in price trends between goods and services over time do not contribute to the identifying
variation.
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using the NTR gap as the instrument. Panel A shows a strong first stage: the larger the NTR gap, the
larger the increase in import penetration from China. As shown in Panel B, the reduced-form relationship
is striking: the CPI inflation rate is significantly lower in ELIs with a higher NTR gap. These binned
scatter plots offer a non-parametric representation of the conditional expectation functions for the first
stage and the reduced form: in both panels, the linear approximation by OLS appears to be an excellent
fit of the underlying data, and outliers appear to play no role for the magnitudes of the estimated slopes.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the baseline IV estimates, using the NTR gap as the source of identifying
variation in equation (3). The OLS coefficients for the first-stage and reduced-form relationships depicted
in Figure 2 are reported in Columns (1) and (2). We find that a 10 percentage point increase in the NTR
gap leads to an increase in the import penetration rate from China of 33.3 basis points and to a fall in
the inflation rate of 74.3 basis points. These findings indicate that the policy change had a large impact
of trade with China and on consumer prices (as reported in Table 1, the mean and standard deviation of
the NTR gap are both around 21 basis points).
The IV estimate in Column (3) indicates that a one percentage point increase in the import penetration
rate from China leads to a fall in inflation of 2.23 percentage points (put another way, the consumer price
index falls by 2.23%). This coefficient is precisely estimated, with a 95% confidence interval ranging
from -3.15 to -1.30. The F-statistic indicates that the instrument is strong. In Column (4), we run the
same specification with OLS. The relationship between trade and prices remains large, but not as strong
as with the instrument: the coefficient is -0.90, which suggests that omitted variables biases or reverse
causality attenuate the estimated relationship between trade and consumer prices by over 50%. Finally,
since the policy change was implemented in 2000, it is instructive to restrict the sample to the second
period only (2000-2007). With only one period, ELI fixed effects would absorb the entire variation in
the data, therefore we only include fixed effects for durable goods and apparel. Column (5) reports the
results: the estimated IV coefficient of -2.15 remains large, statistically significant, and is very similar to
the baseline in Column (3). The standard errors increase by over 60% in Column (5) relative to Column
(3), which shows the usefulness of the full sample with ELI fixed effects to gain power.
Figure 3 and Panel B of Table 2 present the results using as an instrument the change in trade with
China in other developed economies. Figure 3 shows a clear positive first-stage (panel A) and a strong
negative reduced-form (panel B).31 Column (1) of Table 2 reports the corresponding IV coefficient: when
import penetration from China increases by one percentage point, consumer prices fall by 1.44%. Column
(2) repeats the specification after restricting the sample to the second period only: the IV coefficient
remains similar, equal to -1.27. These coefficients are precisely estimated and the F statistics are strong.
31The binned scatter plots in Figure 3 feature somewhat dispersed observations, suggesting that the linear specifications
based on trade in the other developed economies are potentially sensitive to outliers (more so than when using the NTR gap
instrument, cf. Figure 2). The reason is the inclusion of ELI fixed effects, which absorb a lot of the variation in the data.
With fixed effects at higher level of aggregation (e.g., for apparel and durable goods only), the binned scatter plot feature
less dispersion and the estimated regression coefficients remain similar (not reported).
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Column (3) of Table 2 reports the IV results when using both instruments jointly. The IV coefficient
is -1.91 and is precisely estimated, with a standard error of 0.38. Because we now have an over-identified
equation, we can run the test of over-identifying restrictions of Hansen (1982). With a p-value for the J
statistic of 0.21, we cannot reject that the over-identification restrictions are valid. This finding bolsters
the plausibility of a causal interpretation of our estimates.
III.D Robustness and Falsification Tests
We run a series of tests to establish the robustness of our baseline IV estimates: (a) we consider alternative
specification choices, with different sets of fixed effects, time-varying controls and sample restrictions; (b)
we repeat the analysis after aggregating the data at a higher level, from ELIs to 6-digit industries from
the IO table; (c) we implement the IV design with alternative measures of changes in import penetration;
(d) we implement falsification tests using French CPI data. Additional robustness checks are reported
and described in the Online Appendix.
Robustness to specification choices. In Columns (1) through (4) of Panel A of Table 3, we examine
whether the estimates remains stable as we change the set of fixed effects and time varying controls, and
we examine their sensitivity to the exclusion of outlier categories with particularly low inflation rates.
The NTR gap is used as the instrument. Columns (1) repeat the IV specification after replacing the 222
ELI fixed effects with a set of fixed effects for ten broad product categories defined by the BLS (called
“major categories”, they are defined by the first 2 digits of each ELI). The IV coefficient falls slightly to
-2.75. In Column (2), we re-introduce ELI fixed effects as in the baseline but also include period-specific
fixed effects for apparel and durable goods (i.e., inflation can vary systematically across periods). The
IV coefficient remains similar, increasing slightly to -1.78. In Column (3), we exclude ELIs in the bottom
10% of the inflation distribution over our sample. Doing so leaves the IV coefficient virtually unchanged
compared to the baseline, at -2.26. Column (4) repeats the specification after including the period-specific
controls used by Pierce and Schott (2016a) (a fixed effect for high-tech sectors and controls for contract
intensity and union membership), which again leaves the IV coefficient almost unaffected, at -2.10.
Across all specifications, the estimated effects are statistically significant at the 1% level and the first-
stage F statistic remains high. These results suggest that omitted variable biases are unlikely to drive the
effects we document. Online Appendix Table A4 shows that the results are similar when the instrument
is the change in import penetration in other developed economies.
Robustness to aggregation choices. The level at which we define an “industry” may matter for the
magnitude of the estimates. On the one hand, if we consider coarse industry categories, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic goods and Chinese goods may be artificially low because we are effectively
lumping together very different goods. On the other hand, if we consider extremely detailed categories,
it becomes difficult to accurately measure trade flows, thus generating attenuation bias. We assess the
robustness of our results by aggregating the data to the level of coarser industries, the 6-digit IO industries
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defined by the BEA’s 2007 input-output table. These industries are the most detailed industries available
from the IO table, but they are considerably more aggregated than ELIs: the sample size fall from 444
industry-by-period observations to 170.
Column (5) of Panel A of Table 3 reports the results across 6-digit IO industries. The specification is
similar to equation (3) but we now use fixed effects for 6-digit IO industries in the aggregated IO sample.
Using the NTR gap instrument, the IV coefficient is -2.94 and is significant at the 5% level. The first stage
F statistic falls to 9.54, suggesting that the instrument may become weak. However, we obtain a similar
IV coefficient of -1.78 (s.e. 0.65) with the change in import penetration in other developed economies as
the instrument, with a strong F statistic of 48.07 (Online Appendix Table A4). These results indicate
that the large price effects of trade are not an artifact of the level of aggregation we choose.32
Robustness to alternative measures of import penetration. The estimated effects do not account for the
possibility of correlated changes in the patterns of overall trade across ELIs. Trade with other countries
may be a source of omitted variable bias. If other countries tend to increase their import penetration
in the U.S. at the same time as China, then we might conflate the price effects of China with those of
other trading partners (and our IV estimate would be artificially large). Column (1) of Panel B of Table
3 shows that, in fact, China tends to displace other trading partners of the US: when import penetration
from China increases by 1 percentage point, overall import penetration increases by only 78 basis points,
which is a substantial displacement effect.33
The IV coefficient based on the overall change in import penetration is larger than when considering
trade with China alone, because overall trade increases by less than the change in trade with China
alone suggests. Columns (2) and (3) report the results when instrumenting the change in overall import
penetration with the NTR gap. The IV coefficients fall further, to approximately -3.70, are significant
at the 5% level, and as previously are stable across specifications. As discussed in Section IV, the IV
coefficient based on the overall change in import penetration is more informative for standard quantitative
trade models than the change in import penetration from China alone.34
In another robustness check, we adjust our measure of import penetration from China to account for
distribution margins. Intuitively, consider a product category like apparel. China substantially increases
32When we do not include 6-digit IO fixed effects, the NTR gap instrument recovers its strength. The F statistic increases
above 20 and the IV coefficient remains stable. We obtain similar estimates with LIML, which also suggests that our results
are not affected by a potential bias from weak instruments. We have also checked that there is no pre-trend in the sample
aggregated to the level of 6-digit IO industries (not reported).
33Our measure of overall import penetration is based on trade flows across HS codes matched to domestic production data
across 6-digit NAICS codes from the NBER CES database, as explained in Section II.A.
34There are two potential interpretations for the displacement pattern observed in the data (i.e., overall trade increases
less than trade with China across ELIs): (a) it could be viewed as the causal effect of China on other trading partners of
the U.S.; or (b) it could be viewed as an omitted variable bias that attenuates our estimate of the effect of trade with China
on U.S. consumer prices (i.e., for reasons independent of China, other trading partners may happen to reduce trade with
the U.S. in the same product categories where China is expanding). The absence of pre-trends and the falsification tests
using French CPI data discussed below support interpretation (a). If the displacement pattern is causal, then our baseline
estimates from Table 2 are not biased and are the correct measure of the causal effects of increase trade with China on U.S.
consumer prices.
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its market share in the production of apparel. But a substantial share of the retail price of apparel results
from retail and transportation costs, implying that China’s “market share” increases much less in the
consumer basket. China’s market share only increases at the production stage, while, by definition, retail
and transportation costs continue to be incurred domestically.
We therefore use the IO sample and adjust the denominator in equation (1) for distribution margins,
which are given by the ratio of total output in purchaser prices to total output in producer prices. The
results are reported in Online Appendix Table A5. As expected, the IV coefficient becomes more negative
when purchaser prices are used (-4.37, s.e. 0.852) rather than producer prices (-2.44, s.e. 0.431), because
the effective change in import penetration from China is smaller with purchaser prices. Although it is
instructive to note that the price effects become even stronger with the adjustment for distribution mar-
gins, for comparability with prior work we focus on the IV estimates with the baseline import penetration
measure.
Placebo reduced-form and triple-diff IV using French CPI data. The series of robustness checks dis-
cussed so far strengthens the plausibility of the identification conditions, but one potential confounding
factor remains unaddressed. In principle, unobserved time-varying shocks could bias our estimates. With
this in mind, we implement a placebo test using data from the French CPI, which is publicly available
across 132 detailed product categories called COICOP. We link our main analysis sample to COICOP
categories (Online Appendix A.C), aggregate all variables at that level, and repeat the IV strategy from
equation (3) with the French CPI as the outcome, using the NTR gap as the instrument.35
Panel A of Figure 4 reports the placebo reduced-form. There is no relationship between the NTR
gap and inflation across product categories in France, which provides another justification of the research
design. Panel A for Table 4 reports the result: the first-stage in Column (1) is similar to before, except
that we now run the regression across COICOP categories rather than ELIs. Columns (2) shows that
the reduced form is not significant, and Column (3) reports a precisely estimated null IV coefficient with
the baseline coefficient, at -0.074 (s.e. 0.38). The coefficient remains small and insignificant with the
alternative specification in Column (4).36
Table 3 and Figure 4 also report the results from a triple-difference IV specification. The specification
is the same as in equation (3), except that the outcome is now the difference between U.S. CPI inflation
and French CPI inflation. With this differenced outcome, we effectively control for category-by-period
fixed effects for inflation; the estimated IV coefficient only depends on inflation differences between the
United States and France for the same product category. We still allow for COICOP fixed effects, i.e. for
35We work with French CPI data because it is the public data source we found with the most detailed categories with a
consistent definition over a long time series.
36The change in import penetration in other developed economies is naturally not suitable for this falsification test, given
that it should also have an impact in France, while the NTR gap corresponds to a U.S.-specific policy change. The policy
change in the U.S. could potentially have an impact in France if the fall in uncertainty induces China to make investments
that increase exports not only to the U.S. but also to other destination markets. We have checked that the placebo reduced-
form is still zero in a subset of product categories where the United States accounts for a small share of China’s overall
exports, and for which it is therefore unlikely that spillover effects exist (not reported).
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permanent differences in inflation rates between the U.S. and France for each product category. Panel B
of Figure 4 depicts the reduced-form with this differenced outcome, which is clearly negative. Column
(2) of Panel B of Table 3 reports the corresponding coefficient. The IV coefficients in Columns (3) and
(4) are very similar to the baseline results, ranging from -2.08 to -2.52, and are statistically significant at
the 5% level. These facts alleviate the remaining concerns over time-varying unobserved shocks.
Additional robustness checks. The Online Appendix reports and discusses additional robustness checks.
We first investigate the mechanism behind the relevance of the NTR gap instrument. With non-convex
adjustment costs, a fall in uncertainty should boost capital investment (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)),
which should especially matter for capital-intensive industries. Consistent with this idea, Online Appendix
Table A6 shows that the first-stage relationship is stronger for capital-intensive industries with the NTR
gap instrument, but not with the change in import penetration from China in other countries.
Furthermore, Online Appendix Table A7 shows that the results are similar when controlling for ex-
ports. This finding addresses the potential concern that import penetration from China in the domestic
market may mismeasure changes in import competition, which also occurs in foreign markets for exporting
firms. Finally, using the estimated elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006), Online Appendix Table
A8 reports that the IV coefficient is stable across subsamples with different trade elasticities.
IV Mechanisms
We now investigate a series of potential mechanisms that could account for the estimated price effects
of trade with China across product categories. We show how to interpret the estimated price effects
in light of standard quantitative trade models. Using statistical decompositions, we demonstrate the
important contributions of continued and domestic products to the overall price effects. Finally, we study
heterogeneity in the estimated price effects across product categories to distinguish between different
potential channels that could explain the response of domestic products, including intermediate inputs,
offshoring, changes in wages and TFP, and markups. We find empirical support primarily for the markup
channel. Using a simple model of strategic price setting, we also establish that the markup channel is
plausible quantitatively.
IV.A Conceptual Framework
In this subsection, we discuss how to compare the IV coefficients from Section III to the predictions
of standard trade models. The estimated price effect is a useful identified moment that can serve as a
diagnostic tool to distinguish between classes of trade models, following Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
Using a first-order approximation, we first show that the magnitude of our IV estimate cannot be explained
by a fall in the prices of products from China alone. We then show that standard trade models nested by
Arkolakis et al. (2012) require an implausibly low trade elasticity to match our IV estimate.
First-order price effects. Suppose there are j = 1, . . . , J product categories in the domestic U.S.
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economy. In each product category, suppose there are two competing suppliers, China and the United
States, with market shares SChinaj and 1−S
China
j , respectively.
37 Let σj > 1 denote the demand elasticity
of substitution between imported Chinese products and domestically produced U.S. products within
product category j. Suppose that the economy is perturbed by an unanticipated productivity shock in
China (which can be heterogeneous across industries). By Roy’s identity, the first-order impact on πj ,
the price index of the representative U.S. consumer for industry j, is:
πj = S
China
j π
China
j + (1− S
China
j )π
US
j , (4)
where πij is the inflation rate for product category j supplied by country i. If the productivity shock in
China only causes a price response for the Chinese product, then we know that πUSj = 0 ∀ j, and we can
then re-write equation (4) in terms of the observed change in the import penetration rate from China in
product category j, ∆ChinaIPj :
38
πj = −
1
(σj − 1)
(
1− SChinaj
)∆ChinaIPj . (5)
Intuitively, when the price of the Chinese product falls (relative to the U.S. price), consumers reallocate
their spending toward that product. Under the assumptions that U.S. prices do not respond, if we know
the strength of consumers’ substitution patterns (σj) we can infer the (unobserved) change in prices for
the Chinese product from the (observed) change in import penetration from China.
Accordingly, our IV specifications should recover a weighted average of the terms − 1
(σj−1)(1−SChinaj )
across industries. With an average elasticity of substitution of 5 (e.g., Simonovska and Waugh (2014))
and an average value SChina = 0.0452 (from Acemoglu et al. (2016), for 1999), we would expect to find
an estimate of β = −0.26, i.e. a fall in prices of 26 basis points. However, our estimate is about one
order of magnitude larger, equal to -1.91 percentage points (Table 2, using the two instruments jointly).
The elasticity of substitution that would be necessary to reconcile our IV estimate with the comparative
static exercise in Equation (5) is σ̂ = 1 − 1
β·(1−SChina)
= 1.54, which is significantly lower than standard
estimates.
The first-order approximation shows that the estimated price effect is too large to be entirely explained
by a fall in the price of products from China alone. Next, we show that this conclusion still applies when
accounting for general equilibrium effects in the standard class of trade models nested by Arkolakis et al.
(2012).
Connecting the IV specification to quantitative trade models. In an influential paper, Arkolakis et al.
(2012) show that in a wide set of trade models (including Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), Eaton
37The results readily extend to a setting with additional suppliers.
38See Online Appendix B.A for a derivation of Equation (5). The term (1 − SChinaj ) in (5) is a normalization term: by
definition of σj , the relevant substitution effect is given by the change in Chinese import penetration relative to the market
share of the U.S. product,
∆ChinaIPj
(1−SChinaj )
.
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and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)) the gains from trade can be expressed as a simple
function of two sufficient statistics: the change in the domestic expenditure share λ, and the trade
elasticity θ. The parameter θ < 0 is the elasticity of relative imports with respect to variable trade costs
and governs how trade flows change in response to changes in trade costs. For example, in a one-sector
Armington model, we have θ ≡ 1− σ < 0, where σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between foreign and
domestic goods.
In the class of trade model examined by Arkolakis et al. (2012), it can be shown that
∆ log(WUS) =
1
θ
∆ log(λUS), (6)
where ∆ log(WUS) is the change in welfare in the U.S. and ∆ log(λUS) is the change in the domestic
expenditure share, i.e. the U.S. spending share on domestically produced U.S. goods and services.
Our empirical work departs from the baseline model of Arkolakis et al. (2012) because we run a
regression across detailed product categories, while Equation (6) is a statement about the entire (one-
sector) economy. However, it is straightforward to consider the multi-industry variant of Arkolakis et al.
(2012) to derive predictions about price changes across industries when import penetration varies across
industries. In Online Appendix B.B we derive our IV specification (3) from the multi-industry version of
Arkolakis et al. (2012).
With many industries, the model predicts a cross-industry relationship between the domestic expendi-
ture share and consumer prices similar to Equation (6), with prices instead of welfare on the left-hand side.
With the log change in the domestic expenditure share as the endogenous variable, the model predicts
that our IV specification should yield an estimate related to the inverse of the trade elasticity: β̂ = −1θ .
39
When the trade elasticity varies across product categories, our IV estimator recovers a weighted average
of the trade elasticities.40
While the formula from Arkolakis et al. (2012) nests a variety of trade models, it is well understood that
different models require different estimation strategies for the trade elasticity (e.g., Melitz and Redding
(2015)). In practice, these estimation strategies tend to yield relatively similar estimates for the trade
elasticity around a value of θ ≈ −4 (c.f. Simonovska and Waugh (2014)). Therefore, using the log change
in the domestic expenditure share as the endogenous variable, standard trade model models predict an
IV coefficient of β̂ = −1θ ≈ 0.25.
Following the multi-sector variant of Equation (6), we implement our IV specification with the log
change in the domestic expenditure share as the endogenous variable. The estimates are reported in
39There is a minus sign because when the endogenous variable is the log domestic expenditure share, rather than import
penetration from China, the IV coefficient is larger than zero. When the log domestic expenditure share increases, overall
import penetration decreases and prices are predicted to increase. With our baseline endogenous variable, the change in
import penetration from China, the model predicts β̂ ≈ 1
θ
< 0.
40These predictions are based on a model featuring a single domestic factor of production, perfectly mobile across domestic
industries, which rules out the possibility that changes in factor prices could differentially affect domestic production costs
across industries. We relax these assumptionss in Section IV.C but we do not find support for the hypothesis that potential
changes in domestic production costs could help match our IV coefficient.
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Online Appendix Table A9 and are large in magnitude: 2.57 (s.e. 0.96) with the instrument from Pierce
and Schott (2016a), 3.46 (s.e. 1.41) with the instrument from Acemoglu et al. (2016), and 3.10 (s.e.
0.96) with both instruments.41 These estimates are much larger than the predicted IV coefficient of 0.25.
The trade elasticity that would be necessary to match the point estimate (with both instruments) is
θˆ = − 13.10 ≈ −0.32. This trade elasticity is implausibly small: benchmark estimates are all below -1
and generally closer to -4. These results show that standard quantitative trade models do not match the
estimated price response.42
Investigating potential mechanisms. What drives the price effects we find in the data? We have shown
that the large price effects cannot be easily reconciled with consumer optimization if there is no response
of U.S. prices (equation (5)) or with the predictions of standard quantitative trade models (equation (6)).
Next, we empirically document that U.S. prices respond to increased import penetration from China
(Subsection IV.B). We find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that domestic price changes resulted
from changes in domestic production costs (Subsection IV.C). But we document that domestic markups
fell and show that models with endogenous markups can match the estimated price effects (Subsection
IV.D).43
IV.B The Roles of Continued and Domestic Products
We start our empirical investigation of potential mechanisms with a simple statistical decomposition to
isolate the roles of continued products and products that were made in the U.S. We first describe the
statistical decompositions, then the variables we use, and finally the results.
Statistical decompositions. We are interested in decomposing the overall prices effect into effects arising
from subsets of products. Denote the subset of interest by A, and let sAi be the share of items within
product category i that belongs to subset A (which, as we define below, will correspond to continued
products and domestic products). Omitting time subscripts and letting B denote the complementary set,
we obtain an exact decomposition for the CPI inflation rate for each product category as
πi = s
A
i π
A
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡piAi
+ sBi π
B
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡piBi
, (7)
where πi is the inflation rate for product category i as in Section III, π
A
i is the inflation rate for products
41As expected, these IV coefficients are larger (in absolute value) than with the change in import penetration from China
(Table 2), because China tends to displace other trading partners (Table 3)
42As noted by Arkolakis et al. (2011), the trade literature and the international macro literature don’t agree on the value
of the trade elasticity. Macro models, which focus on short-run fluctuations, generally set a low value for this parameter
(e.g., an Armington elasticity of -1.5 in Backus et al. (1993)), which nonetheless remains below one. In contrast with the
international macro studies, our empirical analysis focuses on medium-run responses, for which the elasticities from the trade
literature are the natural benchmark. In the remainder of this section, we provide direct evidence for the pro-competitive
effects of trade by documenting the response of domestic prices and markups (i.e., the patterns in the data could not be fully
explained simply by setting a θ above minus one).
43Endogenous markups resulting from strategic interactions fall outside of the class of trade models nested by Arkolakis
et al. (2012). Intuitively, because of the threat of competition from China, U.S. producers may endogenously lower their
markups, even without much substitution toward imported Chinese goods in equilibrium.
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within subset A and sAi is the spending share on A. Finally, π˜
A
i is the contribution of subset A to overall
inflation in category i, which depends both on the inflation rate within A and on how much spending is
devoted to A.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the contributions of continued goods and domestic goods
to overall inflation. We first run our IV specification (3) with continued goods inflation or domestic goods
inflation as the outcome (πAi ), which is directly informative about the price response for these sets of
goods. These results do not provide a proper decomposition because they ignore the share of spending
on the relevant set of products. If a set of products accounts for a small share of spending, its overall
impact on category-level inflation may be small even if it has a large inflation response to trade. Therefore
we repeat the IV specification with the share-adjusted inflation rate (π˜Ai ) as the dependent variable. By
linearity of OLS, the ratio of the IV coefficient with the share-adjusted inflation rate (π˜Ai ) to the baseline
IV coefficient (with outcome πi) gives the share of the overall effect accounted for by products within
subset A.44
Because we have established that the two instruments from Pierce and Schott (2016a) and Autor et
al. (2014) behave similarly (Table 2), and because more stringent pre-trend and falsification tests could
be implemented with the NTR gap instrument (Section III.D), in the remainder of this Section we focus
on the NTR gap instrument. The results with the change in import penetration from China in other
countries are similar (see Online Appendix Table A10).
The Role of Continued Products. Panel A of Table 5 documents the impact of trade with China on
“inflation for continued products”, which is defined as inflation for the set of products which are available
across consecutive periods. Continued products inflation excludes new products (termed “product sub-
stitutions” by the BLS) from the computation of inflation. This decomposition allows us to test whether
the overall price response to trade stems from declining prices for new products (i.e., inflation would fall
via product substitutions) or from declining prices for pre-existing products (continued products infla-
tion).45 Across all specifications, we find a robust pattern of lower inflation for continued products in
response to increased trade with China. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that inflation for continued prod-
ucts falls by 3 percentage points for each 1 percentage point increase in import penetration from China.
Using the decomposition in equation (7), Columns (3) and (4) show that continued products account for
approximately 70% of the overall price effects from Table 2.
The Online Appendix reports additional results. Online Appendix Table A11 focuses on the subset
of goods that existed prior to the “China shock” (specifically, there were available as of 2000). We still
find a large response of continued products inflation, which shows that pre-existing varieties are affected
by Chinese import competition. This result shows that the patterns of lower continued products inflation
44Since the first-stage regressions are identical, this can be seen immediately from the reduced-form regressions in our IV
setup: we run piip = βZip + νXit + δi + δp + εit, pi
A
i = β
AZip + νXit + δi + δp + εit, and pi
B
i = β
BZip + νXit + δi + δp + εit.
Because πi = π˜i,A + π˜i ¯,A, we obtain the convenient decomposition β = β
A + βB .
45Moreover, using “continued products” only ensures that the price index is immune to potential changes in composition.
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in Panel A of Table 5 are not due to goods that were introduced after the China shock, implying that
“reallocation effects” do not drive the observed price response. Furthermore, Online Appendix Table
A12 documents that trade with China led to increased product turnover, consistent with the notion that
Chinese products displace domestic varieties.
The Role of Domestic Products. Having established that continued products play an important role
in the overall price effects, we now examine the contribution of domestic products. We first continue
working with the CPI data set, before presenting additional evidence from the PPI data set.
To assess whether the price effects are driven by U.S. goods as opposed to foreign (Chinese) goods, we
identify U.S. goods in the CPI using specification checklists. For each product in the CPI, characteristics
are recorded in specification checklist files. We use the specification checklists to gather information
on the country of origin for each product and then repeat each estimation exercise on subsamples of
U.S. products. While checklists for some categories of items have explicit flags for country of origin
information (e.g., “Was the product made in the United States; Yes or No?”), others have entries that
the data collectors populates with text (e.g., “Write in the country in which the product was made.”).
Online Appendix A.A describes the specification checklists and the parsing algorithms we use to retrieve
countries of origin from text entries. Online Appendix Table A13 reports summary statistics on the
number of product categories with explicit flags for country of origin.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the response of prices to trade with China when only taking into account
U.S. goods in the CPI sample. Columns (1) and (2) show that prices for domestic goods experience a
large fall, similar to the full sample, with point estimates ranging from -1.94 to -2.73 across specifications.
Using the statistical decomposition, Columns (3) and (4) show that domestic prices change account for a
substantial fraction of the overall price effects, between 44% and 85% depending on the specification.
Evidence from the PPI Sample. We assess the robustness of our results using the producer prices
from the Producer Price Index. The PPI sample only takes into account price changes for products
manufactured in the U.S., and therefore it is an ideal data set to test whether the price effects we
document are driven by U.S. products.
We run an IV specification identical to (3), except that the outcome variable is now the PPI inflation
rate, measured from micro data underlying the Producer Price Index of the BLS, and that the level of
observation is a 6-digit NAICS code. The PPI methodology is described in Online Appendix A.E: we
aggregate item-level price changes at the level 6-digit NAICS industries using weights derived from the
Census’ data on value of shipments.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the results in the PPI sample. Columns (1) and (2) show that the prices
of domestic U.S. manufacturers fall in response to trade with China. The point estimates are very similar
to the CPI sample, ranging from -2.10 to -2.60 across specifications, and are statistically significant at
the 1% level. Columns (3) and (4) show that the point estimates remain similar in magnitude, falling by
about 50 basis points only, when we repeat the estimate with PPI inflation for continued products as the
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outcome. These results confirm the importance of continued and domestic products in accounting for the
overall price effects.
IV.C The Role of Changes in Domestic Production Cost
The previous results show that there is a large response of domestic prices to trade with China. Con-
ceptually, this response could result from two types of effects of increased trade with China: changes
in production cost for U.S. manufacturers, or changes in markups. In this section, we examine several
potential channels through which production costs for U.S. producers might change across industries due
to trade with China.
Accounting framework. A simple accounting framework helps organize the analysis of changes in
markups and costs. The change in prices for industry i can be decomposed into
∆ log(pi) = ∆ log(µi) + ∆ log(ci),
where µi is the gross markup and ci is the marginal cost of production. Assume domestic firms have access
to a Cobb-Douglas production technology that transforms intermediate inputs I, labor L, and capital K
into output of item i such that,
Yi = AiK
αKi
i L
αLi
i I
αIi
i ,
where Ai is total factor productivity and factor shares α
K
i , α
L
i , α
I
i < 1 sum to one. Cost minimization
yields the change in the domestic production cost,
∆ log(ci) = −∆ log(Ai) + α
K
i ∆ log(ri) + α
L
i ∆ log(wi) + α
I
i∆ log(pI,i). (8)
where ri is industry i’s rental rate for capital, wiis industry i’s wage, and pI,i is the price of a composite
bundle of intermediate inputs to industry i. We now investigate whether changes in domestic production
costs across industries can account for the price effects across industries, using various proxies for the
terms in equation (8).
Intermediate inputs. The measure of Chinese import penetration we have used so far is meant to
reflect exposure to import competition, not to imported intermediate inputs. But it could be the case
that an industry’s change in import penetration from China happens to be correlated with changes in
Chinese import competition faced by that industry’s domestic suppliers. Similarly, if the industry sells to
other domestic producers, then the Chinese import penetration measure could be correlated with import
competition faced by downstream industries. Conceptually, exposure to rising import penetration from
China via buyer-supplier linkages could be a source of omitted variable bias across product categories.46
To examine whether buyer-supplier linkages affect our results, we first compute the correlations be-
46Note that our focus is to investigate the observed relationship between changes in trade and changes in prices across
industries. This exercise is conceptually different from an assessment of the role of intermediate inputs in the gains from
trade (for example, see Ossa (2015)).
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tween our baseline measure of import competition and indirect exposure via domestic suppliers or domestic
buyers. We conduct this analysis with our Input-Output sample, using the BEA’s IO table with the stan-
dard proportionality assumptions. To measure industry j’s exposure via domestic suppliers, denoted
“∆China IP Supplier”, we compute the change in the share of spending on intermediate inputs from
China in industry j’s total sales. For exposure via domestic buyers, denoted “∆China IP Buyer”, we
compute the change in the import penetration rate from China in industry j’s domestic buyer indus-
tries, multiplied by the share of domestic buyer industries in industry j’s total sales. By definition, both
“∆China IP Supplier” and “∆China IP Buyer” are low if an industry has a high share of value added or
sells primarily to final consumers. Online Appendix Table A.D describes the data construction steps for
these IO-adjusted variables, as well as other variables used for robustness tests.47
Panel A of Table 6 reports the correlations between direct and indirect exposure to trade with China.
Column (1) shows the raw relationship without any controls, which is also depicted graphically in Panel
A of Figure 5. The coefficient is positive and significant, but small in magnitude. When the import
penetration rate from China increases by 1 percentage point in industry j, the share of intermediate
inputs from China in industry j’s total output increases by only ten basis points. The relationship
decreases further when we introduce the same set of controls as in our baseline IV specification in Column
(2), and when we exclude intra-industry buyer-seller relationships (the diagonal component of the IO
table) in Column (3).
For buyer effects, Columns (4) shows that the raw relationship is also positive but even smaller: a
1 percentage point increase in import competition from China in industry j is associated with a further
2 basis point increase in import competition via domestic buyer industries. Panel B of Figure 5 depicts
this relationship. Columns (5) and (6) report that the relationship becomes a precisely estimated zero
with the other specifications. These results indicate that direct import competition is not correlated with
indirect effects, therefore the price effects we document are unlikely to be explained by these channels.
In Panel B of Table 6, we directly establish that the price effects are not driven by I-O linkages by
repeating our IV specification from equation (3) while controlling for indirect exposure to trade with
China via suppliers or buyers. Controlling for supplier and buyer effects in turn (Columns (2) and (3)) or
jointly (Column (4)) yields stable point estimates hovering between -2.89 and -3.24, which are very close
to the baseline result of -2.94 in Column (1).
The Online Appendix reports additional results. Table A14 shows that the patterns are the same
when accounting for higher-order I-O linkages. Table A15 and Figure A6 report similar results in an
augmented IV framework, where we instrument for direct and indirect exposure measures simultaneously.
Offshoring. The previous results indicate that upstream and downstream changes in trade with China
do not help explain the estimated price effects. However, intermediate inputs may play a role independent
47We report the main results using IO-adjusted variables based on first-order linkages in the IO table. The Online Appendix
repeats the analysis with higher-order IO linkages, using the Leontieff inverse.
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of I-O linkages. For example, a U.S. manufacturer of water bottles could use plastic imported from China,
in which case imported intermediate inputs would be accounted for by our I-O analysis, because “plastic”
and “water bottles” are distinct product categories. But if the U.S. producer offshores production to
China and re-imports the finished product (i.e., the water bottle, not plastic), then the I-O analysis
would not accurately account for trade-induced changes in production cost. The potential concern is
that increased trade with China does not correspond to intensified import competition, but rather to an
increase in trade between related parties, i.e. our measure of changes in trade flows may reflect offshoring.
We examine the importance of this potential channel using the related-party trade database of the
U.S. Census Bureau (as in, e.g., Antra`s and Chor (2013)).48 Related-party trade includes trade by U.S.
companies with their subsidiaries abroad as well as trade by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies with
their parent companies. If offshoring drives the price effects, we expect to find larger effects (for a given
increase in trade with China) in product categories where related-party trade accounts for a larger fraction
of trade with China. In fact, the share of trade with China occurring between related parties is very low
during the period we study, with a median of 4% (Online Appendix Table A16; related-party trade is
significantly more important with other trading partners).
Although summary statistics suggest that offshoring may not drive our results for the average category,
related-party trade is important for a small fraction of product categories: the 90th percentile of the
distribution of related-party shares is 38%. In Column (1) of Panel A of Table 7, we repeat our IV
specification after interacting the endogenous variable with an indicator for categories with a share of
related-party trade with China above the 90th percentile (the instrument is also interacted with this
indicator). We find that the estimated price effects remains stable and that the interaction term is not
significant. Similar results are obtained with other thresholds and a linear interaction term (not reported).
Overall, the data indicate that changes in domestic production costs via imported inputs or offshoring
cannot account for the estimated price effects.
Returns to scale and productivity. Increased import competition with China could affect domestic
production costs by displacing domestic goods and reducing the scale of domestic production. To ratio-
nalize the evidence in Table 5 through decreasing returns to scale, the marginal cost of production should
fall by 2% as domestic production falls by 1% (due to displacement by China). Recent empirical studies
have estimated this elasticity (e.g., Costinot et al. (2019), Jaravel (2019) and Faber and Fally (2017)).
They find that for tradable U.S. industries returns to scale are increasing, with elasticities of prices to
quantities ranging between -0.1 and -0.4; we would need an elasticity of the opposite sign and five times
larger in magnitude.
In our context, two mechanisms could potentially yield an elastic marginal cost of production: industry-
specific factors and endogenous changes in technology. If an industry relies on industry-specific (hence
48For the remainder of this subsection, we work with our main analysis sample restricted to the ELI categories for manu-
factured goods, which we match to the Census’ related-party trade database and to the NBER-CES Manufacturing database.
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“fixed”) factors, then a fall in production could lead to a substantial fall in production costs, because the
supply curve is inelastic (vertical) for these factors. For example, capital investments may be irreversible,
in which case the industry-specific rental rate of capital may fall substantially as quantities fall. According
to equation (8), this effect should be particularly important for capital-intensive industries (through the
term αKi ∆ log(ri) in equation (8)).
In Column (2) of Panel A of Table 7, we examine whether the magnitude of the price effect varies
across sectors depending on their capital intensity. Using an indicator variable for industries above the
median skill intensity, we find no heterogeneity in the effect. Similar results are obtained with other
thresholds and a linear interaction term (not reported). This finding suggests that decreasing returns
through industry-specific capital do not drive the domestic price effects.
Another possibility is that import competition may affect productivity through endogenous technology
choices. If increased competition spurs domestic firms to adopt or invent cost-reducing technologies (e.g.,
Bustos (2011), Bloom et al. (2016) and Aghion et al. (2018)), then change in productivity could rationalize
our results, through the term ∆ log(Ai) in equation (8). However, recent evidence about the China shock
in the United-States suggests that innovation by domestic firms fell in response to the shock (Autor et al.
(2019)).
To further examine the potential productivity channel, we use our IV framework to examine the
response of Total Factor Productivity, as measured in the NBER-CES database for manufacturing in-
dustries. Becker et al. (2013) describe these TFP measures, which use either four or five factors of
production.49 In Panel B of Table 7, Columns (1) and (2) report that both TFP measures fall in response
to increased trade with China, which is consistent with the evidence from Autor et al. (2019) using patent
data. Online Appendix Figure A7 reports the event study of TFP growth by exposure to the instruments.
We caution that the evidence on TFP should only be viewed as suggestive, because we do not have
access to the underlying micro data and cannot investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative
measures of TFP. But the patterns indicate that the price effects are unlikely to be driven by increases
in productivity for domestic firms. If anything, productivity is falling.
Wages. Changes in wages across industries could be another reason for changes in domestic production
cost. Although this channel is theoretically plausible, we find that in practice it can explain little of the
evidence on domestic prices.
The first piece of evidence is that industries exposed to trade with China are not very labor intensive:
the labor share of total cost is small (αL,i in equation (8)). The NBER-CES Manufacturing database
linked to our sample indicates that the share of labor in total value added for product categories within
manufacturing was about 27% in our sample period. Furthermore, the share of labor in total domestic
49The 5-factor TFP measures uses non-production workers, production workers, energy, materials and capital. The 4-
factor TFP measur is calculated similarly, but using total materials cost spending rather than separating it into energy and
non-energy materials.
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output is only 10.9%, because these industries use intermediate inputs intensively.50 In other words, when
a consumer spends $1 on a domestically-produced good, on average only 10.9 cents accrue to domestic
workers. Therefore, to explain a 2% fall in domestic prices due to increased import penetration from
China, the wage response should be very large, on the order of 20%.
Both public data and high-quality administrative data (used in prior studies) indicate that the wage
effects are much smaller than would be needed to explain the price effects. First, evidence using worker-
level administrative data is provided by Autor et al. (2014), who find that a one percentage point increase
in the import penetration rate from China leads to a 39.3 basis point fall in wages (Column (3) of their
Table III). Second, using public data from the NBER-CES and County Business Patterns databases,
Acemoglu et al. (2016) find no significant fall in average wages, and they also document a 24 basis point
increase for production workers (their Table V).51 In Panel B of Table 7, we use the same outcome variables
in our IV specification and find no significant wage effects, either in County Business Patterns data for
all workers (Column (3)), or in NBER-CES data for production or non-production workers (Columns
(4) and (5)). Online Appendix Figure A7 reports the event study of wage growth by exposure to the
instruments. Although the public data is imperfect and likely fails to capture the negative effects that
Autor et al. (2014) were able to estimate precisely, we can confidently rule out the large wage changes
that would be required to meaningfully affect domestic production costs.52
IV.D The Role of Changes in Markups
Having established that changes in domestic production costs are unlikely to drive the price effects, we
now examine the potential relevance of markups. First, we show theoretically that endogenous markups
arising from strategic interaction can rationalize the evidence. Second, empirically we find that estimated
markups for domestic firms (within Compustat) fall in response to increased trade with China. Finally,
consistent with theoretical predictions, we document that the price effects are larger in industries where
domestic market concentration is higher and China’s initial market share is lower.
Connecting the IV specification to models with endogenous markups. We start with a simple theoretical
exercise: could changes in markups plausibly explain the observed domestic price response, or are the
observed price effects too large? To answer this question without committing to a specific model of
demand, market structure, price setting or production technology, we consider the theoretical framework
in Amiti et al. (2018b) which only requires mild conditions on demand.
In order to starkly illustrate the mechanisms at play, we return to the stylized economic environment
50These figures are reported in Panel A of Table 10, which we discuss further in Section V
51As they note, this finding can be reconciled with Autor et al. (2014) because public data sources are likely to suffer from
composition effects: if lower-paid workers are more likely to be laid off, the measured wage may increase.
52Autor et al. (2013) also investigate wage effects, but they focus on commuting zones as the level of analysis. They find
that increased exposure to trade with China (a) has no significant effect on manufacturing wages across CZs; (b) leads to
a fall in non-manufacturing wages across CZs (their Table VII). For our cross-industry regression, manufacturing wages are
relevant.
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from Section IV.A in which one U.S. producer and one Chinese producer compete in each industry. We
will now introduce price dynamics that depend on the strategic interaction between producers within
each industry. We derive our IV specification in this model, and then discuss testable implications from
a more general setting with multiple, heterogeneous firms.
Economic environment. There are j = 1, . . . , J industries. In each industry, there are two producers:
a domestic U.S. producer and a foreign Chinese producer that exports its product. The two producers
produce and sell differentiated products to a representative U.S. consumer who has an elasticity of substi-
tution between industry j’s varieties of σj and Cobb-Douglas preferences across industries. Let p
i
j , S
i
j , c
i
j
and µij denote respectively the price, market share, marginal cost of production and markup of producer
i ∈ US,China in industry j, and let pj denote the industry price index.
Amiti et al. (2018b) show that for any invertible demand system each firm i’s profit-maximizing price
can be expressed as the solution to a fixed point equation:
log
(
pij
)
= log
(
cij
)
+ log
(
Mij
(
pij , p
−i
j
))
whereMij
(
pij , p
−i
j
)
is the equilibrium markup as a function of firm i’s own price choice and the price choice
of the other firm, p−ij . Total differentiation of the fixed-point equation yields an instructive decomposition,
which characterizes the role of strategic pricing for the observed price effects (see Online Appendix B.C
for derivations). To a first order, a firm’s optimal price change can be decomposed to into its own change
in marginal cost (d log(cij)) and its competitor’s price change (d log(p
−i
j )). A change in a firm’s marginal
cost passes-through into its own price at a rate given by 1
1+Γij
, where Γij ≡ −
∂ log(Mij(.))
∂ log(pij)
is the firm’s
“own-price markup elasticity”. Furthermore, the pass-through rate of a change in the competitor’s price
is given by
Γ−ij
1+Γij
, where Γ−ij =
∂ log(Mij(.))
∂ log(p−ij )
is the “competitor-price markup elasticity”.
With constant markups, the markup is inelastic and we obtain that Γij = Γ
−i
j = 0. With oligopolistic
competition (e.g., Krugman (1979) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008)), Γi and Γ−i are increasing in the
firm’s market share. Under relatively mild assumptions about the demand system, Amiti et al. (2018b)
show that Γij = Γ
−i
j .
53 Empirically, using idiosyncratic variation in the cost of intermediate inputs as an
instrument for prices at the firm level, Amiti et al. (2018b) cannot reject that Γij = Γ
−i
j ; their results
indicate that the markup elasticity Γj is increasing in firm size and is about 0.6 on average.
Our goal is to assess whether our estimated price effects can be matched in a setting with endogenous
markups and a plausible markup elasticity. To do so, we perturb the equilibrium with a change in
China’s marginal production costs, which can be heterogeneous across industries.54 We assume that U.S.
production costs remain unchanged, in line with Section IV.C), so that U.S. prices respond only through
changes in markups. A first-order approximation to the equilibrium perturbation is given by (i) the overall
53This condition is satisfied if the firm perceives that the demand elasticity is a function of the firm’s price relative to
the industry expenditure function. This property holds exactly for a nested-CES demand structure as well as a first-order
approximation for a broad class of models with symmetric preferences.
54See Online Appendix B.C for proofs and derivations for the remainder of this section.
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change in the industry’s price index,
d log(pj) = S
China
j d log
(
pChinaj
)
+
(
1− SChinaj
)
d log
(
pUSj
)
,
(ii) the change in the domestic U.S. producer’s price with respect to its Chinese competitor’s price change,
under the assumption of no change in own-costs,
d log
(
pUSj
)
=
Γj
1 + Γj
d log
(
pChinaj
)
, (9)
(iii) the change in the foreign Chinese producer’s price with respect to the marginal cost shock and the
change in its U.S. competitor’s price,
d log
(
pChinaj
)
=
1
1 + Γj
d log
(
cChinaj
)
+
Γj
1 + Γj
d log
(
pUSj
)
, (10)
and, finally, (iv) the substitution between U.S. produced and Chinese produced goods given the change
in the relative price of Chinese goods and the elasticity of substitution σj ,
d log
(
SChinaj
)
= (1− σj)
(
1− SChinaj
)(
d log
(
pChinaj /p
US
j
))
. (11)
Solving the system of equation and re-arranging terms, we obtain a first-order approximation to the
cross-industry relationship between inflation and changes in the import penetration rate from China:55
πj = −
1 + Γj/S
China
j
(σj − 1)
(
1− SChinaj
)∆ChinaIPj . (12)
With strategic interactions, our IV specification should recover a weighted average of the terms
−
1+Γj/S
China
j
(σj−1)(1−SChinaj )
across industries. With the benchmark estimates Γj = 0.6 (Amiti et al. (2018b)),
σj = 5 (Head and Mayer (2014), Simonovska and Waugh (2014)) and S
China
j = 0.0452 (Acemoglu et
al. (2016), for 1999), we expect to find β = −3.74. This benchmarking exercise establishes that, with
strategic interactions, the magnitude of the reduced-form relationship we estimate is expected to be one
order of magnitude larger than with no domestic price responses (equation (5)) or than from the class of
trade models nested by Arkolakis et al. (2012) (equation (6)).
Intuitively, Chinese producers reduce prices when they experience a positive productivity shock, which
leads U.S. producers to also reduce prices due to strategic interactions. Because of the U.S. price response,
the equilibrium change in the spending share on the product from China is lower than it would be absent
this price response. As a result, the relationship between changes in import penetration from China
and price changes (our IV coefficient) can be large. To illustrate the logic, consider a limiting case with
an extremely high markup elasticity, Γj → ∞, in which the two producers supply highly substitutable
products and become Bertrand competitors. In such a case, the U.S. producer matches the fall in price
55Absent strategic interations (Γj = 0), equation (12) reduces to the price change expression we derived under the assump-
tion of zero domestic price change in equation (5).
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from the Chinese producer almost entirely, i.e. d log
(
pUS
)
≈ d log
(
pChina
)
, as can be seen in equations(9)
and (10) as
Γj
1+Γj
→ 1. Because the relative price of the two producers remains almost unchanged, the
import penetration rate from China barely changes (equation (11)). Since both pUSj and p
China
j fall,
so does the industry price index pj . Therefore we get price effects despite no changes in trade flows:
d log(pj)
dSChinaj
→∞ as Γj →∞. In this limiting case, the reduced-form relationship between price changes and
changes in trade with China across industries can be unboundedly large.
Having established theoretically that the markup channel can plausibly explain large price effects, we
now conduct specific tests to assess its empirical relevance more directly.
The Response of Estimated Markups. To test the theoretical framework above as directly as possible,
we examine whether estimated markups for domestic producers fall in response to increased trade with
China. We follow the methodology of De Loecker et al. (2017) and estimate markups for publicly-listed
firms in Compustat. In this sample, indexing firms by i and years by t, the gross markup can be written
µit = θ
v ·
SALESit
COGSit
, (13)
where θv is the elasticity of output to variable inputs, which multiplies the ratio of sales to the cost of
goods sold. Intuitively, the gross markup corresponds to the ratio of the consumer price to the producer’s
shadow value of an additional unit of output.
Using this expression, we compute gross markups over time for each firm in the Compustat sample.56
We then aggregate the firm-level data to 6-digit NAICS codes, using sales weights. We will consider
in turn the response of the average markup or of certain quantiles of the markup distribution (where
the average and quantiles are computed within each 6-digit NAICS industry). Summary statistics are
reported in Online Appendix Figure A8.
Estimated markups from the Compustat sample can be used to test two predictions from the theoret-
ical framework introduced above. First, do we observe a fall in estimated markups as trade with China
increases in a product category? Second, do we see a larger response at the top of the markup distribution?
The first test is directly implied by equation (9) with Γj 6= 0. The second test is intuitive: a domestic
producer with a large markup has more market power, therefore it should respond more strongly when
rising import penetration from China disrupts domestic market power. Formally, in standard models
firms with larger markups also have a higher markup elasticity Γij , as shown by Amiti et al. (2018b).
Figure 6 and Table 8 present the results of the analysis with estimated markups as the outcome. We
repeat our IV specification (3) over two periods (1991-1999 and 2000-2007), but the level of aggregation
is now a 6-digit NAICS code (instead of an ELI) and the outcome is the annualized change in the net
56Online Appendix A.F derives equation (13) and describes the Compustat sample. Total sales and the cost of goods
sold are reported in firms’ financial statements. We use the time-invariant and sector-invariant elasticity θv = 0.85 from
De Loecker et al. (2017), who show that changes in markups over time are driven by changes in the ratio of sales to cogs
(rather than by changes in the output elasticity). The results are similar when we estimate time-varying elasticities as in
De Loecker et al. (2017) (not reported). Although the production approach to markup estimation has well-known limitations
(e.g., Raval (2019)), it provides an instructive test for our purposes.
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markup (instead of the annualized inflation rate). Expressed in percentage points, the net markup is
defined as µ˜it = (µit − 1) · 100.
57
Panel (a) of Figure 6 reports a clear negative reduced-form relationship for the average markup. The
binned scatter plot shows that the linear fit is a good approximation to the underlying data. Panel A
of Table 8 reports the point estimates. Column (1) shows that the first stage remains strong in the
Compustat sample, with statistical significance at the 1% level (Online Appendix Figure A9 depicts the
first stage). Columns (2) reports the reduced-form coefficient, which is also precisely estimated. Column
(3) reports the IV coefficient: when the import penetration rate from China increases by one percentage
point, domestic markups fall by 1.75 percentage points (s.e. 0.848). The IV estimate is large in magnitude
and statistically indistinguishable from the IV coefficients for the response of domestic prices (from Table
5: -2.73 for CPI, and -2.10 for PPI). This result indicates that changes in domestic markup can account
for much of the observed price effects.
Panels (b), (c) and (d) of Figure 6 document changes in the distribution of markups across industries
that are differentially exposed to increased trade with China. Panel (b) shows that there is no change at
the bottom of the markup distribution: the reduced-form is flat for the 10th percentile of markups. In
contrast, there is a negative relationship for the 50th percentile (Panel (c)), and the relationship becomes
steeper for the 90th percentile (Panel (d)). Panel B of Table 8 reports the corresponding reduced-form
coefficients. In Column (1), the reduced form coefficient for the 90th percentile of markups is -17.42 (s.e.
7.28); in Column (2) the effect gets attenuated by a factor of over 50%, with a coefficient of -7.97 (s.e.
4.83) for the 50th percentile; in Column (3) the coefficient for the 10th percentile becomes insignificant
and is close to zero (-0.84, s.e. 4.023). Consistent with the predictions of the model, the response of
markups is much stronger at the top of the markup distribution.
As a robustness check, we also analyze the response of firm profitability to increased import penetration
from China. We compute the ratios of total profits to total sales and to total assets, where profits are
computed inclusive of fixed costs incurred by the firm (in contrast, the markup measure from equation (13)
does not use information about fixed costs). Online Appendix A.F describes these measures, and Online
Appendix Figure A8 reports summary statistics. Panels (e) and (f) of Figure 6 show that profitability
ratios deteriorate in industries that are more exposed to trade with China. Columns (4) and (5) of Table
8 report the corresponding point estimates, which are statistically significant at the 1% level.58 Finally,
the Online Appendix reports additional results on the role of between-firm reallocation effects (Online
Appendix Table A17 and Online Appendix Figure A10).59
57The results are similar with the log change in the gross markup, which is closely relate to the (level) change in the net
markup: ∆log(µ) ≈ ∆µ˜/100.
58These results are consistent with the findings of Autor et al. (2019), who document a negative cross-industry relationship
between rising import penetration from China and firms’ book values and stock market values (their Table 1). The fact that
profitability deterioriates in sectors more exposed to rising trade with China is an additional piece of evidence suggesting
that falling production costs do not drive the domestic price response.
59The recent literature documents that trends of rising markups and falling labor share are driven by reallocation of
spending. In contrast, trade-induced competition predicts that markups should fall within firms. We test and find support
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Heterogeneity by market structure. To collect evidence beyond the sample of publicly-listed Compustat
firms, we now assess whether heterogeneity in the estimated price effects across product categories is
consistent with the predictions of the markup channel. Using the predictions from equation (12), we can
(indirectly) test for the relevance of the markup channel by studying heterogeneity in the IV estimates
across subsamples.
First, the predicted effect βˆ = −
1+Γj/S
China
j
(σj−1)(1−SChinaj )
is increasing in the markup elasticity Γj . The markup
elasticity depends on market structure and can therefore vary across industries. In Online Appendix B.C,
we extend the model to accommodate multiple domestic firm and show that Γj is larger when the domestic
market is more concentrated. This prediction is intuitive: when the domestic market is more concentrated,
an increase in import competition from China disrupts domestic market power relatively more, therefore
we expect to estimate larger price effects.
Second, the expression for the predicted effect βˆ shows that the magnitude of the effect is decreasing in
China’s initial market share, SChinaj (starting from an equilibrium with a small spending share on Chinese
goods, as in the data). Intuitively, if China has a larger initial market share in an industry, by increasing
its market share by one percentage point China does not disrupt domestic U.S. producers as much as in
another industry where the initial import penetration rate from China is low. Put another way, there is
less room for China to disrupt market power (at the margin) in an industry where it already has a high
market share.60
Next, we take these predictions to the data. To measure domestic market concentration, we obtain
data on Herfindahl indices by 6-digit NAICS industries from the Census for 1997 (as in Grullon et al.
(2018)), which we link to our ELI sample from the CPI micro data. We create two indicator variables,
one for product categories with a Herfindahl index above the median and one for product categories with
an initial import penetration rate from China above the 75th percentile. We then implement our IV
specification with interaction terms, interacting the indicator variables with the endogenous variable and
the instrument.61
Panel A of Table 9 presents the results. Consistent with the predictions, Column (1) shows that the
price response to a one percentage point increase in the import penetration rate from China is much
for this prediction by introducing firm fixed effects into our research design. Naturally, our results are not inconsistent with
the literature documenting a rise in the aggregate markup and profitability in the U.S. (e.g., Autor et al. (2017), Baqaee and
Farhi (2017), De Loecker et al. (2017)). We find that increase trade with China leads to a fall in U.S. markups, but there
could be many other channels leading to a rise in U.S. markups in the aggregate.
60Online Appendix B.C discusses the predicted heterogeneity in treatment effect in greater detail. The model with
multiple firms shows that the heterogeneous effects are non-linear, which motivates the use of specifications with “threshold”
interaction terms, as we do below, rather than linear interaction.
61For this analysis, the sample is restricted to 153 ELIs that can be matched to the concentration statistics from the
Census, which are publicly available for most industries producing goods. In the matched sample, the implied number of
“equally-sized firms” that should operate in the domestic market to be consistent with the median Herfindahl index (H)
is N = 10,000
H
= 19. This calculation helps fix ideas about the degree of domestic market concentration for the median
U.S. industry. The 75th percentile of the import penetration rate from China (in 1999) is computed for the restricted
sample and is about 10%. The choice of these thresholds for the indicator variables is guided by the non-linear heterogeneity
predicted by the model (Online Appendix B.C). The results are similar with alternative thresholds, as well as when measuring
concentration and trade with China in earlier years (not reported).
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larger when the domestic market is more concentrated, and is much smaller when the initial China share
is small. The price decline is 1.29 percentage points larger in the set of more concentrated industries, and
it is attenuated by 1.50 percentage points in the set of industries initially more exposed to trade with
China.
Columns (2) to (5) show the robustness of these results by repeating the IV specifications in sub-
samples. The IV coefficient is large in the subsample of product categories above median concentration
(Column (2)), while it becomes insignificant for those below (Column (3)). The point estimate in Column
(3) is close to the prediction from the class of models without strategic interactions characterized by
Arkolakis et al. (2012). Columns (4) and (5) show that the estimated effect is over twice as large for
industries that were initially less exposed to trade with China.
Panel B of Table 9 repeats the analysis in the PPI sample. We proceed in the same way as for
CPI, except that the PPI sample frame provides weights for “value of shipments” for each establishment,
therefore we are able to construct a Herfindahl index directly from the sample, instead of linking external
data.
The specifications with interactions in Column (1) and the subsample specifications in Columns (2),
(3) and (4) show that, in response to increased trade with China, PPI inflation falls more in product
categories that are more concentrated and falls less in categories that were initially more exposed to
trade with China. The interaction terms in Column (1) are precisely estimated and significant at the
1% level. In the subsample of categories with domestic concentration below median (Column (3)), the
point estimate is close to the prediction of Arkolakis et al. (2012). The PPI results confirm the patterns
observed in our main CPI sample.62
Overall, the observed heterogeneity in price effects across product categories provides additional evi-
dence suggesting that markup responses are an important explanatory mechanism.
V The Distributional Effects of the China Shock
The previous analysis shows that there is a large price response to increased trade with China, and that
this response includes a substantial response from domestic products, which can be accounted for by an
endogenous fall in domestic markups. In this section, we discuss how our estimates help shed light on the
distributional effects of the China shock.
We first characterize distributional effects between consumers and workers, benchmarking our esti-
mates of the price effects to the estimates of employment effects from prior work. We find that falling
prices in product categories that are more exposed to trade with China create hundreds of thousands of
dollars in consumer surplus for each displaced job. Second, we investigate distributional effects across
62The first-stage F statistics remain strong for all specifications for Panel B of Table 9, with the PPI data. However, the F
statistics deteriorate in several specifications in Panel A, with the CPI data. For both panels, we have repeated the analysis
using LIML and obtained similar points estimates (not reported). The fact that the results are similar for CPI and PPI, as
well as with LIML, gives us confidence that the results are not confounded by weak instruments.
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consumers and we find that the price response is larger in product categories that cater to lower-income
households.
V.A Displaced Jobs vs. Consumer Surplus
While we have documented that prices decline in U.S. industries with rising import penetration, numerous
studies have shown that increasing import penetration rates from China have disrupted the U.S. labor
market (e.g, Autor et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016), and Pierce and Schott
(2016a)). Employment declines in U.S. industries more exposed to rising import competition, which is
detrimental to displaced U.S. workers who are not able to transition costlessly to another industry.
Using our IV estimates, we can characterize the tradeoff between rising consumer surplus and displaced
jobs across industries. If the import penetration rate from China increases by one percentage point more
in industry A than in industry B, what is the impact on (relative) consumer surplus and jobs in these
two industries? We can answer this question using IV estimates for the price effects (denoted βprice) and
the employment effects (denoted βemp), provided that they are scaled properly.
A first-order approximation to the change in consumer surplus (in dollars) from the trade shock for
industry j is given by ∆CSj =
(
−βprice
100 ∆ChinaIPj
)
· Consj , where “Consj” is total consumption (or
“domestic absorption”) for industry j and “
−βprice
100 ∆ChinaIPj” is the fall in prices induced by industry
j’s trade shock. Similarly, the fall in the number of jobs is ∆Jobsj =
(
−βemp
100 ∆ChinaIPj
)
·Empj , where
Empj is total employment in industry j.
Assuming that industries A and B initially have the same levels of total consumption and employment,
if import penetration increases by one percentage point more in A than in B, the tradeoff between rising
consumer surplus and displaced jobs in A relative to B is given by
∆CSj
∆Jobsj
=
βprice
βemp
·
Consj
Empj
. (14)
This expression tells us that if product category j employs few workers but accounts for large share
of aggregate consumption, then a large amount of consumer surplus can be created per displaced job, as
long as βprice and βemp are similar. Accordingly, in addition to the IV estimates we need to know the
ratio
Consj
Empj
across industries to characterize the tradeoff between jobs and consumer surplus.
Panel A of Table 10 reports informative summary statistics about the term
Consj
Empj
in equation (14),
focusing on the set of ELIs within goods only (for which we obtain data on domestic absorption and
employment from the NBER-CES Manufacturing database). The summary statistics are reported for
2000, at the outset of the China shock. The first row shows that average annual labor earnings in the
sample are about $33,000 on average. Because the labor share is low, the average value-added of domestic
producers per job is higher, around $120,000 (row 2). And because these product categories use a lot
of intermediate inputs, total domestic sales per job is much higher, about $305,000 on average (row 3).
Finally, since trade is important for consumption in these product categories, total domestic absorption
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per job is even higher, approximately $390,000 per job (row 4).63
For comparability with the estimated price effects, we run IV specifications for employment in our
sample. We repeat specification (3) with the log change in employment as the outcome. Online Appendix
Table A18 reports the results. A one percentage point increase in import penetration from China leads
to a fall in employment of 1.834% with the NTR gap instrument, 1.774% with the change in import
penetration in other developed economies, and 1.815% with both instruments. The estimates are similar
whether we consider all employment, or production workers and non-production workers separately; the
magnitudes are in line with prior work (e.g., Table 2 of Acemoglu et al. (2016)).
Panel B of Table 10 characterizes the tradeoffs between rising consumer surplus and displaced jobs
across industries, using our IV estimates and equation (14). Because the ratio
Consj
Empj
varies across indus-
tries, the tradeoff depends on which industry is affected by rising import competition.
We first consider a counterfactual increase in the import penetration rate from China of one percentage
point for a representative industry with the average ratio of total consumption to employment (in our
sample of goods). We compute ∆CS∆Jobs =
βprice
βemp
·
∑
j Consj∑
j Empj
. In Column (1), with the NTR gap instrument,
consumer surplus increases by $477,555 for each job displaced by trade with China. The estimate remains
large, at $317,383, when using trade with China in other developed economies as the instrument (Column
(2)). With both instruments, the estimate yields $411,464 in consumer surplus per displaced job (Column
(3)).
Next, we repeat these calculations by focusing on the industries that were affected by the rise in import
penetration from China between 2000 and 2007. If the ratio
Consj
Empj
is systematically higher or lower for
affected industries, the tradeoff between consumer surplus and employment for the historical China shock
could differ from what the previous analysis suggests. We compute ∆CS∆Jobs =
βprice
βemp
·
∑
j ∆ChinaIPj ·Consj∑
j ∆ChinaIPj ·Empj
, i.e.
the consumption-to-employment ratio is computed with rising import penetration from China as weights.
The results are reported in Columns (4) to (6) of Panel B of Table 10. They are slightly attenuated
compared to the baseline but remain very large in magnitude, ranging from $288,147 to $433,565 across
specifications.64
Thus, our estimates imply that product categories that are more exposed to trade with China create
hundreds of thousands of dollars in consumer surplus for each displaced job. Using the predicted price
effects from the class of standard trade models nested by Arkolakis et al. (2012), the increase in consumer
63The various columns in Panel A of Table 10 show that there is much heterogeneity across product categories: domestic
absorption per job varies from $150,591 at the 10th percentile to $625,686 at the 90th percentile. It is everywhere significantly
higher than average labor earnings.
64As indicated earlier, the calculations carried out in this section are partial-equilibrium differences across industries with
different levels of exposure to rising import penetration from China. General equilibrium effects induced by the China shock
could affect all industries simultaneously. As is well-known (e.g., Adao et al. (2019)), GE effects affecting all industries are not
reflected in our cross-industry IV estimates as they are absorbed by fixed effects. The tradeoff between increasing consumer
surplus and displaced jobs could be different at the aggregate level, once GE effects are accounted for. For example, jobs are
likely to be created in other industries in the short to medium run, which would attenate the aggregate impact on jobs (e.g.,
Bloom et al. (2019)). For this reason, the increase in consumer surplus per “destroyed” job at the aggregate level (rather
than per displaced jobs across industries) could be even larger than the estimates in Table 10.
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surplus would be attenuated by a factor of ten (equation (6)) and would be on the order of $40,000 per
displaced job, which is similar to average annual labor earnings in this sample.65
V.B Distributional Effects via the Expenditure Channel
Finally, we examine whether the price response differs across product categories that cater to households
of different income levels.
A growing literature characterizes the distributional effects of trade through the expenditure channel,
focusing on differences in spending shares on imports across consumer groups (e.g., Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2016), Borusyak and Jaravel (2018), He (2018), and Hottman and Monarch (2018)). We
investigate a distinct mechanism: does the rate of pass-through of trade shocks into consumer prices vary
systematically with consumer income?
We proceed in two steps. First, we repeat our IV strategy in subsamples of product categories catering
to different income groups; second, we use these new estimates to quantify whether this mechanism has
a substantial impact on distributional effects across income groups.66
We start by running our IV specification (3) in subsamples of product categories whose expenditure
shares vary across groups of consumers. For robustness, we split the sample around the median using three
alternative variables reflecting consumer income: the share of sales to college graduates, the expenditure
elasticity, and the shares of sales to households with an annual income above $60,000.67
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 11. The price effects are large and significant in all
subsamples, but they are much larger in product categories that sell to lower-income households. Columns
(1) and (2) show that the point estimate for product categories with a share of sales to college graduates
above median is only 21% (= 0.91/4.28) of the point estimate for the categories below median. The
difference is similar when splitting by expenditure elasticity (0.83/4.62 = 18.3%, in Columns (3) and
(4)), while it is slightly attenuated when splitting by the share of sales to households with income above
$60,000 (1.18/2.93 = 40.2%, in Columns (5) and (6)). Online Appendix Table A20 reports similar results
with interaction terms in a single specification, instead of repeating the analysis in subsamples.68
65In Online Appendix Table A19, we compute the equivalent variation for increased trade with China from 2000 to 2007,
for the average U.S. household. Assuming that there are no GE effects affecting prices in all product categories, the cross-
industry IV estimates accurately capture the price effects. Using our baseline IV estimate, we find that in 2007 the (annual)
purchasing power of the representative U.S. household was about $1,500 higher, thanks to lower prices induced by increased
trade with China from 2000 to 2007. The estimates range from $1,105 to $1,711 across specifications. Assuming that
prices do not revert back in the longer run, this result indicates that the China shock increased the purchasing power of
U.S. households by about 2% (in the CEX, average annual expenditures were $49,638 in 2007). In GE, increasing import
penetration may induce an overall fall in domestic prices to restore trade balance; therefore the increase in purchasing power
for domestic consumers could be larger after accounting for GE effects.
66In a sample of consumer packaged goods, Bai and Stumpner (2018) examine whether price responses to trade shock
differ across income groups within the same detailed product category (e.g., between different varieties of beer) and find
no difference. In contrast, we document substantial heterogeneity in price responses across product categories that tend to
target different income groups (e.g., between beer and wine).
67We use the spending shares from the CEX for the year 2000, as processed by Borusyak and Jaravel (2018). We match
the CEX consumption categories (UCCs) to ELI as explained in Online Appendix A.C.
68Because we split the sample, the first-stage F statistics in Panel A of Table 11 are low, raising concerns over weak
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Next, we examine whether the estimated heterogeneity in price effects implies substantial distributional
effects across income groups. We compute a first-order approximation to the equivalent variation from
a change in prices for each consumer group i, expressed as a percentage of initial expenditures for each
group,
EVi =
∑
j
sij pˆj ,
where sij is the expenditure share by consumer group i on product category j, and pˆj is the percentage
change in product category j’s price index that is induced by the trade shock. We compute this price
change as pˆj =
βj
100∆ChinaIPj , where βj is our IV estimate for j (which can vary across product categories
as in Panel A of Table 11) and ∆ChinaIPj is the increase in import penetration rate from China in j
between 2000 and 2007.
We compute the difference in the equivalent variation for high-income and low-income groups, stan-
dardized by the average equivalent variation across groups, given by
∆iEV ≡
EV HI − EV LI
EV All
=
∑
j
(
sHIj − s
LI
j
)
βj∆ChinaIPj∑
j s
All
j βj∆ChinaIPj
.
Intuitively, income group i benefits more if it spends more on categories that are more exposed to rising
trade with China (∆ChinaIPj) and that feature a larger price response to the shock (βj).
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Panel B of Table 11 reports the results. Column (1) imposes a homogeneous price response to trade
shocks, using our baseline estimate for β for all categories (-1.91%, from Table 2). We find that higher-
income groups benefit proportionally more from increased trade with China: 6.19% more for college-
educated households relative to those without a college degree; 8.39% more for households earnings above
$60,000 a year relative to those earning less; and 14.53% more for households earning above $100,000
relative to below $30,000.
These differences result from the fact that, between 2000 and 2007, import penetration from China
increased faster in product categories that sell relatively more to higher-income groups (e.g., in consumer
electronics rather than in food products). This finding is confirmed in Column (4) in a sample restricted
to goods only (including services tends to attenuate the differences, because higher-income groups spend
more on services and services are not exposed to trade with China). These patterns are consistent with
prior work by Borusyak and Jaravel (2018).
In Column (2), we allow the price response to vary across product categories, depending on the share
of sales to households earning above $60,000 a year, as in Panel A of Table 11. In this case, the patterns
instruments. The table reports the results with LIML, which yields very similar point estimates and alleviates the potential
concerns. To maximize power, we use both instruments jointly in all specifications. The Hansen J statistics indicate that we
can never reject the overidentifying restrictions, as in the baseline sample.
69As shown in these formulas, when we compare the effects across consumer groups we difference out any GE effect affecting
all product categories. For this reason, our cross-industry IV estimates are well-suited for the estimation of distributional
effects: although they cannot recover aggregate GE effects without additional assumptions, they characterize cross-industry
effects accurately.
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are reversed and higher-income groups now benefit proportionally less: 9.64% less for college relative to
non-college; 19.54% less for those earnings above $60,000 relative to those below; and 23.13% less for those
above $100,000 relative to below $30,000. In Column (3), these differences are magnified, ranging from
13.94% to 36.29%, when we specify heterogeneous price effects using the estimates based on expenditure
elasticities (because with these estimates, the price effects are even larger for low-income groups, as shown
in Panel A of Table 11).
Columns (5) and (6) confirm these findings in the sample of goods: with heterogeneous pass-through
of the trade shocks from China, higher-income groups benefit relatively less, while they benefit relatively
more with homogeneous pass-through. The patterns are similar when using heterogeneous pass-through
rates by the share of sales to college-educated households (not reported).
Taken together, these findings indicate that accounting for heterogeneous price responses across prod-
uct categories can be important to accurately characterize the distributional effects of trade via the
expenditure channel.
VI Conclusion
This paper has presented new evidence on the price effects of trade by leveraging a comprehensive price
data set from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and complementary identification strategies from Autor
et al. (2014) and Pierce and Schott (2016a). Most previous work on the “China shock” emphasized its
detrimental consequences for U.S. employment. Our findings send a different message: the price effects
of trade with China were large and beneficial to U.S. consumers. We estimate that falling prices in
product categories that were more exposed to trade with China created hundreds of thousands of dollars
in consumer surplus for each displaced job. These prices effects are particularly large in product categories
selling to low-income consumers.
Our estimates of the impact of rising import penetration on consumer prices are much larger than
predicted by standard quantitative trade models. We showed that the large price response is accounted
for by falling domestic prices, driven by intensified competition and declining markups. By disrupting
domestic market power, trade can have substantial price effects that benefit consumers. These findings
highlight the importance of including endogenous markups and strategic pricing into quantitative trade
models used for policy analysis. In a period of rising concentration and rising markups in the United States
(Autor et al. (2017), De Loecker et al. (2017)), the pro-competitive effects of trade may be particularly
valuable to U.S. consumers.
The large magnitude of the price effects suggest that it may be possible to compensate those who
suffer from the labor market impacts of trade shocks. Developing and testing such redistribution schemes
is a particularly promising direction for research and policy going forward.
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Figure 1: Testing for Pre-trends
Panel A: Event Study for NTR Gap in Main Analysis Sample
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Panel B: Placebo Reduced-Forms in Extended CPI Sample
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Notes: Panel A reports the estimates from the specification described in equation (2). Panel B reports the binned scatter
plots for the reduced-form specifications in the extended CPI sample. Each dot represents 1% of the data and the OLS
best-fit line is reported in red. The level of observation is an ELI and the specifications are described in Section III.B.
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Figure 2: Instrumental Variable Approach with the NTR Gap
Panel A: First Stage
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Notes: This figure reports the binned scatter plots for the first-stage (Panel A) and reduced-form (Panel B) relationships
of the IV strategy using the NTR gap as an instrument. Each dot represents 1% of the data and the OLS best-fit line are
reported in red. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. Consumption weights are used and the specifications are
described in Section III.C.
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Figure 3: Instrumental Variable Approach with the Change in Import Penetration from China in Other
Developed Economies
Panel A: First Stage
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Notes: This figure reports the binned scatter plots for the first-stage (Panel A) and reduced-form (Panel B) relationships of
the IV strategy using China IP in other developed economies as an instrument. Each dot represents 1% of the data and the
OLS best-fine line are reported in red. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. Consumption weights are used and
the specifications are described in Section III.C.
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Figure 4: Falsification Tests with the French CPI Data
Panel A: Placebo Reduced-Form
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Panel B: Reduced-Form for Triple-Difference Specification
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Notes: This figure reports the binned scatter plots for reduced-form relationships for the placebo test (Panel A) and triple
difference (Panel B), using the NTR gap as an instrument. Each dot represents 1% of the data and the OLS best-fine line is
reported in red. The level of observation is a COICOP-by-period cell. Consumption weights are used and the specifications
are described in Section III.D.
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Figure 5: The Role of Input-Output Linkages for Exposure to Trade with China
Panel A: Relationship between Direct Import Competition and Exposure via Domestic Suppliers
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Panel B: Relationship between Direct and Indirect Import Competition
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Notes: This figure shows the relationship between direct and indirect exposure to trade with China via domestic suppliers
(Panel A) and buyers (Panel B). The specifications correspond to Columns (1) and (4) of Panel A of Table 6. The level
of observation is a 6-digit IO industry-by-period. Each dot represents 1% of the data, using consumption weights, and the
OLS best-fit line is shown in red. The steps to build the measures of indirect exposure to trade with China are described in
Online Appendix A.D.
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Figure 6: The Role of Markups
(a) Average Markup (b) 10th Pctile of Markups
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Notes: This figure reports the reduced-form relationships in the Compustat sample, described in Section IV.D. Each dot
represents 1% of the data, with consumption weights. The level of observation is a NAICS industry-by-period.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observations
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 N Aggreg. Level
Inflation, all (%) 1.15 6.75 -7.48 2.21 7.57
3,774 ELI-by-yearShare of continued products (%) 80.75 16.96 61.10 86.45 96.11
Share of unavailable products 4.92 3.47 1.16 3.94 10.15
∆China IP in U.S. (pp, annualized) 0.66 1.62 0.00 0.00 2.63
444 ELI-by-period
∆China IP in developed economies 0.47 1.07 0.00 0.01 1.63
NTR Gap 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.55
222 ELI
Goods 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00
Durables 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00
Apparel 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
High Tech 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
Contract Intensity 0.41 0.33 0.00 0.41 0.89
Sales Share to College Graduates 0.41 0.10 0.29 0.39 0.56
Income Elasticity 0.98 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.65
Sales Share to Inc.>$60k 0.58 0.10 0.47 0.57 0.72
Sales Share to Inc.>$100k vs. <$30k 0.64 0.14 0.47 0.64 0.82
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, which are described in Sections II.A
and II.B. The sample covers years 1991 to 2007, which are divided into two periods: 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Depending
on the variable, the level of observations is an ELI-by-year, an ELI-by-period, or an ELI.
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Table 2: Baseline Instrumental Variable Estimates
Panel A: With the NTR Gap
∆ China IP (pp) U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
OLS OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NTR Gap 3.33∗∗∗ −7.43∗∗∗
(0.89) (2.21)
∆ China IP (pp) −2.23∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ −2.15∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.32) (0.77)
First-stage F 38.14 23.13
ELI F.E. X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
2000-2007 only X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X
N 444 444 444 444 222
Panel B: With the Change in Import Penetration from China in Other Developed Economies
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.44∗∗∗ −1.27∗∗∗ −1.91∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.28) (0.38)
First-stage F 26.23 405.69 27.34
Hansen J 0.21
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X
Instruments:
∆ China IP Other X X
NTR Gap & ∆ China IP Other X
N 444 222 444
Notes: The specifications are described in Section III.C. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. The sample
includes all ELIs from 1991 to 2007, with variables averaged over two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Consumption
weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Robustness of IV Estimates
Panel A: Specifications with Alternative Sets of Controls
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −2.75∗∗∗ −1.78∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −2.10∗∗∗ −2.94∗∗
(0.79) (0.59) (0.48) (0.62) (1.43)
First-stage F 30.23 24.01 37.50 23.19 9.541
Major Category F.E. X
ELI F.E. X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X
Excluding Deflationary ELIs X
Time-varying controls for High-tech,
X
Contract intensity and Union membership
6-digit IO Fixed Effects X
Instrument: NTR Gap X X X X X
N 444 444 400 444 170
Panel B: Specifications with the Overall Change in Import Penetration
∆ All IP (pp) U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP (pp) 0.78∗∗∗
(0.15)
∆ All IP (pp) −3.68∗∗ −3.67∗∗
(1.60) (1.36)
First-stage F 7.59 18.55
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X X X
Instrument: NTR Gap X X
N 444 444 444
Notes: The specifications are described in Section III.C. In both panels, the level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell
and the sample includes all ELIs from 1991 to 2007, with variables averaged over two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007.
Column (5) of Panel A is an exception: the data is aggregated from ELIs to 6-digit industries defined in the BEA’s IO
table. Consumption weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by ELIs or 6-digit IO industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
54
Table 4: Falsification Tests with the French CPI Data
Panel A: Placebo IV
∆ China IP (in U.S., pp) French CPI Inflation (pp)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR Gap 3.22∗∗ −0.24
(1.27) (1.82)
∆ China IP (in U.S., pp) −0.074 −0.27
(0.38) (0.91)
First-stage F 20.71 15.73
COICOP F.E. X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X
2001-2007 only X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X
N 264 264 264 132
Panel B: Triple-Difference IV
∆ China IP (in U.S., pp) U.S. Infl. Minus French Infl. (pp)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR Gap 3.22∗∗ −8.12∗∗
(1.27) (3.27)
∆ China IP (in U.S., pp) −2.52∗∗ −2.08∗∗
(1.09) (0.93)
First-stage F 20.71 15.73
COICOP F.E. X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X
2000-2007 only X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X
N 264 264 264 132
Notes: The specifications are described in Section III.D. The level of observation is a COICOP-by-period cell, with variables
averaged over two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Consumption weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by
COICOPs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table 5: The Roles of Continued and Domestic Goods
Panel A: IV Estimates for Continued Goods in Main Sample (CPI)
U.S. CPI Inflation, Continued Products (pp) Contribution to U.S. CPI Inflation (pp) [%]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP (pp) −3.00∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ [69%] −1.54∗∗∗[72%]
(0.79) (1.62) (0.46) (0.74)
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X X
N 444 222 444 222
Panel B: IV Estimates for Domestic Goods in Main Sample (CPI)
U.S. CPI Inflation, Domestic Products (pp) Contribution to U.S. CPI Inflation (pp) [%]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.94∗∗∗ −2.73∗∗∗ −0.98∗∗[44%] −1.82∗∗∗[85%]
(0.59) (0.96) (0.42) (0.63)
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X X
N 444 222 444 222
Panel C: IV Estimates for Continued and Domestic Goods in PPI Sample
U.S. PPI Inflation (pp) U.S. PPI Infl., Continued Products (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP (pp) −2.60∗∗∗ −2.10∗∗∗ −2.07∗∗ −1.69∗∗
(1.08) (0.81) (1.06) (0.84)
First-stage F 21.44 24.04 21.44 24.04
NAICS F.E. X X
Period-specific Computers F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Computers F.E. X X
N 550 275 550 275
Notes: Panel A and B use the main analysis sample, while panel C uses the PPI sample. The specifications are described
in Section IV.B. In all panels, the instrument is the NTR gap and the level of observation is an industry-by-period cell.
First-stage F statistics in Panel A and B are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by industries. ∗∗∗ denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table 6: The Role of Input-Output Linkages
Panel A: Correlations between Direct and Indirect Exposure to Trade with China
∆ China IP Supplier, First-order IO (pp) ∆ China IP Buyer, First-order IO (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ China IP (pp) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.01241 −0.00081
(0.014) (0.0154) (0.010) (0.0062) (0.0098) (0.00191)
6-digit IO F.E. X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
Excl. diagonal of IO Table X X
N 170 170 170 170 170 170
Panel B: IV with Controls for Indirect Exposure to Trade with China
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP (pp) −2.943∗∗ −3.214∗∗ −2.892∗∗ −3.241∗∗
(1.435) (1.539) (1.427) (1.582)
First-stage F 9.541 6.691 8.727 6.270
Controls:
∆ China IP Supplier (pp) X X
∆ China IP Buyer (pp) X X
6-digit IO F.E. X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
N 170 170 170 170
Notes: The specifications are described in Section IV.C. The level of observation is a 6-digit IO industry-by-period cell. The
instrument is the NTR gap. Standard errors are clustered by IO industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table 7: The Role of Domestic Production Costs
Panel A: Offshoring and Returns to Scale
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
(1) (2)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.685∗∗∗ −2.01∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.70)
∆ China IP ×Interaction −0.074 0.43
(1.274) (0.71)
Interacted indicators:
Related Trade > p90 X
Capital Intensity > Median X
First-stage F 9.403 8.05
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X X
N 306 306
Panel B: Wages and Total Factor Productivity
TFP Growth (pp) Wage Growth (pp)
4-factor TFP 5-factor TFP All Production Non-production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −0.629∗∗ −0.632∗∗ 0.0806 0.0856 0.4105
(0.290) (0.292) (0.1249) (0.1726) (0.2994)
First-stage F 24.155 24.155 26.328 26.328 26.328
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X X X X X
N 300 300 306 306 306
Notes: The specifications are described in Section IV.C. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. The sample
is restricted to ELIs that can be matched to the NBER-CES Manufacturing database. The instrument is the NTR gap.
Standard errors are clustered by ELIs.∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table 8: The Role of Markups
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
∆ China IP (pp) U.S. Markups (pp)
OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3)
NTR Gap 5.414∗∗∗ −9.52∗∗∗
(1.051) (4.34)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.75∗∗
(0.848)
First-stage F 407.303
NAICS F.E. X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X
N 796 796 796
Panel B: Analysis by Quantile and with Profitability Ratios
U.S. Markups by Quantiles (pp) Profitability
p90 p50 p10 Profits/Sales Profits/Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NTR Gap −17.42∗∗ −7.97∗ −0.84 −7.47∗∗∗ −4.91∗∗∗
(7.28) (4.83) (4.023) (2.66) (2.23)
NAICS F.E. X X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X X
N 796 796 796 796 796
Notes: The specifications and sample are described in Section IV.D. The level of observation is a 6-digit NAICS-by-period
cell. In Panel A, the instrument is the NTR gap. Standard errors are clustered by 6-digit NAICS industries.∗∗∗ denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, ∗ at the 10% level.
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Table 9: Heterogeneity by Market Structure
Panel A: Main Sample (CPI)
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
Interacted Specs. Subsample Specs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −0.70 −1.58∗∗∗ -0.34 −0.77∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.40) (0.48) (0.35) (0.33)
∆ China IP×High Concentration −1.29∗∗
(0.53)
∆ China IP×High China IP 1.50∗∗
(0.60)
First-stage F 5.76 28.77 8.26 2.64 34.23
ELI F.E. X X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X X
Subsample All High Conc. Low Conc. High China IP Low China IP
Panel B: PPI Sample
U.S. PPI Inflation (pp)
Interacted Specs. Subsample Specs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −0.47∗∗∗ −3.47∗∗∗ −0.31 0.18 −1.88∗∗
(0.26) (1.72) (0.40) (0.57) (0.82)
∆ China IP×High Concentration −1.70∗∗
(0.96)
∆ China IP×High China IP 2.31∗∗
(1.08)
First-stage F 111.85 209.20 174.75 26.10 296.58
NAICS F.E. X X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X X
Subsample All High Conc. Low Conc. High China IP Low China IP
Notes: The specifications and samples are described in Section IV.D. “High Concentration” product categories have a level
of domestic market concentration above median in 1997 (resp. below for “Low Concentration”). “High China IP” product
categories have an import penetration rate from China above the 75th percentile in 1999 (resp. below for “Low China IP”).
The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell in Panel A, and a 6-digit NAICS-by-period cell in Panel B. In both panels,
standard errors are clustered by industries.∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, ∗ at the
10% level.
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Table 10: Consumer Surplus per Displaced Job across Product Categories
Panel A: Summary Statistics across Product Categories (year 2000, goods only)
Total S.D. p10 p50 p90
Average Labor Earnings ($) 33,305 10,276 21,318 28,875 43,321
Value-Added of Domestic Producers ($) / Job 121,897 179,052 55,531 98,172 268,606
Total Sales of Domestic Producers ($) / Job 305,250 262,578 103,795 225,279 545,720
Domestic Absorption ($) / Job 390,998 376,320 150,591 357,974 625,686
N = 174
Panel B: Estimates of Consumer Surplus per Displaced Job
Uniform 1pp Increase in Import Observed Change in Import
Penetration from China Penetration from China, 2000-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumer Surplus per Displaced Job, $ 477,555 317,383 411,464 433,565 288,147 373,562
IV Estimates:
- NTR gap: βprice = −2.23 βemp = −1.834 X X
- ∆China IP Other: βprice = −1.44 βemp = −1.774 X X
- Both: βprice = −1.91 βemp = −1.815 X X
Notes: Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample of ELIs that can be matched to the NBER-CES Manufacturing
database. Panel B presents estimates of consumer surplus per displaced jobs in this sample, following the methodology
discussed in Section V.A, in the year 2000. For Columns (1) to (3), the increase in consumer surplus per displaced job is
computed as
βprice
βemp
·
∑
j Consj∑
j Empj
. Columns (4) to (6) use the formula
βprice
βemp
·
∑
j ∆ChinaIPj ·Consj∑
j ∆ChinaIPj ·Empj
, which gives larger weights to
product categories with a larger increase in trade with China. All values are given in dollars for the year 2000.
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Table 11: Distributional Effects via the Expenditure Channel
Panel A: IV Estimates across Subsamples
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS: ∆ China IP (pp) −4.28∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗ −4.62∗∗ −0.83∗∗ −2.93∗∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗
(1.59) (0.35) (1.94) (0.40) (1.00) (0.41)
LIML: ∆ China IP (pp) −4.57∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗ −5.42∗∗ −0.84∗∗ −3.18∗∗∗ −1.22∗∗∗
(1.80) (0.37) (2.61) (0.42) (1.17) (0.43)
First-stage F 6.80 8.64 3.07 12.13 10.01 7.39
Hansen J 0.31 0.40 0.64 0.23 0.08 0.36
Above/below median? < > < > < >
Splitting variable Sales Share to College Educ. Expenditure Elasticity Sales Share to Inc. > $60k
ELI F.E. & period F.E. X X X
N 166 166 166 166 166 166
Panel B: Estimates of Distributional Effects
All Product Categories Goods Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distributional Effects, EV
HI
−EV LI
EV All
:
- College vs. non-college 6.19% -9.64% -13.94% 19.46% 3.20% -1.22%
- Income above vs. below $60k 8.39% -19.54% -26.60% 17.47% -10.03% -16.98%
- Income above $100k vs. below $30k 14.53% -23.13% -36.29% 26.97% -9.35% -22.04%
IV Estimates:
- Homogeneous X X
- Heterogeneous by sales share to inc. > $60k X X
- Heterogeneous by expenditure elasticity X X
Notes: Panel A reports the results of IV specifications across subsamples, which are described in Section V.B. The level of
observation is an ELI-by-period. Standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level. Panel B reports the estimates of distributional effects across groups, using the formula EV
HI
−EV LI
EV All
=
∑
j(s
HI
j −s
LI
j )βj∆ChinaIPj
∑
j s
All
j
βj∆ChinaIPj
, described in Section V.B.
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A Data Appendix
A.A Consumer Price Index Data
This section contains information about the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For additional information, we
refer the reader to chapter 17 of the BLS Handbook of Methods (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018)).
Overview: Our price dataset is known as the CPI Research Database (CPI-RDB), which is main-
tained by the Division of Price and Number Research at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is a restricted
access data set that contains the micro data underlying the non-shelter component of Consumer Price
Index (CPI). The CPI-RDB contains all product-level prices on goods and services collected by the BLS
for use in the CPI since January 1988.70 Although the number of individual prices used to construct the
CPI has changed over time, the BLS currently collects data on approximately 80,000 core products and
130,000 total products per month from about 27,000 retail outlets across 87 geographical areas in the
United States. The sampling frame for the non-shelter component of the CPI represents about 70% of
consumer expenditures. Descriptions of and summary statistics for the CPI-RDB in prior years of data
can be found in Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Bils et al. (2012) who base
their research on the same dataset.
The CPI-RDB contains prices and sampling weights for each individual item in the non-shelter com-
ponent of the CPI. We use the CPI-RDB to construct inflation by disaggregated categories called Entry
Level Items (ELIs). The BLS defines ELIs for the practical construction of the CPI. There are nearly
360 ELIs between 1988-1998 and 270 ELIs after a 1998 revision of definitions. We collapse the number
of ELIs to 222 in order to maintain a consistent definition before and after a 1998 revision to the ELI
structure. Examples of ELIs are “Carbonated Drinks,” “Washers & Dryers,” “Woman’s Outerwear,” and
“Funeral Expenses”.
The item structure of the CPI is grouped from broadest to most narrow product category: Major
Groups, Item Strata, and ELIs. The Appendix Table of Konny et al. (2019) provides the list of ELIs,
item structure, item weights and number of quotes contained in the CPI as of August 2018 (note that the
sample used in our paper does not draw upon post-2007 data; the full list corresponding to our sample is
available upon request).
Index Construction: The BLS constructs a matched-model price index, which means that the BLS
selects a set of products and then collects the prices for those products over time. This enables the BLS
to construct price changes for the same product each month. These price changes are then aggregated to
construct elementary price indexes for each product category.
Aggregation. Aggregation to the ELI proceeds as follows. Let pi,t be a price quote within a given
70The CPI-RDB was extended to cover 1977-1987 by Nakamura et al. (2018).
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product category (ELI) in a month t, and let ωi,t−1 be its accompanying sampling weight. Following BLS
procedure, we aggregate individual price quotes to the product category level using a Geometric Laspeyres
Index (or, as it is alternatively called, the “Geometric Mean Index”), in which quantity information is
incorporated through the share of expenditures in the base period,
It = exp
(
N∑
i=1
ωi,t−1 log
(
pi,t
pi,t−1
))
where N is the supposed number of price quotes collected between times t − 1 and t, and the sampling
weight ωi,t−1 measures product-level expenditures,
71
ωi,t−1 =
N∑
i=1
pi,t−1qi,t−1∑N
j=1 pj,t−1qj,t−1
.
This price index can be derived from a more general CES price aggregator when the elasticity of substi-
tution is 1. The general CES price index is,
ICESt =
Pt
Pt−1
=
N∑
i=1
ωi,t−1
(
pi,t
pi,t−1
)1−σ
,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and the CES price aggregator is,
Pt =
(
N∑
i=1
p1−σi,t
)
.
Item Rotation. New products are phased into the CPI once every four years after initial introduction
to the index. In other words, about a quarter of items in the CPI are newly introduced within any given
year. After the BLS identifies a new outlet and product, the new product is not included in the CPI
until a price is recorded for two consecutive periods, thereby creating a record for the item’s initial price
change, pi,t/pi,t−1, for inclusion in the CPI.
Forced Substitutions and Imputations. When a product is unable to be priced in a given month, the
BLS implements one of two types of procedures. If the product is only temporarily unavailable, then the
BLS imputes a value to the missing price observation. This value tends to be the average price change of
all available products, which is therefore equivalent to dropping that product’s price change from the index
for the period. If the product is no longer available at an outlet, then there are two types of substitutions.
The first is a “comparable substitution”, which replaces the previous item with one that is similar in
sufficiently many dimensions to consider it the same fundamental item. In this case there is no quality
adjustment applied to the prices of the new or old product versions. The second is a ✧non-comparable
substitution✧, which occurs when there is no available item that is a sufficiently close substitute to the
71The BLS weighting procedure for aggregation to the product category level has two components. First, the main product-
level weighting is performed by BLS through probability sampling, i.e. through the selection of retail outlets and individual
products within those outlets. Second, the CPI-RDB provides additional weights for each product-level price that correct
for sampling error to ensure weights reflect expenditure shares.
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old. In this case, the BLS implements a quality adjustment to net out the difference in price between
old and new version that can be attributed to differences in underlying product characteristics. We refer
the reader to Moulton and Moses (1997) for a discussion of each type of non-comparable substitution in
practice. Bils et al. (2012) document that from 1990-2009 the monthly rate of forced item substitutions
is approximately 3 percent and the monthly rate of temporary unavailability is 12 percent.
From the perspective of price index construction, the quality adjustment can be understood as follows.
Suppose product i is currently in its v-th vintage or version. Let ϕvi be consumers’ perceived quality from
version v of product i. Likewise pvi,t is the price of the v-th vintage or version of product i. The quality-
adjusted price is pvi,t/ϕ
v
i and therefore the associated quality-adjusted price change in the absence of a
substitution is,
pvi,t/ϕ
v
i
pvi,t−1/ϕ
v
i
=
pvi,t
pvi,t−1
.
When the BLS initiates a substitution, it compares two versions (denote them v and v + 1) that have
different underlying product characteristics and therefore different perceived quality from consumers. The
quality-adjusted price change during a product substitution from version v to version v + 1 of product i
is,
pv+1i,t /ϕ
v+1
i
pvi,t−1/ϕ
v
i
=
1
ϕv+1i /ϕ
v
i
×
pv+1i,t
pvi,t−1
,
where ϕv+1i /ϕ
v
i is the ideal quality adjustment that the BLS approximates and nets out from price change
at substitution.
Specification Checklists. When a BLS price collector prices an item for the first time, they create a
detailed description of its characteristics. This description is partially contained in a pre-written checklist
that ensures the price collector records information that is necessary to identify that item upon returning to
the outlet, or to identify an appropriate substitute for that item if it is no longer available. A specification
checklist can be also be used to prevent inconsistencies in price collection from month to month.
This paper utilizes specification checklists to identify imported goods in the CPI. For some product
categories, there is an explicit field for denoting the product’s country of origin (either as a pre-designed
checkbox or as a write-in field). For all categories, there are open fields that price collectors use to
write information that has not been explicitly coded into checkboxes and will include country of origin if
the United States is not the explicit product manufacturer. Product categories that tend to contain an
explicit check box for country of origin are apparel, non-perishable food items, furniture and household
furnishings, electronics, and motor vehicles.72
The procedure by which we identify country of origin is as follows. If a checkbox exists then we
can find out whether the U.S. produced the product. If not, then we must rely on a write-in text field.
We use a fuzzy text match to identify country of origin in such cases. Though no special denotation is
72In fact, the apparel industry lobbied Congress in the 1970s to require that country of origin be placed on tags by law.
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required for domestically produced products, we searched for text strings that denote domestic production
such as ✧United States✧, ✧USA✧, ✧US✧, ✧U.S✧, ✧U.S.A✧, ✧U.SA✧, ✧US.A✧, ✧USA.✧, ✧U. S.✧, ✧domestic✧,
✧Alabama✧, ✧Alaska✧, ✧Arizona✧, etc. as well as state abbreviations and the names of major U.S. cities.
We also searched for text strings denoting non-domestic production such as ✧Import✧, ✧Impt✧, ✧Imprt✧,
✧Foreign✧ and the names and abbreviations of possible importing countries (including countries that
existed earlier in the sample but do not exist in 2019) and foreign cities. Remaining cases for which a
country of origin was not explicitly identified was assigned to the United States. To validate text matches,
a random 10% sample of text fields was manually inspected and multiple text matching algorithms were
implemented to ensure robustness.
Data Processing. Price collectors flag substitutions and abnormally large price changes, which ana-
lysts use to implement quality adjustments and imputations. However, in order to reduce the sensitivity
of price indexes to exceptionally large price changes as well as avoid respondent disclosure (as per BLS
disclosure avoidance policy) we exclude positive or negative price changes greater than 500%. These
outliers occur rarely in the sample.
ELI definitions changed in 1998 and new ELIs have been introduced since 2007. There are nearly
360 ELIs between 1988-1998 and 270 ELIs after the 1998 revision of definitions. We collapse the number
of ELIs to 222 in order to maintain a consistent definition before and after a 1998 revision to the ELI
structure. To do this, we matched ELI categories based on the category descriptions available in the
BLS’ documentation for the CPI Research Database. The full list of ELIs and their average consumption
weights over the sample period is available upon request.
Finally, we define a set of ELIs as Durable Goods, motivated by the set of products Bils (2009) studied.
This set of products tend to be durables that require more use of quality adjustments than the rest of
the product categories in the CPI. The ELIs in this list include “personal computers and peripherals”,
“telephones”, “watches”, “electric appliances”, “refrigerator”, “washers and dryers”, “microwave ovens”,
“small kitchen appliances”, “clocks”, “televisions”, “audio equipment”, and “other video equipment”; the
full list is available from Bils (2009). We use fixed effects for these durable goods to control for inflation
trends that may be introduced through methodological issues in the construction of inflation measures
for these products.
Data Limitations. Certain data limitations motivate the specifications we estimate. First, the CPI
sampling methods limit what can be said of product variety growth over time. The CPI chooses a set
of products and follows those products over time. Planned item rotations introduce new products to the
sample, but the number of new items is pre-selected. While forced item substitutions could entail product
turnover from old to new varieties, the number of price quotes in the CPI is not changed through forced
substitution. Therefore, the CPI introduces new product varieties in a way that does not explicitly track
the number of varieties in the economy’s consumption set.
Second, we follow the aggregation procedures used by the BLS in constructing the CPI. This means
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that price change within an ELI assumes a particular elasticity of substitution, specifically a unit elasticity.
This elasticity is motivated by a desire to allow for consumer substitution in utility, but without the proper
data for identifying the structural elasticity of substitution in each ELI. For the purposes of the current
paper, however, a unit elasticity of substitution obviates us from identifying the elasticity’s value in
each ELI. Furthermore, the unit elasticity is a conservative parameter choice: if the true elasticity of
substitution is above one (between products within the same ELI), then the unit elasticity of substitution
understates the effect of the China shock on inflation within an ELI. Suppose that the China shock
increases price dispersion within an ELI. In this case, a higher elasticity of substitution (σ > 1) implies
that consumers are more sensitive to price changes and substitute their purchases to lower priced items.
In turn, the product category’s price index will be lower when the elasticity of substitution is higher.
Empirically, we find that product categories that experience higher Chinese import penetration following
China joining the WTO are indeed characterized by higher price dispersion. Therefore, by choosing a
higher elasticity of substitution we would estimate a larger deflationary effect from increased Chinese
trade (which would be more difficult to reconcile by the class of trade models we study in Section IV.A).
A.B Historical CPI Data
To check for pre-trends in the CPI data, it is useful to have a long time series. Accordingly, for pre-trend
exercises in the CPI data we incorporate pre-1988 inflation by Entry Level Item into our analysis.
The CPI-RDB was extended to cover 1977-1987 by Nakamura et al. (2018). This data was scanned
from microfilm cartridges and converted to digital format using Optical Character Recognition software.
The final data set contains prices for 80,000 to 100,000 products per month. For each product, the data set
contains the product’s price (in level and percent change from the preceding period), a product identifier,
the Entry Level Item (ELI) classifier for the product, an outlet identifier, the location of the outlet, a
flag indicating whether the product was on sale, and a flag indicating whether the product underwent an
item replacement procedure (and, if so, the flag indicates what type of quality adjustment or imputation
was made).
Because ELI definitions changed after 1987, Nakamura et al. (2018) created a concordance that maps
pre-1988 ELIs into post-1988 ELI definitions. We use their concordance to create a consistent set of ELIs
across time.
A.C Crosswalks
Our data building process uses a total of eight crosswalks, including five new crosswalks we build by hand.
We build three many-to-one crosswalks to the ELI product categories that define our main analysis
sample: from SIC industries to ELIs, from NAICS industries to ELIs, and from UCC consumption
categories to ELIs. Because SIC, NAICS and CEX categories are significantly more detailed than ELI
categories, a many-to-one match is convenient. Furthermore, we build a many-to-one match of ELIs to
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6-digit IO industries from the BEA’s 2007 input-output table (as the BEA’s industries are a bit less
detailed than ELIs). Finally, for the falsification test using French CPI data, we build a many-to-one
crosswalk from the (less detailed) COICOP categories to ELIs. The match is made by hand according to
a comparison of the description of the product descriptions (as well as individual item names contained
in in the CPI-RDB and discussions with BLS analysts).
Finally, we rely on three crosswalks from prior work: HS to NAICS codes from Pierce and Schott
(2012), NAICS to IO codes from Borusyak and Jaravel (2018), and SIC to NAICS codes from the U.S.
Census Bureau.
A.D Variables based on the 2007 Input-Output Table
We use the BEA’s 2007 input-output table to measure indirect exposure to trade with China. An industry
j may be directly expose to trade with China via import competition in its own product category. But it
may also be exposed indirectly, for example if it buys intermediate inputs from China (or from domestic
producers who face increased competition with China) or if it sells some of its output to domestic producers
who are increasingly likely to buy from China instead. This appendix describes the computation of indirect
exposure to China, via either supplier effects (i.e., via the cost of intermediate inputs) or buyer effects
(i.e., import competition from China over the supply of intermediate inputs).73
Indirect exposure via supplier effects. We compute the change in the import penetration rate from
China in industry j’s total output. By definition this quantity will be small if value-added is a high share
of industry j’s output. In robustness check, we implement a similar procedure to compute the import
penetration rate from China in industry j’s intermediate inputs (instead of j’s output).
We carry out this analysis using the BEA’s “Use table.” In a pre-processing step, we must obtain
a square industry Use Table, denoted U I . Following the methodology of the BEA, we do so by pre-
multiplying the original (non-symmetric) Use Table U by the commodity-normalized Make Table MC
(which is close to an identity matrix). The Make Table gives the share of total production of each
commodity across all industries, and each of its columns sums up to one.74
A stylized example with two industries illustrates the way we measure supplier effects. The matrix
formulas given below apply regardless of the number of industries.
73Our analysis is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2016)’s study of input-output linkages, except that they use the 1992 IO
table. The 2007 IO table is much more disaggregated and hence potentially more accurate.
74U is commodity (row) by industries (columns), while UI is industry by industry. MC is (row) by commodities (columns).
Each column of MC sums to one because it reflects the share of production of each commodity produced by each industry.
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Commodity/Industry A B
A 30 5
B 10 40
Total Cost of Intermediate Inputs 40 45
Value Added (Labor, Capital, Surplus) 60 155
Total Output 100 200
Commodity/Industry A B
A 0.3 0.025
B 0.1 0.2
Total Intermediates 0.4 0.225
Value Added (Labor, Capital, Surplus) 0.6 0.775
Total Output 1 1
(a) Use Table for Supplier Analysis, Dollars (b) Use Table for Supplier Analysis, Shares
In this stylized example, we define the “supplier first-order linkages” as follows:
DC =
(
0.3 0.025
0.1 0.2
)
Conceptually, this matrix gives the direct input requirement (in dollars, expressed as a fraction of de-
mand normalized to $1). To produce y =
(
Ay
By
)
, the economy requires DC · y units of inputs x =(
0.3 ·Ay + 0.025 ·By
0.1 ·Ay + 0.2 ·By
)
. For the “second round” of inputs, the economy requiresDC ·
(
DC · y
)
=
(
DC
)2
· y,
etc. We first focus on direct effects only.
Assume that the vector of import penetration across industries is given by:
IP =
(
A B
10% 20%
)
By also assuming that the IP ratios apply to both sales of intermediates inputs and final use products,
we can readily apply them to the use of intermediates. We can then compute the “first-order” importance
of IP in the production cost of each industry:
CIP,F irstOrder = IP ·DC =
(
A B
5% 4.25%
)
Next, we want to characterize the importance of IP in production cost for each industry, accounting
for higher-order input-output effects. Conceptually, we adjust the IP measure (denoted IP above) so
that it reflects the importance of import penetration in the “IO-adjusted cost structure”, not simply its
importance in the direct supplier industries. Production of intermediates requires production of other
intermediates, which in turn also relies on intermediates, etc. We assess the total importance of imports
by using the following matrix, which captures the infinite chain of spending (“production requirements”)
that is set off when requiring an additional unit of each input:
TC = I +DC +
(
DC
)2
+
(
DC
)3
+ ... =
(
I − DC
)
−1
We then normalize matrix TC so that each column sums to one, denoted TC,Norm. Conceptually,
the normalized matrix shows the share of each industry in “total induced (upstream) input cost”. We
then compute average import penetration, using the entries of TC,Norm as weights:
IP ,IO,C = IP · TC,Norm
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Finally, our “IO-adjusted” importance of IP in production cost in each industry is given by:
CIP,IO = IP IO,C ·DC
We then compute how these measures vary over time. We keep the DC matrix fixed since we only have
detailed data on IO linkages in 2007, but the import penetration vectors vary over time.
Indirect exposure via buyer effects. We compute the change in the import penetration rate from China
in “buyer industries”, scaled by (1 - share of industry sales to final consumers). This quantity is by
definition low if an industry is primarily selling to final consumers.
We carry out this analysis using the BEA’s “Use table”, processed as discussed above.
Industry/Commodity A B
A 30 10
B 5 40
(1) Total Sales to Intermediate Inputs 35 50
(2) Total Sales to Domestic Final Consumers
500 175
(personal consumption, investment, govt., some of which from imports)
(3) Exports 20 75
(4) Imports -455 -100
Total Output 100 200
Domestic Absorption = (1)+(2) 535 225
Sales of Domestic Producers Excluding Exports = (1)+(2)+(4) 80 125
Total Sales of Domestic Producers = (1)+(2)+(3)+(4) = Total Output 100 200
(c) Use Table for Buyer Analysis, Dollars
Commodity A B
(1) Share of Domestic Producers in Domestic Sales
0.1495 0.5555
= Sales of Domestic Producers Excluding Exports/Domestic Absorption
Share of Sales of Domestic Producers to Domestic Intermediates
0.052 0.1388
= Total Sales to Intermediate Inputs * (1) / Total Sales of Domestic Producers
Share of Domestic Sales of Domestic Producers to Domestic Intermediates
0.065 0.222
= Total Sales to Intermediate Inputs/Domestic Absorption
(d) Use Table for Buyer Analysis, Shares
In our baseline analysis, we use the share of domestic intermediates in the total sales of domestic
producers. The definition is given in Figure (d) above. We define the buyer first-order effects as follows:
DB =
(
0.04485 0.027775
0.007475 0.1111
)
When selling y =
(
Ay
By
)
units of output, domestic producers sell DB · y units as inputs to other
domestic producers, denoted x =
(
0.04485 ·Ay + 0.027775 ·By
0.007475 ·Ay + 0.1111 ·By
)
. In the “second round” they sell
DB·
(
DB · y
)
=
(
DB
)2
· y, etc.
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Assume that the vector of import penetration across industries is:
IP =
(
A B
10% 20%
)
We can then compute the “first-order” importance of IP for “indirect import competition” in each
industry, which is defined as follows:
BIP,F irstOrder = IP ·DB =
(
A B
0.598% 2.49%
)
These quantities indicate the degree of import competition faced by each industry in downstream
markets. In this example, it is very low for industry A because intermediates are not very important for
demand in that industry; but it is larger for industry B.
Following a reasoning similar to before, we account for higher-order input output linkages as follows:
TB = I +DB +
(
DB
)2
+
(
DB
)3
+ ... =
(
I − DB
)
−1
We then normalize matrix TB so that each column sums to one, denoted TB,Norm. Conceptually,
the normalized matrix shows the share of each industry in “total induced (downstream) sales”. We then
compute average import penetration, using the entry of TB,Norm as weights:
IP ,IO,B = IP · TB,Norm
Finally, our “IO-adjusted” importance of indirect import competition for each industry is:
BIP,IO = IP IO,B ·DB
As for the supplier effects, we keep the DB matrix fixed but let the import penetration vectors vary
over time.
A.E Producer Price Index Data
This section contains information about the Producer Price Index (PPI). Further information is available
from the chapter 14 of the BLS Handbook of Methods (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018)).
Overview. We use data from the PPI’s Research Database (PPI-RDB) from January 1987 to August
2008.75 The BLS defines PPI prices as “net revenue accruing to a specified producing establishment from
a specified kind of buyer for a specified product shipped under specified transaction terms on a specified
day of the month.” Accordingly, BLS requests (via fax or email) each establishment in the PPI sample
to report the price of actual shipments transacted, as of the Tuesday of the week containing the 13th of
the month. If an establishment fails to respond in a given month, the BLS price collector follows up with
a phone call.
75See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009) for additional details about the PPI-RDB.
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Sample Frame. The BLS collects prices from approximately 25,000 to 30,000 establishments for
approximately 100,000 individual items on a monthly basis. The sample is constructed from the universe
of establishments in the U.S., derived from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages business
register that is collected in the enforcement of unemployment insurance programs in each U.S. state.
Individual establishments within an industry are chosen probabilistically based on the total value of
shipments, or total number of employees. Individual items are then selected by a BLS price collector
during a field visit to the establishment according to value of shipment.
Industries are defined as a 6-digit NAICS category and span goods producing sectors (e.g., mining,
manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, forestry, energy and construction industries) for the whole sample.
Service sector industries were introduced to the PPI in 2005, which we exclude from our analysis.
Index Construction. The PPI constructs a matched-model price index, much like the CPI does. Once
prices have been recorded for an item i at times t− 1 and t, we can compute price change as pi,t/pi,t−1.
These price changes are aggregated to the 6-digit NAICS classifications (or any high aggregations thereof)
according to a Laspeyres price index formula. The Laspeyres is constructed as,
ILt =
∑N
i=1 pi,tqi,t−1∑N
j=1 pj,t−1qj,t−1
=
N∑
i=1
ωi,t−1
pi,t
pi,t−1
where
ωi,t−1 =
pi,t−1qi,t−1∑N
j=1 pj,t−1qj,t−1
is item i’s share of total sales in the sample from the NAICS category. Notice that the Laspeyres index
can be re-expressed as a CES price index (see Section A.A) with an assumed elasticity of substitution of
zero, which is derived from a Leontief aggregate production technology.
Item Rotation. Establishments continue to report prices for a given item for five to seven years on
average. After these five to seven years, the BLS selects a new sample for the 6-digit NAICS industry.
Like item rotation in the CPI, the new sample attempts to better reflect the structure of a particular
industry in terms of establishments and products over time.
Forced Substitutions. When an item is no longer produced, or future production has incorporated a
change in the product’s characteristics, the BLS must initiate a substitution. If the updated product is
a sufficiently close substitute for the one it replaces, then the two product versions’ prices are compared
directly. However, when a close substitute is not available, the BLS and the establishment choose a
substitute product that possesses as similar product characteristics as possible. The BLS then implements
a quality adjustment to eliminate differences in prices across products that are due to changes in underlying
product characteristics. When a comparison between the new and old products is not feasible, or the
respondent does not provide a price record in a given month, the BLS imputes the change in price, usually
as the average price change across all products for which reliable information is available. The quality
adjustment can be represented in the index by introducing notation for product quality, as in Section
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A.A.
Data Processing. In order to reduce the sensitivity of price indexes to exceptionally large price changes
as well as avoid respondent disclosure (as per BLS disclosure avoidance policy) we exclude positive or
negative price changes greater than 500%. These outliers occur rarely in the sample.
A.F Estimated Markups and Profitability Ratios
In this appendix, we describe how we use Compustat to estimate markups and compute profitability
ratios.
Estimated Markup. To estimate markup in Compustat, we follow De Loecker et al. (2017). They
derive expressions for markups based on observables by exploiting cost minimization of a variable input of
production. A key assumption underlying this approach is that the producer is a “price taker” for variable
inputs. The main advantages of this approach are twofold: (a) theoretically, it does not require a specific
model of how firms compete or specific assumptions about the demand system; (b) empirically, firms’
financial statements are sufficient to implement this approach, there is no need for separate information
on prices and quantities.
In this framework, the gross markup is defined as the difference between the consumer price PQit and
the shadow value of one more unit of production to the firm, λit, which is itself defined by the firm’s
cost-minimization problem. For firm i at time t, output comes from a production function using variable
inputs (labor, intermediates, materials, etc.), capital and a fixed cost. Intuitively, the gross markup is the
wedge between the willingness to pay of consumers for one more unit of output (PQit ) and the “reservation
price” of the supplier to produce one more unit (λit).
The reservation price, λit, can be solved for in terms of observables by solving the cost-minimization
problem of the producer,
Λ = min
Vit,Kit
P Vit Vit + ritKit + Fit − λit
(
Q(Vit,Kit)−Qit
)
,
where the first-order condition with respect to variable costs yields an expression for λit,
λit =
P Vit Vit
Qit
θvit, (A1)
where the output elasticity of production with respect to variable inputs is,
θvit ≡
∂Q(Vit,Kit)
∂Vit
Vit
Qit
.
De Loecker et al. (2017) estimate the output elasticity of production with respect to variable inputs,
θvit, using various production functions. Defining the gross markups as µit ≡
PQit
λit
and substituting into
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equation (A1) yields
µit = θ
v
it
PQit Qit
P Vit Vit︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡
SALESit
COGSit
. (A2)
For intuition, it is instructive to consider the following heuristic derivation of the markup. Conceptu-
ally, the markup can be viewed as the wedge between the reservation price the consumer would be willing
to pay to have the producer use one more unit of variable inputs (PQit ×
∂Q(.)
∂Vit
), and the reservation price
of the producer for doing so (P Vit ). The wedge is therefore given by µit =
PQit
PVit
∂Q(.)
∂Vit
=
PQitQit
PVit Vit
· θvit, as in
(A2). A positive wedge between reservation prices constitutes an inefficiency.
We follow the data construction steps of De Loecker et al. (2017) in the Compustat North America –
Fundamentals Annual data set (obtained through WRDS). The steps we take are identical to De Loecker
et al. (2017), except that we assign a firm to a unique 6-digit NAICS industry (instead of the focus on
more aggregated 2-digit industries in their paper). We eliminate firms with reported cost-of-goods to
sales, and SG&A to sales ratio’s in the top and bottom 1 percent, where the percentiles are computed for
each year separately.
Following equation (A2), two key variables are used two compute markups: total sales (variable
“SALE” in Compustat) and the total cost of goods sold (variable “COGS” in Compustat). Furthermore,
for our baseline specification we use a time-invariant and sector-invariant elasticity θvit = 0.85, because
De Loecker et al. (2017) show that their results are driven by changes in the ratio of sales to cost of goods
sold, and remain very similar whether or not the elasticity is allowed to vary over time and across sectors
(see their Appendix B1). Panel A of Online Appendix Figure A8 reports trends in markups over time:
the average markup is increasing, but this increase is not uniform across the markup distribution and is
driven by the top of the distribution.
Profitability Ratios. For robustness analysis, we compute two profitability ratios, profits over sales
and profits over assets. To calculate profits, we use the markup measure in equation (A2) and account
for all costs, including fixed costs:
Πi = Sit − P
V
t Vt − rtKit − P
X
t Xt.
With Πi denoting profits, the profit rate as a share of sales is πit =
Πi
SALEit
. This measure scales the
profits by firm size as measured by its revenue. From an investment viewpoint, we may want to measure
the return on assets. Therefore we also compute an analogous measure, now dividing by total capital
instead of total sales: πit =
Πi
Kit
.
Panel B of Online Appendix Figure A8 reports the trends in profitability over time. The trends paint
a picture similar to the markup trends: profitability has been increasing over time, and particularly so
for the most profitable firms.
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B Theory Appendix
B.A Connecting the IV Specification to First-Order Price Effects
In this appendix, we derive equation (5) in the main text. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that
the elasticity of substitution σ governs the relationship between a percentage change in relative prices
and a percentage change in relative expenditure shares. Second, we re-write this relationship to match
the definition of the variables used in our empirical analysis.
Suppose there are two countries, the U.S. and China, denoted by ”us” and ”ch” respectively. Let
P ji and X
j
i denote the price and quantity of industry i’s output produced in country j ∈ us, ch. For
notational compactness we will omit the industry subscript in the remainder of this section. Denote the
expenditure share on Chinese goods by Sch = P chXch/(P usXus+P chXch) so that the share of U.S. goods
is 1− Sch. Lastly, define the elasticity of substitution between U.S. and Chinese produced goods by
σ ≡ −
d log(Xch/Xus)
d log(P ch/P us)
Accordingly, the elasticity of relative expenditures, (P chXch)/(P usXus), with respect to relative prices,
P ch/P us, is
d log(P chXch/P usXus)
d log(P ch/P us)
=
1
Xch/Xus
·
(
(Xch/Xus) + (P ch/P us)
d(Xch/Xus)
d(P ch/P us)
)
.
Rearranging and applying the definition of σ gives,
d log(P ch/P us) = −
1
σ − 1
d log
(
P chXch
P usXus
)
Then, given the definitions of U.S. and Chinese goods expenditure shares, we know that,
d log
(
P chXch
P usXus
)
=
P usXus
P chXch
d
(
P chXch
P usXus
)
=
1− Sch
Sch
d
(
Sch
1− Sch
)
=
1− Sch
Sch
(
1
1− Sch
+
Sch
(1− Sch)2
)
dSch
=
(
1
1− Sch
)
·
dSch
Sch
.
By assuming that the domestic price remains unchanged, we can write,
d log
(
P ch
P us
)
= d log(P ch) ≡ πch,
π ≡ d log (P ) = Schπch
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Hence, plugging in the previous expressions, we obtain equation (5) as desired,
π = −
1
(σ − 1)(1− Sch)
dSch.
In the data, we work with a first-order approximation to this equation (i.e. with the observed change in
import penetration from China, ∆ChinaIP ) rather than with the infinitesimal change dSch that makes
the equation hold exactly.
B.B Connecting the IV Specification to Arkolakis et al. (2012)
In this appendix, we derive our cross-industry IV specification (equation (3) in the main text) from a multi-
sector version of the baseline trade model in Arkolakis et al. (2012). We show that the IV specification
implied by the model requires using the log change in the domestic expenditure share as the endogenous
variable (as we do in Online Appendix Table A9), rather than the change in import penetration from
China (as we do in the baseline specifications in Table 2). We start by discussing the case with a single
sector, then move to many sectors.
One sector economy. There are n countries, each producing is a good. Suppose that there is a
representative consumer in country j with CES preferences over goods varieties i = 1, . . . , n, including
the domestic good (e.g., i = j). Let the price and quantity demanded of variety i consumed in the
home country j (in our case, the United States) be denoted by pij and qij , respectively. Accordingly, the
representative consumer’s preferences are
Uj =
(
n∑
i=1
q
(σ−1)/σ
ij
)σ/(σ−1)
,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, and the associated price of a representative
consumption bundle is
Pj =
(
n∑
i=1
(wiτij)
1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
,
where we have assumed that markets are perfectly competitive within a variety so that the price pij equals
the marginal cost of production, wi, times variable trade costs of importing country i’s variety, τij . These
preferences yield a standard demand function for variety i
Xij =
(
wiτij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj ,
where Xij is the expenditure on variety i in the home country j, and Yj ≡
∑n
i=1Xij is total expenditures
in country j. Accordingly, denote variety i’s expenditure share in country j as λij ≡ Xij/Yj . Finally,
given marginal cost pricing and the demand structure, we can write the elasticity of relative imports with
respect to variable trade costs as
θ ≡ 1− σ =
∂ln(Xij/Xjj)
∂ln(τij)
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Next we will derive an expression for the change in real income for country j with respect to a change
in variable trade costs. Assume that a representative firm possesses a linear production technology that
transforms labor into output of the home country’s variety. Labor is the single factor of production,
which is perfectly mobile across sectors but immobile across countries. Further assume that country j is
endowed with Lj units of labor that receives wage rate wj (treated as the numeraire and normalized to
1). Accordingly, define real income by Wj ≡ Yj/Pj and note that trade balance requires that Yj = wjLj
such that d log(Yj) = 0 and d log(Wj) = −d log(Pj).
Given that the log change in a weighted average z =
∑n
i=1 αixi is given by d log(z) =
∑n
i
αix¯i
z¯i
d log(xi),
we can express the log change in the aggregate price as,
d log(Pj) =
1
1− σ
n∑
i=1
[
(wiτij)
1−σ∑n
k=1(wkτkj)
1−σ
d log
(
(wiτij)
1−σ
)]
=
1
1− σ
n∑
i=1
[
λijd log
(
(wiτij)
1−σ
)]
=
1
1− σ
n∑
i=1
[λijd log (λij/λjj)]
= −
1
1− σ
d log(λjj) +
1
1− σ
n∑
i=1
[λijd log(λij)]
where the second line follows from substituting the demand function into the expression, the third line
follows from noting that wj = 1 and τjj = 1 so that (wiτij)
1−σ = λij/λjj , and the last line follows from
the fact that the expenditure shares sum to one,
∑n
i=1 λij = 1. Since λijd log(λij) = λij · dλij/λij = dλij ,
the sum over the change in shares is zero. Therefore we can write the expression for the change in real
income with respect to a change in variable trade costs as,
d log(Wj) =
1
1− σ
d log(λjj).
Finally, we integrate over the infinitesimal logarithmic changes. Since percentage changes are transitive
and since the elasticity doesn’t change, we can consider large changes and write:
∆ log(W j) =
1
1− σ
∆ log(λjj) (B3)
This expression shows that the change in consumer welfare can be computed directly from the change in
the domestic expenditure share, given knowledge of σ. Equation (B3) is a statement about welfare at the
aggregate level, which we cannot directly test in the data, where we can only investigate patterns across
detailed product categories. However, this class of trade models makes specific quantitative predictions
about the strength of the relationship between prices and trade across product categories, which we derive
next.
Multiple sector economy. We turn to the case with many sectors and derive our IV specification. We
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have multiple sectors indexed by s. Assume that consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over sectors,
with expenditure shares ηs. The elasticity of substitution in each sector is σs. The consumer price index
is:
Pj = Π
S
s=1
(
pjs
)ηs
,
where pjs is the price index for sector s for domestic consumers in j.
Following the same steps as above, the overall welfare change is given by:
∆ log(Wj) =
∑
s
(
ηs
1− σs
∆ log(λsjj)
)
.
Similarly, we can derive the price change in each sector as a function of the change in domestic expenditure
shares in each sector:
∆ log
(
pjs
)
= −
1
1− σs
∆ log(λsjj).
Introducing common inflation shocks over time across sectors as well as sector-specific inflation shocks,
we get:
∆ log
(
pjs
)
= α−
1
1− σs
∆ log(λsjj) + ǫj . (B4)
Equation (B4) corresponds to our IV specification using the log change in the domestic expenditure
share as the endogenous variable, as we do in Online Appendix Table A9. Note that our baseline IV
specifications are of the form:
∆ log(psj) = α+ β∆λ
s
jChina + ǫj ,
where j indexes the home country (the U.S. in our case). This specification can be derived from equation
(B4) by making two approximations: (i) China is the only trade partner of the US, i.e. λsjj+λ
s
jChina = 1 ∀s;
(ii) the initial import share from China is small. Under these assumptions, we have
∆ log(P sj ) = α−
1
1− σs
∆ log(1− λsjChina) + ǫj ,
≈ α+
1
1− σs
∆λsjChina + ǫj . (B5)
Since our empirical specification uses spending weights, we should recover a spending-weighted average of
1
1−σs
if the model is correctly specified. As discussed in Section IV.A, the empirical estimates are about
one order of magnitude larger than predicted by this class of trade models.
B.C Connecting the IV Specification to Models with Endogenous Markups
In this appendix, we derive the equations presented in Section IV.D, which connect our IV specification
to models with endogenous markups and motivate several tests of the markup channel.
Setting. Consider N industries over which consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences. Each industry
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has competing producers from China and the United States. We perturb the equilibrium by a productivity
shock that reduces the marginal cost of production for the Chinese producer. We then examine the
response of prices, assuming that production costs in the U.S. do not change while markups evolve
endogenously.
We consider the economic environment in Amiti et al. (2018b) to characterize markups. We first
specialize their setting to contain only two producers in each industry, then extend the derivations to many
producers. Under the assumption of demand invertibility, the market outcome can be fully characterized
in terms of a vector of prices, with a unique corresponding vector of quantities.76
Accounting decomposition. Denoting log prices by log(pis), log marginal cost by log(mcis) and log
markups by log(µis), with i indexing firms and s industries, Amiti et al. (2018b) show that firm i’s
profit-maximizing price is the solution to a fixed-point equation:
log(pis) = log(mcis) + log(µi(pis, p−is, ζs)), (B6)
where p−is is the competitor’s price, and ζs an industry demand shock. This relationship indicates that
the competitor’s price serves as a sufficient statistic for the best-response of each firm.
Equation (B6) can be totally differentiated to study our proposed perturbation of the equilibrium:
d log(pis) = d log(mcis) +
∂ log(µi(.))
∂ log(pis)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡−Γi
d log(pis) +
∂ log(µi(.))
∂ log(p−is)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ−i
d log(p−is) +
∂ log(µi(.))
∂ log(ζs)
d log(ζs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡εs
,
which can be simplified to,
d log(pis) =
1
1 + Γis
d log(mcis) +
Γ−is
1 + Γis
d log(p−is) + εs. (B7)
Equation (B7) is the accounting decomposition from Amiti et al. (2018b). It shows how firm i’s price
change can be decomposed into its own cost shock (d log(mcis)), its competitor’s price change (d log(p−is))
and demand shifters (εs). The markup elasticities Γis and Γ−is govern the pass-through of changes in
marginal cost and changes in the competitor’s price into firm i’s price.
Amiti et al. (2018b) show that if the perceived demand elasticity is a function of the price of the firm
relative to the industry expenditure function, then the two markup elasticities are equal: Γis = Γ−is.
Using idiosyncratic variation in the cost of intermediate inputs as an instrument for prices, Amiti et al.
(2018b) document that this assumption is valid empirically. Intuitively, this assumption holds when the
markup function only depends on the relative price between competitor. In this case, the markup function
has the same elasticity with respect to the firm’s own price and its competitor’s price (in absolute value,
with opposite signs).77
76Amiti et al. (2018b) point out that this assumption rules out the case of perfect substitutes, but it covers many standard
demand systems, including CES, linear, Kimball, translog, discrete-choice logit and the non-homothetic demand system of
Arkolakis et al. (2018).
77Amiti et al. (2018b) show that this assumption holds for the nested-CES demand structure as weall as a first-order
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Perturbation and first-order approximation. Assuming Γis = Γ−is ≡ Γs, and denoting the equilibrium
market shares by SChinas and 1 − S
China
s , a first-order approximation to the equilibrium perturbation is
given by:
d log
(
pUSs
)
=
1
1 + Γs
d log
(
cUSs
)
+
Γs
1 + Γs
d log
(
pChinas
)
,
d log
(
pChinas
)
=
1
1 + Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
+
Γs
1 + Γs
d log
(
pUSs
)
,
d log
(
SChinas
)
= (1− σs)(1− S
China
s )
(
d log(pChinas )− d log(p
US
s )
)
,
d log(ps) = S
China
s d log(p
China
s ) + (1− S
China
s )d log(p
US
s ),
where the first and second lines follow from (B7) with εs = 0, the third is implied by CES demand, and
the fourth follows from Roy’s identity. This completes the proof of equations (9), (10) and (11) in the
main text.
Deriving the IV specification. Assume that there is no change in production cost in the U.S. while there
is one in China, i.e. dln(cUS) = 0 and dln(cChn) 6= 0. Therefore we have dln
(
pUSs
)
= Γs1+Γsdln
(
pChinas
)
.
Given this, the first two lines in the system of equations above imply:
d log
(
pChinas
)
=
1 + Γs
1 + 2Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
,
d log
(
pUSs
)
=
Γs
1 + 2Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
.
Plugging these expressions into the third and fourth lines of the system of equations above yields:
dSChinas = −
(σs − 1)S
China
s (1− S
China
s )
1 + 2Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
, (B8)
d log(ps) =
SChinas + Γs
1 + 2Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
. (B9)
Equation (B8) gives an expression for the change in the import penetration rate from China (in percentage
points), while equation (B9) gives the change in the industry price index (in log points). Combining
equations (B8) and (B9) give the relationship between the industry price index and the change in the
import penetration rate from China:
d log(ps) = −
1 + Γs/S
China
s
(σs − 1)(1− SChinas )
· dSChinas . (B10)
In the data, we work with a first-order approximation to (B10), i.e. with the observed change in import
penetration from China, (∆ChinaIP ) and with the observed industry inflation rate (πs), rather than
with the infinitesimal changes dSChina and dln(ps) that make (B10) hold exactly. This completes the
proof of equation (12) in the main text.
approximation for a broad class of models with symmetric preferences.
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Heterogeneity by market structure. We extend the model to a setting with multiple firms to derive
predictions of the markup channel that we can test empirically across product categories with different
levels of (domestic) market concentration. Suppose there are N producers in each sector, of which N − 1
are U.S. producers and one based in China. Producers can equivalently be viewed as differentiated product
varieties. For simplicity assume that the N − 1 U.S. producers are symmetric. Given symmetry, the price
change for any one of the N−1 symmetric U.S. producers can be expressed in terms of their own marginal
cost, the price change of the N − 2 other U.S. producers in the industry and the Chinese importer,
d log(pUSs ) =
1
1 + Γs
d log
(
cUSs
)
+
Γs
1 + Γs
[
(N − 2)d log
(
pUSs
)
+ d log
(
pChinas
)]
and the price change for the Chinese producer in industry s can be written as a function of its own
marginal cost and the prices of the N − 1 U.S. competitors,
d log(pChinas ) =
1
1 + Γs
d log
(
cChinas
)
+
Γs
1 + Γs
(N − 1)d log
(
pUSs
)
.
Suppose the Chinese marginal cost changes, but the U.S. producers’ marginal costs do not change. Thus,
setting d log(cUSs ) = 0 allows us to rewrite U.S. producer price changes in industry s as,
d log(pUSs ) =
Γs
1+Γs
1− Γs1+Γs (N − 2)
d log
(
pChinas
)
and substituting this into the expression for the change in the Chinese producer’s price yields,
d log(pChinas ) =
1
1+Γs
1− Γs1+Γs (N − 1)
Γs
1+Γs
1− Γs
1+Γs
(N−2)
d log
(
cChinas
)
.
Finally, when we substitute this expression back into the price change for U.S. producers, we obtain the
price change as a function of the Chinese marginal cost shock,
d log(pUSs ) =
Γs
1+Γs
1− Γs1+Γs (N − 2)
·
1
1+Γs
1− Γs1+Γs (N − 1)
Γs
1+Γs
1− Γs
1+Γs
(N−2)
d log
(
cChinas
)
.
For notational compactness, we will define the parameters (α, κ) in terms of the two price change expres-
sions as follows,
d log(pChinas ) = κ · d log
(
cChinas
)
,
d log(pUSs ) = ακ · d log
(
cChinas
)
.
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Accordingly, the change in expenditure share of Chinese produced goods is,
d log
(
SChinas
)
= (1− σ)
(
N∑
k=1
(1− SChinas )
N − 1
)[
d log(pChinas )−
N∑
k=1
d log(pUSs )
]
dSChinas = (1− σ)(1− S
China
s )S
China
s [1− (N − 1)α]κ · d log
(
cChinas
)
.
Furthermore, the total price change in industry s is,
d log(ps) =
N∑
k=1
(1− SChinas )
N − 1
d log(pUSs ) + S
China
s d log(p
China
s )
= d log(pUSs ) + S
China
s
(
d log(pChinas )− d log(p
US
s )
)
=
[
α+ SChinas (1− α)
]
κ · d log
(
cChinas
)
Thus we can derive the relationship between the change in import penetration from China and the industry
price index as,
d log(ps)
dSChinas
= −
[
α+ SChinas (1− α)
]
κ · d log
(
cChinas
)
(σs − 1)(1− SChinas )S
China
s [1− (N − 1)α]κ · d log (c
China
s )
= −
1 + α1−α
1
SChinas
(σs − 1)(1− SChinas )
.
Given the definition of α, we can write the expression using the fact that:
α
1− α
=
Γs
1− Γs(N − 2)
.
Thus, the full expression for the N -firm model equivalent of our IV specification is,
d log(ps) = −
1 + Γs/S
China
s
1−Γs(N−2)
(σs − 1)(1− SChinas )
· dSChinas . (B11)
Notice that this expression reduces to the case in equation (B10) when N = 2.
To compute how Γs may vary across industries, we use the expression derived by Amiti et al. (2018b)
under Betrand competition. With a Cobb-Douglas aggregator across sectors, in our setting with equally-
sized firms we have:
Γs =
(σs − 1) ·Hs
1 + (σs − 1)(1−Hs)
, (B12)
where σs is the elasticity of substitution within the industry and Hs = hs/10, 000, with hs denoting the
Herfindahl index. Intuitively, Hs is the market share of the typical firm in industry s, which is equal to
1/Ns with equally-sized firms. A higher typical market share reflects larger markup power, therefore Γs is
larger when the market is more concentrated, i.e. when Hs is higher. As the economy approaches perfect
competition (Ns →∞), Hs → 0 and Γs → 0.
These expressions show that the markup channel predicts a larger price response when the domes-
tic market is more concentrated and when the initial import penetration rate from China is small. We
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calibrate the predicted heterogeneity across product categories from equations (B11) and (B12). We use
data on domestic Herfindahl indices from the U.S. Census (for Hs) and on the initial import penetration
rate from China (for SChinas ). We find that the relationships are non-linear: the price response is par-
ticularly strong when the initial import penetration rate is small and when the domestic market is more
concentrated. These results motivate the tests implemented in Section IV.D.
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C Online Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A1: Validation of Import Penetration Measure against BEA Measure for 2007
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Coeff. 0.9252*** (s.e. 0.049)
Notes: This figure reports a validation test to assess the accuracy of the import penetration measure used in the analysis.
The x-axis corresponds to the measure of import penetration from China described in Section II.A, except that we aggregate
the data to the level of the 6-digit IO industries defined in the BEA’s 2007 input-output table. As described in Section
II.A, the trade data is measured at the level of HS codes, while the domestic production data comes from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing database; the data is then linked and aggregated to the level of IO industries. The y-axis gives the measure
of import penetration provided by the BEA’s input-output table for 2007, at the level of approximately 400 industries.
The BEA gives the full import penetration rates across industries, which we convert to import penetration rates for China
by using the share of China in trade for each industry. We conduct this comparison in 2007 because in earlier years the
input-output table is significantly more aggregated. The figure reports a binned scatter plot, where each dot represents 1%
of the underlying data. The close relationship between the two measures, with a slope close to one, alleviates potential
measurement concerns.
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Figure A2: Chinese Import Penetration over Time and Across Industries
Panel A: For Manufacturing
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Panel B: For Selected Manufacturing Industries
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Notes: This figure reports trends in import penetration rate over time, for manufacturing (Panel A) and for selected
manufacturing industries (Panel B). The data source in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database. The import
penetration rate from country c in industry j is defined as IP cj = Imports
c
j/(DomesticProductionj+ Importsj−Exportsj).
Panel B illustrates the type of variation across industries that can be leveraged to study the impact of trade on consumer
prices. In particular, Panel B illustrates that it is possible to use only “within-industry” variation over time (i.e., with
industry fixed effects in a specification using the change in the import penetration rate as the independent variables).
Indeed, industries are exposed to China very differently over time: there is a steady increase for footwear, no exposure for
breakfast cereals, and a fast increase for computers only after 2000.
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Figure A3: Testing for Pre-trends in the Extended CPI Sample
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Note: Sample is restricted to goods. Year-by-year regressions include apparel, Bils goods,and major category FEs.
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Note: Sample is restricted to goods. Year-by-year regressions include apparel, Bils goods,and major category FEs.
(a) China IP in other developed economies (b) NTR gap
Notes: The specification is the same as described in Section III.B, but using the extended CPI sample described in Online
Appendix A.C. F-tests indicates that we cannot reject that the estimated coefficients are jointly insignificant.
Figure A4: Testing for Pre-trends Without Controls
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Notes: The specification is the same as described in Section III.B, but without fixed effects for apparel or durables. The
figure exhibits pre-trends, in contrast with Figure 1 in the main text. These results indicate that including fixed effects for
apparel and durables is important to ensure that a causal interpretation of the estimates is plausible.
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Figure A5: Long-Run Event Studies in NBER-CES Manufacturing Database
Panel A: Excluding NAICS 334, Computers and Electronics
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(a) NTR gap, by quartiles (b) China IP in other developed economies, by quartiles
Panel B: Including NAICS 334, Computers and Electronics
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(a) NTR gap, by quartiles (b) China IP in other developed economies, by quartiles
Notes: This figure reports a long-run analysis of price trends by quartiles of the instruments for trade with China. A
higher quartile indicates higher exposure. The data source for prices is the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database,
which provides a price index for the value of shipments for each 6-digit Naics industry in each year from 1975 to 2011. All
industries within manufacturing are covered, including those providing intermediate inputs. We match this data set to the
instruments for trade with China: the NTR gap is available across 6-digit Naics codes; using the SIC-NAICS described in
Online Appendix A.C, we link the data set to the 2000-2007 change in the import penetration rate from China in other
developed economies. In all panels, the price index for the value of shipments is normalized to one in 2000 and the price
trends are reported by quartiles of exposure to the instruments. Panel A excludes industries belonging to the 3-digit Naics
category “Computers and Electronics” (Naics 334). In this panel, industries across quartiles of exposure are on similar price
trends up to the treatment period (starting in 2000) and start diverging afterwards. With both instruments, more exposed
industries have a lower inflation rate after 2000. These results support the causal interpretation of the estimates presented
in Section III. Panel B includes industries within “Computers and Electronics”: when doing so, large pre-trends appear
because these industries are more exposed to the instruments and have been on lower inflation trends for decades. These
results indicate the importance of excluding these categories or including suitable controls, as we do in Section III. The
results are similar with a median split or by deciles of exposure of the instruments, instead of quartiles (not reported).
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Figure A6: First-Stage Relationships for Supplier and Buyer Effects
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Notes: This figure reports the first-stage relationships for indirect effects via suppliers (sub-figure (a)) and buyers (sub-figure
(b)) using the NTR gap instrument. The specifications correspond to Column (1) of Online Appendix Table A15. The level
of observation is a 6-digit IO industry-by-period. Each dot represents 1% of the data, using consumption weights, and the
OLS best-fit line is shown in red. The steps to build the measures of indirect exposure to trade with China are described in
Online Appendix A.D.
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Figure A7: The Roles of Wages and Total Factor Productivity
Panel A: Event Studies for Wages
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Panel B: Event Studies for Total Factor Productivity
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Notes: Panel A of this figure reports the path of average wages across industries that are more or less exposed to our
instruments for trade with China, using a median split. Panel B reports a similar event study for Total Factor Productivity.
Wages and TFP are measured in the NBER CES Manufacturing database. The change in import penetration rate from
China in other developed economies is measured over the period 2000-2007. Wages and TFP are normalized to one in 1990.
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Figure A8: Summary Statistics for Estimated Markups and Profitability Measures
Panel A: Estimated Markups
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Panel B: Profitability Measures
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Notes: This figure reports trends in estimated markups. We follow the methodology of De Loecker et al. (2017) (described
in Appendix A.F) and obtain similar results. Statistics are computed using sales as weights.
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Figure A9: First-Stage in Compsutat Sample
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Notes: This figure shows the binned scatter plots for the relationships between the NTR gap instrument and the change in
import penetration from China in the Compustat Sample. Each dot represents 1% of the data, using consumption weights,
and the OLS best-fit lines are reported in red. The specification and the Compustat sample are described in Section IV.D.
The level of observation is a NAICS industry-by-period.
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Figure A10: The Response of Markups, Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects
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Notes: This figure shows the binned scatter plots for the relationships between the NTR gap instrument and the estimated
markups in the Compustat Sample with firm fixed effects. Each dot represents 1% of the data, using consumption weights,
and the OLS best-fit lines are reported in red. The level of observation is a Compustat firm-by-period. The point estimate
and standard error are reported in Online Appendix Table A17.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics for Input-Output Sample
Panel A: First-Order Exposure
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 N
∆China IP in U.S., direct (pp, annualized) 0.5407 1.248 0 0.0064 1.99 170
∆China IP in U.S., first-order downstream/buyer (pp, annualized) 0.0251 0.0529 0 0.0053283 0.0609737 170
∆China IP in U.S., first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.11409 0.1624 0.0097 0.0634 0.291862 170
∆China IP in Europe, direct (pp, annualized) 0.36405 0.8880 0 0.01232 1.32402 170
∆China IP in Europe, first-order downstream/buyer (pp, annualized) 0.02161 0.04371 0 0.00708 0.05378 170
∆China IP in Europe, first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.11008 0.16980 0.00770 0.05267 0.29486 170
NTR Gap (pp) 0.17894 0.1905 0 0.12788 0.419 170
NTR Gap, first-order downstream/ buyer (pp, annualized) 0.0253 0.02768 0.000083 0.01851 0.05575 170
NTR Gap, first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.075163 0.05664 0.0154 0.06135 0.15507 170
Share of own prod. in total intermediates 0.0666 0.090 0.00025 0.02526 0.20141 369
Panel B: Higher-Order Exposure
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 N
∆China IP in U.S., first-order downstream/buyer (pp, annualized) 0.02494 0.04498 0 0.00874 0.063045 170
∆China IP in U.S., first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.08752 0.09966 0.0161 0.05918 0.19671 170
∆China IP in Europe, first-order downstream/buyer (pp, annualized) 0.02147 0.0381 0.00008 0.00854 0.04880 170
∆China IP in Europe, first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.0959 0.1157 0.01378 0.05565 0.2294 170
NTR Gap, first-order downstream/ buyer (pp, annualized) 0.0250 0.0251 0.000362 0.0183 0.05435 170
NTR Gap, first-order upstream/supplier (pp, annualized) 0.0595 0.03634 0.0183 0.0517 0.11364 170
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the input-output sample, which are described in Section II.A. Panel
A reports first-order exposure measures, while panel B reports higher-order exposure measures, which are computed as
explained in Online Appendix A.D. The sample extends between 1991 and 2007 and is divided into two periods, 1991-1999
and 2000-2007. The level of observation is a 6-digit IO code by period. All variables are defined for final consumption IO
industries only, except “share of own production in total intermediates”, which is defined for all IO codes.
Table A2: Summary Statistics for PPI Sample
Observations
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 N Aggregation Level
Inflation, all (%) 0.04 10.19 -7.19 0.84 7.28
1,044 NAICS6-by-period
∆China IP in U.S., direct 0.39 0.69 0.00 0.11 1.04
NTR Gap 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.29 0.45 522 NAICS6
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the PPI sample, which is described in Section II.A and Online Appendix
A.E. The sample extends between 1991 and 2007 and is divided into two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007.
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Table A3: Testing for Pre-trends in the Extended CPI Sample (1977-1986)
Annual U.S. CPI Inflation
(1) (2)
NTR Gap 1.798
(2.285)
∆ China IP Other −0.2863
(0.5016)
N 156 156
Notes: This table reports the reduced-form specifications in the extended CPI sample. The level of observation is an ELI and
heteroeksedasticty-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The corresponding binned scatter plots are shown in
Panel B of Figure 1 in the main text. The extended CPI sample is described in Online Appendix A.B.
Table A4: Alternative IV Specifications with the Change in Import Penetration in Other Developed
Economies
U.S. CPI Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP −1.43∗∗∗ −1.43∗∗ −1.58∗∗∗ −1.78∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.61) (0.48) (0.65)
First-stage F 357.70 14.84 21.50 48.07
Major Category F.E. X
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X
Excluding Deflationary ELIs X
6-digit IO industry F.E. X
Instrument: ∆ China IP Other X X X X
N 444 444 444 170
Notes: The specifications reported in this table are described in Section III.C. They are identical to Panel A of Figure 3
in the main text, except that we use the change in import penetration from China in other developed economies as the
instrument, instead of the NTR gap. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell and the sample includes all ELIs from
1991 to 2007, with variables averaged over two periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Column (4) of Panel A is an exception: the
data is aggregated from ELIs to 6-digit industries defined in the BEA’s IO table. Consumption weights are used. Standard
errors are clustered by ELIs or 6-digit IO industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A5: IV Results with Purchaser vs. Producer Pricers
U.S. CPI Inflation
IV IV
(1) (2)
∆ China IP, Producer Prices −2.44∗∗∗
(0.431)
∆ China IP, Purchaser Prices −4.37∗∗∗
(0.852)
First-stage F 111.71 31.56
Hansen J 0.881 0.459
Instruments: NTR Gap & ∆ China IP Other X X
N 170 170
Notes: The specifications reported in this table are described in Section III.C, except that the data is aggregated from ELIs
to 6-digit industries defined in the BEA’s IO table. Column (1) uses the baseline definition for the change in import pene-
tration rate from China (defined in Section II.A). Column (2) adjusts this definition by accounting for distribution margins.
Distribution margins correspond to the costs associated with transportation and retail, which inflate the denominator in
the definition of China IP in equation (1) in the main text. For each 6-digit IO industry, we estimate distribution margins
as the ratio of purchaser prices to producer prices observed in the BEA’s 2007 IO table. When accounting for distribution
margins, the change in the import penetration rate from China decreases, and accordingly the IV coefficient is larger in
Column (2) than in Column (1). These IV specifications use both instruments jointly (the NTR gap and the change in
import penetration from China in other developed economies). The Hansen J statistics indicate that we cannot reject the
over-identification restrictions. The results are similar when using the 1992 IO table, where the available industries are more
aggregated (not reported). The level of observation is a 6-digit IO industry-by-period cell. Standard errors are clustered by
6-digit IO industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A6: A Test of the Uncertainty Channel — First-stage Heterogeneity by Capital Intensity
∆China IP
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
∆ NTR Gap 3.861∗∗∗
(1.361)
∆ NTR Gap × Capital Intensity 4.786∗∗
(2.308)
∆ China IP Other 1.353∗∗∗
(0.331)
∆ China IP Other × Capital Intensity −0.249
(0.357)
N 306 306
Notes: This table reports the results from first-stage regressions with interaction terms for capital intensity. The interaction
term is the only difference with the specifications described in Section III.C. Capital intensity is measured in the NBER-CES
database. The sample is restricted to ELIs that can be matched to this data set; the crosswalk is described in Online
Appendix A.C. The NTR gap instrument corresponds to a fall in uncertainty over import tariffs applied by the U.S. to
China. In a situation of uncertainty, standard models generate a region of inaction in investment space due to nonconvex
adjustment costs (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). If the relevance of the NTR gap instrument is driven by the uncertainty
channel, we expect the first stage to be stronger in product categories that are more capital intensive. Column (1) confirm
that this is the case in the data. Column (2) reports a placebo test and shows that the first stage features no heterogeneity
by capital intensity when the instrument is the change in import penetration from China in the set of developed economies
other than the United States. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. Standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A7: IV Results with Controls for Exports
U.S. CPI Inflation
IV IV
(1) (2)
∆ China IP −1.805∗∗∗ −1.447∗∗∗
(0.474) (0.3358)
First-stage F 25.628 205.028
Controls:
Change in exports to China, 1991-1999 X X
Exports to China in 1992 X X
Instruments:
NTR Gap X
∆ China IP Other X
N 306 306
Notes: This table reports the IV estimates with specifications similar to Section III.C but including controls for exports
from the U.S. to China across product categories. Exports to China are measured in trade data recorded under HS codes
(which we link to NAICS industries and to ELIs using the crosswalks from Online Appendix A.C). The controls include the
log change in exports to China from 1991 to 1999, as well as the level of exports to China in 1992. The results are similar
when repeating the anlaysis in subsamples (above vs. below median of exports), when including controls in level and changes
for exports to China for other years, and when including all exports instead of exports to China specifically (not reported).
These results indicate that the baseline IV estimates are not confounded by differences in export dynamics across product
categories. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell. Standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A8: Testing for Heterogeneity by Trade Elasticities
U.S. CPI Inflation
IV IV
(1) (2)
∆ China IP −2.363∗∗∗ −1.911∗∗
(0.399) (0.816)
Subsample: Trade Elasticity ≥ p50 Trade Elasticity < p50
Instrument: NTR Gap X X
N 140 140
Notes: This table reports the IV estimates from the baseline specification from Section III.C in two subsamples, above and
below the median trade elasticity as estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). The trade elasticities were estimated by
Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the period 1990 - 2001 across HS codes, which we match and aggrgeate to the level of ELIs.
The IV estimates are a bit larger in the subsample with a higher trade elastictity. The estimates in both subsamples are
similar to the baseline IV results from Table 2. In theory, the relationship between changes in import penetration from China
and U.S. consumer prices could have widely varied depending on the trade elasticity. This table indicates that in practice
the magnitudes are relatively stable, implying that our baseline IV estimate provides a meaningful summary measure. In
other (unreported) IV specifications, we find that when interacting the estimated trade elasticity with the change in import
penetration from China, the interaction term is not statistically significant. The level of observation is an ELI-by-period cell.
Standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
Table A9: IV Estimates with the Log Domestic Expenditure Share
U.S. CPI Inflation
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Log Domestic Expenditure Share 2.57∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗
(0.9601) (1.411) (0.961)
Cragg-Donald F 13.211 17.197 11.599
Hansen J 0.568
Instruments:
NTR Gap X X
∆ China IP Other X X
N 444 444 444
Notes: This table reports the IV estimates with the log change in the domestic expenditure share as the endogenous variable
(the choice of the endogenous variable is the only difference with equation (3) in the main text). As described in Section
II.A, the trade data is measured at the level of HS codes, while the domestic production data comes from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing database. Column (1) uses the NTR gap instrument, Column (2) uses the change in the import penetration
rate from China in other developed economies, and Column (3) uses both instruments jointly. The Hansen J statistic in
Column (3) indicates that we cannot reject the overidentification restriction. Consumption weights are used. Standard errors
are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A10: The Roles of Continued and Domestic Goods, using the Change in Import Pentration in
Other Developed Economics as the Instrument
Panel A: IV Estimates for Continued Goods in Main Sample (CPI)
U.S. CPI Inflation, Continued Products (pp) Contribution to U.S. CPI Inflation (pp) [%]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.58∗ −2.15∗∗∗ −0.65 [45%] −1.25∗∗∗[98.4%]
(0.91) (0.71) (0.49) (0.33)
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X X
N 444 222 444 222
Panel B: IV Estimates for Domestic Goods in Main Sample (CPI)
U.S. CPI Inflation, Domestic Products (pp) Contribution to U.S. CPI Inflation (pp) [%]
(1) (2) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.26∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗[64%] −1.08∗∗∗[85%]
(0.48) (0.31) (0.38) (0.25)
ELI F.E. X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X X
N 444 222 444 222
Panel C: IV Estimates for Continued and Domestic Goods in PPI Sample
U.S. PPI Inflation (pp) U.S. PPI Infl., Continued Products (pp)
(1) (2) (4) (5)
∆ China IP (pp) −1.50∗∗ −1.92∗ −0.83∗ −0.98∗
(0.71) (1.15) (0.46) (0.48)
First-stage F 748.98 604.61 748.98 604.61
NAICS F.E. X X
Period-specific Computers F.E. X X
2000-2007 only X X
Computers F.E. X X
N 550 275 550 275
Notes: The specifications are the same as for Table 5 in the main text, except that the instrument is the change in import
penetration in other developed economie. Standard errors are clustered by industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A11: IV Estimates for Continued Goods in Balanced Sample
2000-2003 CPI Infl. for Contined Goods 2000-2005 CPI Infl. for Contined Goods
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP −1.98∗∗∗ −2.63∗∗∗ −2.00∗∗∗ −2.66∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.98) (0.72) (1.01)
First-stage F 215.40 214.06
2000-2007 only X X X X
Goods, Durables & Apparel F.E. X X X X
N 222 222 222 222
Notes: This table reports OLS and IV estimates using inflation for continued products as the outcome variable. We consider
a balanced sample of products that are continuously available from 2000 to 2003 (Columns (1) and (2)) or from 2000 to 2005
(Columns (3) and (4)). The NTR gap is used as an instrument. The price effects are not sensitive to the period we choose
for the balanced sample. The magnitudes are similar to the estimates in Panel A of Table 5, which indicates that changes
in composition do not drive our results for continued products. This result can help discipline quantitative trade models,
because it shows that “reallocation effects” (entry or exit of more/less productive products of firms in response to trade
shocks) are not the leading force in the data. Instead, there is a large response of pre-existing varieties (continued products
inflation). The level of observation is an ELI-by-period and the standard errors are clustered by ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
Table A12: The Effect of Trade with China on Product Turnover
Product Turnover (pp)
(1) (2)
∆ China IP (pp) 1.72 1.45∗∗∗
(1.533) (0.403)
Instrument:
NTR gap X
∆ China IP Other X
N 444 444
Notes: This table investigates the impact of trade with China on product turnover. Product turnover is measured as the
rate of “product substitutions” in the BLS data. Product substitutions occur when price collectors can no longer find the
product they were pricing in a given store (for instance, this could happen because this product was displaced by foreign
competition). The table shows that product turnover increases substantially in response to trade with China, consistent with
the notion that Chinese products displace domestic varieties. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the
5% level.
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Table A13: Summary Statistics on Country of Origin Flags
Number of ELIs Share of Expenditures
with flags with flags
All All Tradables
Year (1) (2) (3)
2000 51 0.1830 0.3703
2001 59 0.1760 0.3555
2002 59 0.1828 0.3630
2003 63 0.1929 0.3959
2004 62 0.1860 0.3865
2005 65 0.2016 0.4300
2006 60 0.1832 0.3877
2007 61 0.1743 0.3668
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on the number of ELIs with a country of origin flag. This ELIs explicitly
gather country of origin information (e.g., “Was the product made in the United States; Yes or No?” or “Write in the country
in which the product was made.”). Country of origin flags are obtained from specification checklists, as explained in Online
Appendix A.A.
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Table A14: The Role of Higher-Order Input-Output Linkages
Panel A: Direct and Indirect Higher-Order Exposure to Trade with China
∆ China IP Supp, Higher-order IO ∆ China IP Buyer, Higher-order IO
(1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (6)
∆ China IP (pp) 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.03607∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.01127 −0.0013
(0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0098) (0.00149)
6-digit IO F.E. X X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
Excl. diagonal of IO Table X X
N 170 170 170 170 170 170
Panel B: IV Results Controlling for Indirect Higher-Order Exposure to Trade with China
U.S. CPI Inflation
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP −3.143∗∗ −2.831∗∗ −3.196∗∗
(1.451) (1.383) (1.515)
First-stage F 7.110 8.497 6.321
Controls:
∆ China IP Supplier. Full IO X X
∆ China IP Buyer. Full IO X X
ELI F.E. X X X
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X
N 170 170 170
Notes: The sample and specification are the same as for Table 6 in the main text, except that the IO-adjusted measures
including higher-order IO linkages instead of first-order linkages only. The level of observation is a 6-digit IO industry-
by-period cell. The instrument is the NTR gap. Standard errors are clustered by IO industries. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A15: IV Estimates for Input-Output Effects
U.S. CPI Inflation
First-order I-O Linkages Higher-order I-O Linkages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ China IP −1.454∗∗∗ −1.458∗∗∗ −1.441∗∗∗ −1.478∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.408) (0.389) (0.399)
∆ China IP Supplier −4.602 −5.552 −8.688 −9.208∗
(3.821) (3.633) (5.348) (5.310)
∆ China IP Buyer −4.868 −8.102 −0.383 −1.489
(9.348) (10.614) (9.942) (11.373)
First-stage F 45.773 40.567 45.773 40.567
Period-specific Goods F.E. X X X X
Tech-by-period F.E. X X X X
IO2 F.E. X X
N 170 170 170 170
Notes: This table reports IV estimates with three endogenous variable: direct trade exposure, indirect exposure via inter-
mediate inputs (“supplier effect”) and indirect exposure via domestic buyer industries (“buyer effect”). Columns (1) and
(2) use first-order IO linkages only, while columns (3) and (4) use higher-order IO linkages. The supplier and buyer effects
across specifications are computed as explained in Online Appendix A.D. The first-stage relationships for Column (1) are
depicted in Online Appendix Figure A6. We include alternative sets of fixed effects across specifications. With 6-digit IO
fixed effects, the IV becomes weak (not reported). ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
Table A16: Summary Statistics on Related-Party Trade
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 Sample
Share of related trade, All Countries, 2005, % 48.08 25.37 11.85 47.99 82.61
NAICS
Share of related trade, China, 2005, % 26.07 23.49 2.148 17.70 65.55
Share of related trade, All Countries, 2015, % 50.61 24.86 17.43 50.24 86.20
Share of related trade, China, 2015, % 27.61 19.84 4.90 25.69 56.49
Share of related trade, China, 2005, % 11.45 17.24 1.227 4.098 38.38 ELI matched sample
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on the share of U.S. imports occuring between related parties in trade, with all
trading partners and with China specifically. The data source is the related-party trade database of the U.S. Census. The
original data is provided across NAICS codes, but the patterns are similar once we match the data to our ELI sample (as
shown in the fifth row). The average share of related-party trade is smaller in our ELI sample (11% in 2005) than in the full
NAICS sample (26% in 2005) because our sample covers final goods and there tends to be more trade between related parties
for intermediate products. Although the average share of related-trade is is small, there is susbtantial variation across ELIs.
For example, the share of related-party trade from China is particularly high for computer storage devices (72%) and other
computer equipment (65%), while is it low for “men’s suits and coats” (1.9%) and “women’s suits and coats” (2.1%).
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Table A17: The Response of Markups, Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects
U.S. CPI Inflation
OLS
(1)
NTR Gap −9.01∗∗∗
(2.63)
Firm F.E. Yes
N NAICS 796
Notes: This table reports the results from the specificatoin described in Section IV.D, except that the level of observation is
a Compustat firm (rather than a NAICS code) and firm fixed effects are used. The recent literature documents that trends of
rising markups and falling labor share are driven by reallocation of spending, i.e. market shares for firms with initially high
markups tend to increase over time (e.g., Baqaee and Farhi (2017), De Loecker et al. (2017), Autor et al. (2017)). In contrast,
trade-induced competition predicts that markups should fall within firms (equation (9)). To test this prediction, we amend
our research design. We repeat our IV specification (3) but keep the data at the firm level; we run firm-level regressions, with
the firm-level estimated markup as the outcome and firm fixed effects as controls. As previously, the independent variable
is the industry-level change in import penetration from China. Due to firm fixed effects, this specification isolates changes
in markups within firms. In contrast, in the specifications from Table 8, the observed change in markup is at the industry
level, after aggregation with sales weights, and it could result from either within-firm markup changes or reallocation effects
between firms (i.e., after the China shocks consumers could reallocate spending toward firms with lower markups). The
point estimate of 9.01 (s.e. 2.63) is statistcally indistinguishable from our baseline reduced-form estimate of 9.52 (s.e. 4.34),
reported in Panel A of Table 8 (Column (2)). This result indicates that controlling for firm fixed effects leaves the baseline
estimate unchanged, implying that changes in markup are not driven by reallocation of sales across firms; rather, markups
fall within firms. This finding is consistent with the predictions of the markup channel. Online Appendix Figure A10 depicts
the relationship graphically. Standard errors are clustered at the level of NAICS code, because the NTR gap instrument is
observed at this level of aggregation.∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level.
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Table A18: Employment Effects of Trade
Panel A: With the NTR Gap
∆ Non-Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Total Emp. (pp)
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP (pp) -2.591 -1.893 -1.834
(0.789) (0.648) (0.537)
First-stage F 25.464 25.464 25.464
ELI F.E. X X X
Durables & Apparel Time-Varying F.E. X X X
N 306 306 306
Panel B: With the Change in Import Penetration from China in Other Developed Economies
∆ Non-Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Total Emp. (pp)
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP (pp) -2.319 -2.137 -1.774
(1.174) (1.002) (0.930)
First-stage F 13.860 13.860 13.860
ELI F.E. X X X
Period-specific F.E. for Durables/Apparel X X X
N 306 306 306
Panel C: With Both Instruments
∆ Non-Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Prod Emp. (pp) ∆ Total Emp. (pp)
(1) (2) (3)
∆ China IP (pp) -2.506 -1.970 -1.815
(0.635) (0.574) (0.498)
First-stage F 16.234 16.234 16.234
ELI F.E. X X X
Period-specific F.E. for Durables/Apparel X X X
N 306 306 306
Notes: This table reports the results from our baseline IV specification (3), except that the outcome is the change in industry
employment (expressed in %). Panel A uses the NTR gap instrument, Panel B uses changes in import penetration in other
developed economies, and Panel C uses both instruments jointly. The employment outcomes are measured in the NBER
CES database, which distinguishes between “production” and “non-production” workers. We consider in turn employment
for production workers, non-production workers, and total employment as outcomes. The results indicate that employment
falls by 1.77% to 2.59%, depending on the specification, for each one percentage point increase in the import penetration rate
from China. We obtain similar results when we use total employment from the County Business Patterns Database instead
(not reported). Standard errors are clustered at the level of ELIs. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at
the 5% level.
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Table A19: Estimates of the Increase in Consumer Surplus from Increased Trade with China from 2000-
2007, in 2007 U.S. Dollars
(1) (2) (3)
Annual Increase in Consumer Surplus, $/Household 1,711 1,105 1,466
Calibration Parameters:
- Observed Cumulative Change in China IP, 2000-2007, within Goods (=6.15pp) X X X
- Average Household Spending on Goods in 2007, CEX (=$12,479) X X X
IV Estimates:
- NTR gap: βprice = −2.23 X
- ∆China IP Other: βprice = −1.44 X
- Both: βprice = −1.91 X
Notes: This table estimates the gains to U.S. consumers from the fall in prices induced by the increase in trade with
China from 2000 to 2007. The results are expressed in 2007 dollars of consumer surplus per U.S. household. Assuming
that there are no GE effects affecting prices in all product categories, our cross-industry IV estimates accurately reflect the
price changes induced by increasing trade with China at the level of the whole economy. If prices do not revert back in
the future, the estimated annual gains reported in the table should persist going forward. Under these assumptions, the
estimate in Column (1) should be interpreted as follows: from 2007 onward, the annual purchasing power of the average
U.S. consumer is $1,711 higher thanks to the increase in trade with China between 2000 and 2007 (which is about 2%
of total consumption expenditures). The increase in consumer surplus is computed based on three components: (a) the
increase in import penetration from China between 2000 and 2007 in the set of all tradable product categories (denoted
∆2000−2007ChinaIP ); (b) the IV estimates for the price response (β); and (c) average household spending on tradable
product categories in 2007, which we measure in the 2007 Consumer Expenditure Survey (denoted C2007). A product of
these three ingredients gives a first-order approximation to the annual consumer surplus created by falling prices from increase
trade with China: CS = −β
100
· ∆2000−2007ChinaIP · C2007. The three columns of the table consider different estimates for
the price response, which we apply to the observed cumulative change in import penetration from China between 2000 and
2007 (equal to 6.15 percentage points within the set of tradable product categories). In Column (1), using the IV estimate
from the NTR gap instrument, we obtain an increase in consumer surplus per household of $1,711 (= −2.23
100
· 6.15 · 12479).
Columns (2) and (3) report the results using alternative instruments for the price effects. The increase in consumer surprlus
is $1,105 per U.S. household using the change in trade with China in other developed economies (Column (2)), and $1,466
using both instruments jointly (Column (3)). These estimates are much larger than predicted by the class of trade models
nested by Arkolakis et al. (2012). Using a standard trade elasticty of θ = −4, the predicted price effect in these models is
β = 1
θ
= −0.25, implying an increase in consumer surplus of $192 per U.S. household (= −0.25
100
· 6.15 · 12479). In robustness
checks, we find that these results are similar (i) when we use the BEA’s measure of average personal consumption expenditures
on tradable goods in 2007 (equal to $11, 153) instead of the estimates from the CEX, as well as (ii) when we use an adjusted
measure for the change in trade with China as in Acemoglu et al. (2016) (they attempt to isolate the share of the observed
increase in trade with China that was caused by increased productivity in China, rather than by other factors such as a fall
in productivity in the U.S.). The calculations underlying this table rest on two simplifying assumption that may understate
the magnitude of the gains to U.S. consumers: (1) the first-order approximation does not allow U.S. consumers to reallocate
their expenditures toward product categories that become relatively cheaper – including these second-order gains would
further increase consumer surplus; (2) we assumed away GE effects affecting all product categories, but if increasing import
penetration induces an overall fall in domestic prices to restore trade balance, then the increase in purchasing power for U.S.
consumers would increase further.
A44
Table A20: Distributional Effects via the Expenditure Channel, Interacted Specifications
U.S. CPI Inflation (pp)
(1) (2)
∆ China IP (pp) −3.59∗∗∗ −3.01∗∗∗
(1.22) (0.87)
∆ China IP×Interaction 3.40∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗
(1.72) (1.02)
Interacted variable (standardized by S.D.) Expenditure Elast. Share Inc. >60k
ELI F.E. & interacted-variable-by-period F.E. X
N 332 332
Notes: This table reports the results from our baseline IV specification (3), including linear interaction terms characterizing
the consumers across product categories. Column (1) use the expenditure elasticity, standardized by its standard deviation,
as the interaction term. The results indicate that as the income elasticity increases by one standard deviation, the price fall
is mitigated by 3.40 percentage points. Column (2) documents similar results with another interaction term, the share of
sales to consumers with annual earnings above $60,000. The price effect is mitigated by 2.28 percentage points as the share
of sales to this group of consumers increases by one standard deviation. These patterns indicate that, for a given trade shock,
the price response is stronger in product categories that sell to lower-income consumers.
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